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Abstract
In this thesis, we consider the problem of solving two player infinite games,
such as parity games, mean-payoff games, and discounted games, the problem of
solving Markov decision processes. We study a specific type of algorithm for solving
these problems that we call strategy iteration algorithms. Strategy improvement
algorithms are an example of a type of algorithm that falls under this classification.
We also study Lemke’s algorithm and the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm, which
are classical pivoting algorithms for solving the linear complementarity problem.
The reduction of Jurdzin´ski and Savani from discounted games to LCPs allows these
algorithms to be applied to infinite games [JS08]. We show that, when they are
applied to games, these algorithms can be viewed as strategy iteration algorithms.
We also resolve the question of their running time on these games by providing a
family of examples upon which these algorithm take exponential time.
Greedy strategy improvement is a natural variation of strategy improvement,
and Friedmann has recently shown an exponential lower bound for this algorithm
when it is applied to infinite games [Fri09]. However, these lower bounds do not
apply for Markov decision processes. We extend Friedmann’s work in order to prove
an exponential lower bound for greedy strategy improvement in the MDP setting.
We also study variations on strategy improvement for infinite games. We
show that there are structures in these games that current strategy improvement
algorithms do not take advantage of. We also show that lower bounds given by
Friedmann [Fri09], and those that are based on his work [FHZ10], work because they
exploit this ignorance. We use our insight to design strategy improvement algorithms
that avoid poor performance caused by the structures that these examples use.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, we study the problem of solving Markov decision processes and two
player infinite games played on finite graphs. In particular, we study parity, mean-
payoff, and discounted games. We are interested in strategy iteration algorithms,
which are a specific type of algorithm that can be used to solve these problems. In
this chapter, we give an overview of the problems that we are considering, and the
results that will be obtained in this thesis. A formal description of these problems
will be given in Chapter 2, and a formal description of the algorithms that we study
will be given in Chapter 3.
1.1 Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes were originally formulated in order to solve inventory
management problems. In keeping with this tradition, we will illustrate this model
with a simple inventory management problem. The following example is largely
taken from the exposition of Puterman [Put05].
A manager owns a store that sells exactly one good. At the start of each
month the manager must order stock, which arrives the following day. During
the course of the month customers place orders, which are all shipped on the last
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day of the month. Naturally, the manager cannot know how many orders will arrive
during a given month, but the manager can use prior experience to give a probability
distribution for this. The manager’s problem is to decide how much stock should
be ordered. Since storing goods is expensive, if too much stock is ordered then the
profits on the goods that are sold may be wiped out. On the other hand, if not
enough stock is ordered, then the store may not make as much profit as it could
have done.
This problem can naturally be modelled as a Markov decision process. At
the start of each month the inventory has some state, which is the number of goods
that are currently in stock. The manager then takes an action, by deciding how
many goods should be ordered. The inventory then moves to a new state, which
is decided by a combination of the amount of goods that have been ordered, and
the amount of orders that arrive during the month. Since the number of orders is
modelled by a probability distribution, the state that the inventory will move to in
the next month will be determined by this probability distribution. Each action has
a reward, which is the expected profit from the goods that are sold minus the cost
of storing the current inventory. If this reward is positive, then a profit is made
during that month, and if it is negative, then a loss is made.
A strategy (also known as a policy in the Markov decision process literature)
is a rule that the manager can follow to determine how much stock should be ordered.
This strategy will obviously depend on the current state of the inventory: if the
inventory is almost empty then the manager will want to make a larger order than
if the inventory has plenty of stock.
The problem that must be solved is to find an optimal strategy. This is a
strategy that maximizes the amount of profit that the store makes. The optimality
criterion that is used depends on the setting. If the store is only going to be open
for a fixed number of months, then we are looking for an optimal strategy in the
total-reward criterion. This is a strategy that maximizes the total amount of profit
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that is made while the store is open. On the other hand, if the store will remain
open indefinitely, then we are looking for an optimal strategy in the average-reward
criterion. This is a strategy that maximizes the long-term average profit that is
made by the store. For example, the strategy may make a loss for the first few
months in order to move the inventory into a state where a better long-term average
profit can be obtained. Finally, there is the discounted-reward criterion, in which
immediate rewards are worth more than future rewards. In our example, this could
be interpreted as the price of the good slowly falling over time. This means that
the profit in the first month will be larger than the profits in subsequent months.
The study of Markov decision processes began in the 1950s. The first work on
this subject was by Shapley, who studied two player stochastic games [Sha53], and
Markov decision processes can be seen as a stochastic game with only one player.
The model was then developed in its own right by the works of Bellman [Bel57],
Howard [How60], and others. Puterman’s book provides a comprehensive modern
exposition of the basic results for Markov decision processes [Put05].
Markov decision processes have since been applied in a wide variety of areas.
They have become a standard tool for modelling stochastic processes in operations
research and engineering. They have also found applications in computer science.
For example, they are a fundamental tool used in reinforcement learning, which is
a sub-area of artificial intelligence research [SB98].
These applications often produce Markov decision processes that have very
large state spaces, and so finding fast algorithms that solve Markov decision pro-
cesses is an important problem. It has long been known that the problem can be
formulated as a linear program [d’E63, Man60], and therefore it can be solved in
polynomial time [Kha80, Kar84]. However, this gives only a weakly polynomial
time algorithm, which means that its running time is polynomial in the bit length
of the numbers occurring in its inputs. There is no known strongly polynomial time
algorithm for solving Markov decision processes.
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1.2 Two Player Games
The defining text on game theory was written by von Neumann and Morgenstern in
1944 [vM44]. Part of this work was the study of two player zero-sum games, which
are games where the goals of the two players are directly opposed. The zero-sum
property means that if one player wins some amount, then the opposing player loses
that amount. A classical example of this would be a poker game, where if one player
wins some amount of money in a round, then his opponents lose that amount of
money. These are the type of game that will be studied in this thesis.
Game theory can be applied to to produce a different type of model than
those models that arise from Markov decision processes. In many systems it is
known that there can be more than one outcome after taking some action, but there
may not be a known probability distribution that models this uncertainty about
the environment. Game theory can be used to model this, by assuming that the
decisions taken by the environment are controlled by an adversary whose goal is to
minimize our objective function.
For example, let us return to our inventory control problem. To model this
as a Markov decision process, we required a probability distribution that specified
the number of orders that will be placed by customers in each month. Now suppose
that we do not have such a probability distribution. Instead, we are looking for
a strategy for inventory control which maximizes the profit no matter how many
orders arrive during each month. To do this, we can assume that the number of
orders that are placed is controlled by an adversary, whose objective is to minimize
the amount of profit that we make. If we can devise a strategy that ensures a certain
amount of profit when playing against the adversary, then this strategy guarantees
that we will make at least this amount of profit when exposed to real customers.
From this, we can see that playing a game against the adversary allows us to devise
a strategy that works in the worst case.
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We will study two player infinite games that are played on finite graphs.
In particular, we will study mean-payoff games and discounted games. These are
similar to Markov decision processes with the average-reward and discounted-reward
optimality criteria, but where the randomness used in the Markov decision process
model is replaced with an opposing player. The objective in these games is again
to compute an optimal strategy, but in this case an optimal strategy is one that
guarantees a certain payoff no matter how the opponent plays against that strategy.
These games have applications in, for example, online scheduling and online string
comparison problems [ZP96].
Whereas the problem of solving a Markov decision process can be solved in
polynomial time, there is no known algorithm that solves mean-payoff or discounted
games in polynomial time. However, it is known that these games lie in the com-
plexity class NP ∩ co-NP [KL93]. This implies that the problems are highly unlikely
to be NP-complete or co-NP-complete, since a proof of either of these properties
would imply that NP is equal to co-NP.
In fact, it is known that these three problems lie in a more restricted class
of problems. A common formulation for the complexity class NP is that it contains
decision problems for which, if the answer is yes, then then there is a witness of
this fact that can be verified in polynomial time. The complexity class UP contains
decision problems for which, if the answer is yes, then there is a unique witness of
this fact that can be verified in polynomial time. The complexity class co-UP is
defined analogously. Jurdzin´ski has shown that the problem of solving these games
lies in UP ∩ co-UP [Jur98].
The complexity status of these games is rather unusual, because they are
one of the few natural combinatorial problems that lie in UP ∩ co-UP for which
no polynomial time algorithm is known. This complexity class is also inhabited by
various number theoretic problems such as deciding whether an integer has a factor
that is larger than a given bound, which is assumed to be hard problem. However,
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there are few combinatorial problems that share this complexity.
Membership of NP ∩ co-NP does not imply that a problem is hard. There
have been problems in this class for which polynomial time algorithms have been
devised. For example, the problem of primality testing was known to lie in NP ∩ co-
NP, and was considered to be a hard problem. Nevertheless, Agrawal, Kayal, and
Saxena discovered a polynomial time algorithm that solves this problem [AKS04].
Another example is linear programming, which was shown to be solvable in polyno-
mial time by Khachiyan [Kha80]. Finding a polynomial time algorithm that solves
a mean-payoff game or a discounted game is a major open problem.
1.3 Model Checking And Parity Games
The field of formal verification studies methods that can be used to check whether a
computer program is correct. The applications of this are obvious, because real world
programs often contain bugs that can cause the system to behave in unpredictable
ways. On the other hand, software is often entrusted with safety critical tasks, such
as flying an aeroplane or controlling a nuclear power plant. The goal of verification
is to provide tools that can be used to validate that these systems are correct, and
that they do not contain bugs.
Model checking is one technique that can be used to verify systems [CGP99].
The problem takes two inputs. The first is a representation of a computer program,
usually in the form of a Kripke structure. This structure represents the states that
the program can be in, and the transitions between these states that the program
can make. The second input is a formula, which is written in some kind of logic.
The model checking problem is to decide whether the system satisfies the formula.
This problem can be rephrased as a problem about a zero-sum game between
two players. This game is played on a graph, which is constructed from the system
and the formula. One player is trying to prove that the systems satisfies the property
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described by the formula, and the other player is trying to prove the opposite.
Therefore, a model checking problem can be solved by deciding which player wins
the corresponding game.
The type of game that is played depends on the logic that is used to spec-
ify the formula. The modal µ-calculus is a logic that subsumes other commonly
used temporal logics, such as LTL and CTL* [Koz82]. When the input formula
is written in this logic, the corresponding model checking game will be a parity
game [EJS93, Sti95]. Therefore, fast algorithms for solving parity games lead to
faster model checkers for the modal µ-calculus. Parity games also have other ap-
plications in, for example, checking non-emptiness of non-deterministic parity tree
automata [GTW02].
Parity games are strongly related to mean-payoff games and discounted
games. There is a polynomial time reduction from parity games to mean-payoff
games, and there is a polynomial time reduction from mean-payoff games to dis-
counted games. Parity games are also known to be contained in UP ∩ co-UP, and
no polynomial time algorithm is known that solves parity games. Finding a poly-
nomial time algorithm that solves parity games is a major open problem, and this
also further motivates the study of mean-payoff and discounted games.
1.4 Strategy Improvement
Strategy improvement is a technique that can be applied to solve Markov decision
processes and infinite games. Strategy improvement algorithms have been devised
for all three optimality criteria in MDPs [Put05], and for all of the games that we
have introduced [Pur95, BV07, VJ00]. Strategy improvement algorithms fall under
the umbrella of strategy iteration algorithms, because they solve a game or MDP by
iteratively trying to improve a strategy. We will introduce the ideas behind strategy
improvement by drawing an analogy with simplex methods for linear programming.
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The problem of solving a linear program can naturally be seen as the problem
of finding a vertex of a convex polytope that maximizes an objective function. The
simplex method, given by Dantzig [WD49, Dan49], takes the following approach to
finding this vertex. Each vertex of the polytope has a set of neighbours, and since
the polytope is convex, we know that a vertex optimizes the objective function if and
only if it has no neighbour with a higher value. Therefore, every vertex that is not
optimal has at least one neighbour with a higher value. The simplex method begins
by considering an arbitrary vertex of the polytope. In each iteration, it chooses some
neighbouring vertex with a higher value, and moves to that vertex. This process
continues until an optimal vertex is found.
Since there can be multiple neighbours which offer an improvement in the
objective function, the simplex method must use a pivot rule to decide which neigh-
bour should be chosen in each iteration. Dantzig’s original pivot rule was shown to
require exponential time in the worst case by a result of Klee and Minty [KM70]. It is
now known that many other pivot rules have exponential running times in the worst
case, and there is no pivot rule that has a proof of polynomial time termination. On
the other hand, the simplex method has been found to work very well in practice
because it almost always terminates in polynomial time on real world examples. For
this reason, the simplex method is still frequently used to solve practical problems.
Strategy improvement uses similar techniques to those of the simplex algo-
rithm in order to solve MDPs and games. For each strategy, the set of neighbouring
strategies that secure a better value can be computed in polynomial time, and it can
be shown that a strategy is optimal if and only if this set is empty. Therefore, strat-
egy improvement algorithms begin with an arbitrary strategy, and in each iteration
the algorithm picks some neighbouring strategy that secures a better value.
Strategy improvement algorithms also need a pivot rule to decide which
neighbouring strategy should be chosen. In the context of strategy improvement
algorithms, pivot rules are called switching policies. As with linear programming,
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it has been shown that using an unsophisticated switching policy can cause the
algorithm to take exponential time [MC94]. However, no exponential lower bounds
were known for more sophisticated switching policies. In particular, the greedy
policy is a natural switching policy for strategy improvement, and it was considered
to be a strong candidate for polynomial time termination for quite some time. This
was because, as in the case of linear programming, the greedy switching policy was
found to work very well in practice. However, these hopes were dashed by a recent
result of Friedmann [Fri09], in which he constructed a family of parity games upon
which the strategy improvement algorithm of Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski equipped with
the greedy switching policy takes exponential time. These results have been adapted
to show exponential lower bounds for greedy strategy improvement algorithms for
mean-payoff and discounted games [And09].
1.5 The Linear Complementarity Problem
The linear complementarity problem is a fundamental problem in mathematical
programming [CPS92], which naturally captures the complementary slackness con-
ditions in linear programming and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of quadratic
programs. The linear complementarity problem takes a matrix as an input. In
general, the problem of finding a solution to a linear complementarity problem is
NP-complete [Chu89]. However, when the input matrix is a P-matrix, the problem
is known to belong to the more restrictive class PPAD [Pap94]. This class is known
to have complete problems, such as the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in
a bimatrix game [DGP06, CDT09], but it is not known whether the P-matrix lin-
ear complementarity problem is PPAD-complete. On the other hand, there is no
known polynomial time algorithm that solves P-matrix LCPs, and finding such an
algorithm is a major open problem.
The simplex method for linear programming can be called a pivoting algo-
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rithm, because it uses pivotal algebra to move from one vertex of the polytope to
the next. Pivoting algorithms have also been developed to solve the linear com-
plementarity problem. Prominent examples of this are Lemke’s algorithm [Lem65],
and the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm [DC67]. Although these algorithms may fail to
solve an arbitrary LCP, both of these algorithms are guaranteed to terminate with
a solution when they are applied to a P-matrix LCP.
Recently, the infinite games that we are studying have been linked to the
linear complementarity problem. Polynomial time reductions from simple stochastic
games [Con93] to the linear complementarity problem have been proposed [GR05,
SV07]. Simple stochastic games are a type of game that also incorporate random
moves, and it has been shown that the problem of solving a discounted game can
be reduced to the problem of solving a simple stochastic game [ZP96]. Also, a
direct polynomial time reduction from discounted games to the P-matrix linear
complementarity problem has been devised by Jurdzin´ski and Savani [JS08]. These
reductions mean that the classical pivoting algorithm from the LCP literature can
now be applied to solve parity, mean-payoff, and discounted games.
1.6 Contribution
In Chapter 4, we study how the pivoting algorithms for the linear complementarity
problem behave when they are applied to the LCPs that arise from the reduction
of Jurdzin´ski and Savani. We show that Lemke’s algorithm and the Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm can be viewed as strategy iteration algorithms, and we present versions of
these algorithms that work directly on discounted games, rather than on the LCP
reductions of these games. This allows researchers who do not have a background in
mathematical optimization, but who are interested in solving games, to understand
how these algorithms work.
Although there are exponential lower bounds for these algorithm when they
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are applied to P-matrix LCPs [Mur78, Fat79], it was not known whether these
bounds hold for the LCPs that arise from games. It is possible that the class of
LCPs generated by games may form a subclass of P-matrix LCPs that is easier to
solve. We show that this is not the case, by providing a family of parity games upon
which both Lemke’s algorithm and the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm take exponential
time. Since parity games lie at the top of the chain of reductions from games to the
linear complementarity problem, this lower bound also holds for mean-payoff and
discounted games. The work in this chapter is joint work with Marcin Jurdzin´ski
and Rahul Savani, and it is a revised and extended version of a paper that was
published in the proceedings of SOFSEM 2010 [FJS10].
In Chapter 5, we study strategy improvement algorithms for Markov decision
processes. The greedy switching policy was a promising candidate for polynomial
time termination in both game and MDP settings. For parity games, the result of
Friedmann [Fri09] proved that this was not the case. However, while Friedmann’s
examples have been adapted to cover mean-payoff and discounted games, no expo-
nential lower bounds have been found for greedy strategy improvement for Markov
decision processes. We resolve this situation by adapting Friedmann’s examples to
provide a family of Markov decision processes upon which greedy strategy improve-
ment takes an exponential number of steps. This lower bound holds for the average-
reward criterion. The work presented in this chapter is a revised and extended
version of a paper that was published in the proceedings of ICALP 2010 [Fea10a].
In Chapter 6, we study strategy improvement algorithms for parity games
and mean-payoff games. With the recent result of Friedmann, doubts have been cast
about whether strategy improvement equipped with any switching policy could ter-
minate in polynomial time. This view is reinforced by a recent result of Friedmann,
Hansen, and Zwick [FHZ10], who showed that random facet, another prominent
switching policy, is not polynomial.
Most previous switching policies that have been proposed for strategy im-
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provement follow simple rules, and do not take into account the structure of the
game that they are solving. In this chapter, we show that switching policies can
use the structure of the game to make better decisions. We show that certain struc-
tures in parity and mean-payoff games are strongly related with the behaviour of
strategy improvement algorithms. Moreover, we show that switching policies can
exploit this link to make better decisions. We propose an augmentation scheme,
which allows traditional switching policies, such as the greedy policy, to take advan-
tage of this knowledge. Finally, we show that these ideas are also exploited by the
recent super-polynomial lower bounds, by showing that the augmented version of
the greedy policy is polynomial on Friedmann’s examples, and that the augmented
version of random facet is polynomial on the examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and
Zwick. The work in this chapter is a revised and extended version of a paper that
will appear in the proceedings of LPAR-16 [Fea10b].
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Chapter 2
Problem Statements
In this section we introduce and formally define the problems that will be studied
in this thesis. There are three types of problem that we will introduce: two player
infinite games, Markov decision processes, and the linear complementarity prob-
lem. We will then see how these problems are related to each other, by the know
polynomial time reductions between them.
2.1 Infinite Games
In this section we will introduce three different types of infinite game: parity games,
mean-payoff games, and discounted games. All of these games are played on finite
graphs, in which the set of vertices has been partitioned between two players. The
game is played by placing a token on a starting vertex. In each step of the game, the
player that owns the vertex upon which the token is placed must move the token
along one of the outgoing edges from that vertex. In this fashion, the two players
construct an infinite path, and the winner of the game can be determined from the
properties of this path.
Parity games are an example of a qualitative game, where one player wins and
the other player loses. In the setting of infinite games on finite graphs, a qualitative
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Figure 2.1: An example of a parity game.
winning condition means that one player wins the game if infinite path satisfies
some property, while the other player wins if the infinite path does not satisfy that
property.
Mean-payoff and discounted games are examples of quantitative games. In
these games, every infinite path is assigned a payoff, which is a real number. The
two players are usually referred to as Max and Min, and Min pays the payoff of the
infinite path to Max. Therefore, the two players have opposite goals: it is in the
interest of Max to maximize the payoff of the infinite path, and it is in the interest
of Min to minimize the payoff of the infinite path.
2.1.1 Parity Games
A parity game is played by two players, called Even and Odd, on a finite graph.
Each vertex in the graph is assigned a natural number, which is called the priority
of the vertex. Formally, a parity game is defined by a tuple (V, VEven, VOdd, E,pri),
where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges, which together form a finite
graph. We assume that every vertex in the graph has at least one outgoing edge.
The sets VEven and VOdd partition V into vertices belonging to player Even and
vertices belonging to player Odd, respectively. The function pri : V → N assigns a
priority to each vertex.
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Figure 2.1 gives an example of a parity game. Whenever we draw a parity
game, we will represent the vertices belonging to player Even as boxes, and the
vertices belonging to player Odd as triangles. Each vertex is labeled by a name
followed by the priority that is assigned to the vertex.
The game begins by a token being placed on a starting vertex v0. In each
step, the player that owns the vertex upon which the token is placed must choose
one outgoing edge from that vertex and move the token along it. In this fashion,
the two players form an infinite path pi = 〈v0, v1, v2, . . . 〉, where (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for
every i ∈ N. To determine the winner of the game, we consider the set of priorities
that occur infinitely often along the path. This is defined to be:
Inf(pi) = {d ∈ N : For all j ∈ N there is an i > j such that pri(vi) = d}.
Player Even wins the game if the largest priority occurring infinitely often is even,
and player Odd wins the game if the largest priority occurring infinitely often is
odd. In other words, player Even wins the game if and only if max(Inf(pi)) is even.
In Figure 2.1, the players could construct the path 〈a, b, e〉 followed by 〈f, c〉ω.
The set of priorities that occur infinitely often along this path is {1, 3}. Since 3 is
odd, we know that player Odd would win the game if the two players constructed
this path.
A strategy is a function that a player uses to make decisions while playing
a parity game. Suppose that the token has just arrived at a vertex v ∈ VEven.
Player Even would use his strategy to decide which outgoing edge the token should
be moved along. Player Even’s strategy could make its decisions using the entire
history of the token, which is the path between the starting vertex and v that the
players have formed so far. The strategy could also use randomization to assign a
probability distribution over which outgoing edge should be picked. However, we
will focus on the class of positional strategies. Positional strategies do not use the
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history of the token, and they do make probabilistic decisions.
A positional strategy for Even is a function that chooses one outgoing edge
for every vertex in VEven. A strategy is denoted by σ : VEven → V , with the condition
that (v, σ(v)) is in E, for every Even vertex v. Positional strategies for player Odd
are defined analogously. The sets of positional strategies for Even and Odd are
denoted by ΠEven and ΠOdd, respectively. Given two positional strategies σ and τ ,
for Even and Odd respectively, and a starting vertex v0, there is a unique path
〈v0, v1, v2 . . . 〉, where vi+1 = σ(vi) if vi is owned by Even and vi+1 = τ(vi) if vi is
owned by Odd. This path is known as the play induced by the two strategies σ
and τ , and will be denoted by Play(v0, σ, τ).
An Even strategy is called a winning strategy from a given starting vertex
if player Even can use the strategy to ensure a win when the game is started at
that vertex, no matter how player Odd plays in response. We define PathsEven :
V ×ΠEven → 2V ω to be a function that gives every path that starts at a given vertex
and is consistent with some Even strategy. If σ is a positional strategy for Even,
and v0 is a starting vertex then:
PathsEven(v0, σ) = {〈v0, v1, . . . 〉 ∈ V ω : for all i ∈ N, if vi ∈ VEven
then vi+1 = σ(vi), and if vi ∈ VOdd then (vi, vi+1) ∈ E)}.
A strategy σ is a winning strategy for player Even from the starting vertex v0 if
max(Inf(pi)) is even for every path pi ∈ PathsEven(v0, σ). The strategy σ is said to
be winning for a set of vertices W ⊆ V if it is winning for every vertex v ∈ W .
Winning strategies for player Odd are defined analogously.
A game is said to be determined if one of the two players has a winning
strategy. We now give a fundamental theorem, which states that parity games are
determined with positional strategies.
Theorem 2.1 ([EJ91, Mos91]). In every parity game, the set of vertices V can
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be partitioned into two sets (WEven,WOdd), where Even has a positional winning
strategy for WEven, and Odd has a positional winning strategy for WOdd.
There are two problems that we are interested in solving for parity games.
Firstly, there is the problem of computing the winning sets (WEven,WOdd) whose
existence is implied by Theorem 2.1. Secondly, there is the more difficult problem of
computing the partition into winning sets, and to provide a strategy for Even that
is winning for WEven, and a strategy for Odd that is winning for WOdd.
In the example shown in Figure 2.1, the Even strategy {a 7→ b, e 7→ d, c 7→ f}
is a winning strategy for the set of vertices {a, b, d, e}. This is because player Odd
cannot avoid seeing the priority 6 infinitely often when Even plays this strategy. On
the other hand, the strategy {d 7→ a, b 7→ a, f 7→ c} is a winning strategy for Odd
for the set of vertices {c, f}. Therefore, the partition into winning sets for this game
is ({a, b, d, e}, {c, f}).
2.1.2 Mean-Payoff Games
A mean-payoff game is similar in structure to a parity game. The game is played
by player Max and player Min, who move a token around a finite graph. Instead
of priorities, each vertex in this graph is assigned an integer reward. Formally, a
mean-payoff game is defined by a tuple (V, VMax, VMin, E, r) where V and E form
a finite graph. Once again, we assume that every vertex must have at least one
outgoing edge. The sets VMax and VMin partition V into vertices belonging to player
Max and vertices belonging to player Min, respectively. The function r : V → Z
assigns an integer reward to every vertex.
Once again, the game begins at a starting vertex v0, and the two players
construct an infinite path 〈v0, v1, v2, . . . 〉. The payoff of this infinite path is the
average reward that is achieved in each step. To capture this, we define M(pi) =
lim infn→∞(1/n)
∑n
i=0 r(vi). The objective of player Max is to maximize the value
of M(pi), and the objective of player Min is to minimize it.
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The definitions of positional strategies and plays carry over directly from the
definitions that were given for parity games. The functions PathsMax and PathsMin
can be defined in a similar way to the function PathsEven that was used for parity
games. We now define two important concepts, which are known as the lower and
the upper values. These will be denoted as Value∗ and Value∗, respectively. For
every vertex v we define:
Value∗(v) = max
σ∈ΠMax
min
pi∈PathsMax(v,σ)
M(pi),
Value∗(v) = min
τ∈ΠMin
max
pi∈PathsMin(v,τ)
M(pi).
The lower value of a vertex v is the largest payoff that Max can obtain with a
positional strategy when the game is started at v, and the upper value of v gives
the smallest payoff that Min can obtain with a positional strategy when the game
is started at v. It is not difficult to prove that, for every vertex v, the inequality
Value∗(v) ≤ Value∗(v) always holds. However, for mean-payoff games we have that
the two quantities are equal, which implies that the games are determined.
Theorem 2.2 ([LL69]). For every starting vertex v in every mean-payoff game we
have Value∗(v) = Value∗(v).
This theorem implies that if a player can secure a certain payoff from a given
vertex, then that player can also secure that payoff using a positional strategy. Once
again, this implies that we only need to consider positional strategies when working
with mean-payoff games.
We denote the value of the game starting at the vertex v as Value(v), and we
define it to be equal to both Value∗(v) and Value∗(v). A Max strategy σ is optimal
for a vertex v if, when that strategy is used for a game starting at v, it ensures a
payoff that is at least the value of the game at v. In other words, as strategy σ
is optimal for a vertex v if minpi∈PathsMin(v,σ)M(pi) = Value(v). A Max strategy σ
is optimal for the game if it is optimal for every vertex in that game. Optimal
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strategies for Min are defined analogously.
There are several problems that we are interested in for mean-payoff games.
Firstly, we have the problem of computing the value of the game for every vertex.
Another problem is to compute an optimal strategy for the game for both players.
We can also solve mean-payoff games qualitatively. In this setting, Max wins if and
only if the payoff of the infinite path is strictly greater than 0. In this setting, a
Max strategy σ is winning from a vertex v if minpi∈PathsMin(v,σ)M(pi) > 0, and a Min
strategy τ is winning from the vertex v if maxpi∈PathsMax(v,τ)M(pi) ≤ 0. A strategy
is said to be a winning strategy for a set of vertices W if it is a winning strategy for
every vertex v ∈W .
The computational problem associated with the qualitative version of mean-
payoff games is sometimes called the zero-mean partition problem. To solve this we
must compute the partition (WMax,WMin) of the set V , where Max has a winning
strategy for WMax, and where Min has a winning strategy for WMin. An efficient
algorithm for the zero-mean partition problem can be used to solve the quantitative
version of the mean-payoff game efficiently: Bjo¨rklund and Vorobyov have shown
that only a polynomial number of calls to an algorithm for finding the zero-mean
partition are needed to find the value for every vertex in a mean-payoff game [BV07].
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a mean-payoff game. Every time that we
draw a mean-payoff game, we represent the vertices belonging to player Max as
boxes, and the vertices belonging to player Min as triangles. One possible play in
this game would be 〈a, b, c, d〉ω , and the payoff of this play is −6.25. An optimal
strategy for player Max is {a 7→ b, c 7→ e, e 7→ c}, and an optimal strategy for player
Min is {b 7→ a, d 7→ a}. The value of the game for the vertices in the set {a, b, d} is
the average weight on the cycle formed by a and b, which is −3.5, and the value of
the game for the vertices in the set {c, e} is the average weight on the cycle formed
by c and e, which is 0.5. The zero-mean partition for this mean-payoff game is
therefore ({c, e}, {a, b, d}).
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Figure 2.2: An example of a mean-payoff game.
2.1.3 Discounted Games
Discounted games are very similar to mean-payoff games, but with a different def-
inition of the payoff of an infinite path. Formally, a discounted game is defined by
a tuple (V, VMax, VMin, E, r, β), where the first five components are exactly the same
as the definitions given for mean-payoff games. In addition to these, there is also a
discount factor β, which is a rational number chosen so that 0 ≤ β < 1.
As usual, the game begins at a starting vertex v0, and the two players con-
struct an infinite path 〈v0, v1, v2, . . . 〉. In a discounted game, the payoff of an infinite
path is the sum of the rewards on that path. However, for each step that the path
takes, the rewards in the game are discounted by a factor of β. Formally, the payoff
of an infinite path is defined to be D(pi) = ∑∞i=0 βi r(vi). For example, if we took
the game shown in Figure 2.2 to be a discounted game with discount factor 0.5,
then the payoff of the path 〈e, c〉ω would be:
4 + (0.5×−3) + (0.52 × 4) + (0.53 ×−3) + · · · = 10
3
.
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With this definition in hand, we can again define the lower and upper values:
Value∗(v) = max
σ∈ΠMax
min
pi∈PathsMax(v,σ)
D(pi),
Value∗(v) = min
τ∈ΠMin
max
pi∈PathsMin(v,τ)
D(pi).
The analogue of Theorem 2.2 was shown by Shapely.
Theorem 2.3 ([Sha53]). For every starting vertex v in every discounted game we
have Value∗(v) = Value∗(v).
Therefore, we define Value(v) to be equal to both Value∗(v) and Value∗(v),
and the definitions of optimal strategies carry over from those that were given for
mean-payoff games.
Some results in the literature, such as the reduction from discounted games
to the linear complementarity problem presented in Section 2.5.2, require a differ-
ent definition of a discounted game. In particular, the reduction considers binary
discounted games that have rewards placed on edges. A binary discounted game is
a discounted game in which every vertex has exactly two outgoing edges.
We introduce notation for these games. A binary discounted game with
rewards placed on edges is a tuple G = (V, VMax, VMin, λ, ρ, r
λ, rρ, β), where the
set V is the set of vertices, and VMax and VMin partition V into the set of vertices
of player Max and the set of vertices of player Min, respectively. Each vertex has
exactly two outgoing edges which are given by the left and right successor functions
λ, ρ : V → V . Each edge has a reward associated with it, which is given by the
functions rλ, rρ : V → Z. Finally, the discount factor β is such that 0 ≤ β < 1.
All of the concepts that we have described for games with rewards assigned
to vertices carry over for games with rewards assigned to edges. The only difference
that must be accounted for is the definition of the payoff function. When the rewards
are placed on edges, the two players construct an infinite path pi = 〈v0, v1, v2, . . . 〉
where vi+1 is equal to either λ(vi) or ρ(vi). This path yields the infinite sequence of
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rewards 〈r0, r1, r2, . . . 〉, where ri = rλ(vi) if λ(vi) = vi+1, and ri = rρ(vi) otherwise.
The payoff of the infinite path is then D(pi) =∑∞i=0 βiri.
At first sight, it is not clear how the two models relate to each other. Allowing
rewards to be placed on edges seems to be less restrictive that placing them on
vertices, but forcing each vertex to have exactly two outgoing edges seems more
restrictive. We will resolve this by showing how a traditional discounted game can
be reduced to a binary discounted game with rewards placed on edges.
We will first show that every discounted game can be reduced to a discounted
game in which every vertex has exactly two outgoing edges. This will be accom-
plished by replacing each vertex with a binary tree. Let k be the largest out degree
for a vertex in the discounted game. Every vertex in the game will be replaced with
a full binary tree of depth dlog2 ke − 1, where each vertex in the tree is owned by
the player that owns v, and each leaf of the tree has two outgoing edges. The root
of the tree is assigned the reward r(v), and every other vertex in the tree is assigned
reward 0.
For each incoming edge (u, v) in the original game, we add an edge from u to
the root of the binary tree in the reduced game. For each outgoing edge (v, u) in the
original game, we set the successor of some leaf to be u. If, after this procedure, there
is a leaf w that has less than two outgoing edges, then we select some edge (v, u) from
the original game, and set u as the destination for the remaining outgoing edges of w.
It is not a problem if w has two outgoing edges to u after this procedure, because we
use left and right successor functions in our definition of a binary discounted game,
rather than an edge relation. We then set the discount factor for the binary game
to be l
√
β, where l = dlog2 ke.
We now argue that this construction is correct. Clearly, a player can move
from a vertex v to a vertex u in the discounted game if and only if that player can
move from v to u in our binary version of that game. Therefore, the players can
construct an infinite path 〈v0, v1, . . . 〉 in the original game if and only if they can
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construct an infinite path 〈v0, v0,1, v0,2, . . . , v0,dlog2 ke−1, v1, . . . 〉 in the binary version
of that game, where each vertex vi is the root of a binary tree, and each vertex vi,j
is an internal vertex in the binary tree. To see that the construction is correct, it
suffices to notice that these two paths have the same payoff. The payoff of the first
path is r(v0) + β · r(v1) + . . . , and the payoff of the second path is:
r(v0) +
l
√
β · r(v0,1) + · · ·+ ( l
√
β)dlog2 ke−1 · v0,dlog2 ke−1 · r(v0,2) + ( l
√
β)l r(v1) + . . .
Since r(v0,i) = 0 for all i, and (
l
√
β)l = β, the two paths must have the same payoff.
From this, it follows that the two games must have the same value, and therefore
solving the binary game gives a solution for the original game.
We now argue that a discounted game with rewards placed on vertices can
be transformed into an equivalent game in which the rewards are placed on edges.
The reduction in this case is simple: if a vertex v has reward r in the original game,
then we set the reward of every outgoing edge of v to be r in the transformed game.
This reduction obviously gives an equivalent game, because in both games you must
see a reward of r if you pass through v.
In summary, an efficient algorithm that solves binary discounted games with
rewards placed on edges can also be used to efficiently solve discounted games spec-
ified with the standard formulation. We will use this formulation when we describe
the reduction from discounted games to the linear complementarity problem in Sec-
tion 2.5.2, and in the work based on this reduction presented in Chapter 4.
2.2 Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes are similar to two player games, but with two important
differences. Firstly, a Markov decision process does not have two players. This could
be thought of as a game in which there is only one player. The second difference is
that the moves made in a Markov decision process are not necessarily deterministic.
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Figure 2.3: An example of a Markov decision process.
In the game setting, the vertices are connected by edges, and when the token is at
some vertex, then the owner of that vertex can choose one of the edges and move
the token along that edge. In the Markov decision process setting, the vertices are
connected by actions, and when the token is at some vertex, an action must be
chosen. The outcome of picking an action is not deterministic. Instead, each action
has a probability distribution over the vertices in the game. The vertex that the
token is moved to is determined by this probability distribution.
Formally, a Markov decision process consists of a set of vertices V , where
each vertex v ∈ V has an associated set of actions Av . For a given vertex v ∈ V and
action a ∈ Av the function r(v, a) gives an integer reward for when the action a in
chosen at the vertex v. Given two vertices v and v′, and an action a ∈ Av, p(v′|v, a)
is the probability of moving to vertex v′ when the action a is chosen in vertex v. This
is a probability distribution, so
∑
v′∈V p(v
′|v, a) = 1 for all v ∈ V and all a ∈ Av.
The MDPs that we will study actually contain a large number of deterministic
actions. An action a ∈ Av is deterministic if there is some vertex v′ such that
p(v′|v, a) = 1. For the sake of convenience, we introduce notation that makes
working with these actions easier. We will denote a deterministic action from the
vertex v to the vertex v′ as (v, v′), and the function r(v, v′) gives the reward of this
action.
Figure 2.3 shows an example of a Markov decision process. When we draw
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a Markov decision process, the vertices will be drawn as boxes, and the name of a
vertex will be displayed on that vertex. Actions are drawn as arrows: deterministic
actions are drawn as an arrow between vertices, and probabilistic actions are drawn
as arrows that split, and end at multiple vertices. Each deterministic action is
labelled with its reward. For probabilistic actions, the probability distribution is
marked after the arrow has split, and both the name of the action and the reward
of the action are marked before the arrow has split.
Strategies and runs for MDPs are defined in the same way as they are for
games. A deterministic memoryless strategy σ : V → As is a function that selects
one action at each vertex. If an action a is a deterministic action (v, u), then we
adopt the notation σ(v) = u for when σ chooses the action a. For a given starting
vertex v0, a run that is consistent with a strategy σ is an infinite sequence of vertices
〈v0, v1, v2, . . . 〉 such that p(vi+1|vi, σ(vi)) > 0 for all i.
There could be uncountably many runs that are consistent with a given
strategy. We must define a probability space over these runs. The set Ωχv0 contains
every run that starts at the vertex v0 and that is consistent with the strategy χ.
In order to define a probability space over this set, we must provide a σ-algebra of
measurable events. We define the cylinder set of a finite path to be the set that
contains every infinite path which has the finite path as a prefix. Standard results
from measure theory imply that there is a unique smallest σ-algebra Fχv0 over Ωχv0
that contains every cylinder set. Furthermore, if we define the probability of the
cylinder set for a finite path 〈v0, v1, v2, . . . vk〉 to be
∏k−1
i=0 p(vi+1|vi, σ(vi)), then
this uniquely defines a probability measure Pχv0 over the σ-algebra Fχv0 [ADD00].
Therefore, our probability space will be (Ωχv0 ,Fχv0 ,Pχv0). Given a measurable function
that assigns a value to each consistent run f : Ω → R, we define Eχv0{f} to be the
expectation of this function in the probability space.
A reward criterion assigns a payoff to each run. In the total-reward criterion,
the payoff of a run is the sum of the rewards along that run. In the average-reward
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criterion, the payoff of a run is the average reward that is obtained in each step
along the infinite run. The value of a vertex under some strategy is the expectation
of the payoff over the runs that are consistent with that strategy. Formally, the
value of a vertex v in the strategy σ under the total-reward criterion is defined to
be:
Valueσ(v) = Eσv{
∞∑
i=0
r(vi, vi+1)}.
Under the average-reward criterion the value of each vertex is defined to be:
ValueσA(v) = E
σ
v{lim inf
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=0
r(vi, vi+1)}.
Finally, for the discounted reward criterion a discount factor β is chosen so that
0 ≤ β < 1, and the value of each vertex is defined to be:
ValueσD(s) = E
σ
s {
∞∑
i=0
βi · r(si, si+1)}.
For a given MDP, the computational objective is to find an optimal strat-
egy σ∗, which is the strategy that maximizes the optimality criterion for every start-
ing vertex: an optimal strategy will satisfy Valueσ(v) ≤ Valueσ∗(v) for every vertex v
and every strategy σ. We define the value of a vertex to be the value that is obtained
by an optimal strategy from that vertex. That is, we define Value(v) = Valueσ∗(v),
we define ValueA(v) = Valueσ∗A (v), and we define ValueD(v) = Value
σ∗
D (v), for every
vertex v.
In the example shown in Figure 2.3 the strategy {a 7→ x, b 7→ e, c 7→ a, d 7→
y, e 7→ e} is an optimal strategy under the total reward criterion. The value of the
vertex a under this strategy is 4.6. Under the average reward criterion, every vertex
will have value 0, no matter what strategy is used. This is because we cannot avoid
reaching the sink vertex e, and therefore the long term average-reward will always
be 0.
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2.3 The Linear Complementarity Problem
The linear complementarity problem is a fundamental problem in mathematical
optimisation. Given an n × n matrix M and an n-dimensional vector q, the linear
complementarity problem (LCP) is to find two n-dimensional vectors w and z that
satisfy the following:
w =Mz + q, (2.1)
w, z ≥ 0, (2.2)
zi · wi = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (2.3)
We will denote this problem as LCP(M, q). The condition given by (2.3) is called
the complementarity condition, and it insists that for all i, either the i-th component
of w is equal to 0 or the i-th component of z is equal to 0. It is for this reason that we
refer to wi and zi as being complements of each other. From the complementarity
condition combined with the non-negativity constraint given by (2.2) it is clear that
every solution to the LCP contains exactly n non-negative variables and exactly n
variables whose value is forced to be 0. In LCP terminology, the non-negative
variables are called basic variables and the complements of the basic variables are
called non-basic.
Before continuing, it must be noted that the system given by (2.1)-(2.3) may
not have a solution or it may have many solutions. However, we are interested
in a special case of the linear complementarity problem, where the matrix M is a
P-matrix. For every set α ⊆ {1, 2, . . . n} the principal sub-matrix of M associated
with α is obtained by removing every column and every row whose index is not in
α. A principal minor of M is the determinant of a principal sub-matrix of M .
Definition 2.4 (P-matrix). A matrix M is a P-matrix if and only if every principal
minor of M is positive.
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In our work, we will always consider LCPs in which the matrix M is a P-
matrix. LCPs of this form have been shown to have the following special property.
Theorem 2.5 ([CPS92]). If the matrix M is a P-matrix then, for every n dimen-
sional vector q, we have that LCP(M, q) has a unique solution.
A fundamental operation that can be applied to an LCP is a pivot operation.
This operation takes two variables wi and zj and produces an equivalent LCP in
which the roles of these two variables are swapped. In this new LCP, the variable zj
will be the i-th variable in the vector w, and the variable wi will be the j-th variable
in the vector z. To perform a pivot step, we construct a tableaux A = [I,M, q], that
is, a matrix whose first n columns are the columns of the n-dimensional identity
matrix, whose following n columns are the columns of M , and whose final column
is q. Now, suppose that the variable wi is to be swapped with zj . The variable wi
is associated with the i-th column of A, and the variable zj is associated with
the (n + j)-th column of A. To perform this operation we swap the columns that
are associated with wi and zj. We then perform Gauss-Jordan elimination on the
tableaux A, which transforms the first n columns of A into an identity matrix and
the remaining columns into an n by n matrix M ′ and an n dimensional vector q′.
A matrix Mα and a vector qα, where α ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are called a prin-
cipal pivot transform of M and q, if they are obtained by performing |α| pivot
operations, which exchange the variables wi and zi, for every i ∈ α. Each solution
of LCP(Mα, qα) corresponds to a solution of LCP(M, q). If there is a solution of
LCP(Mα, qα) in which the variables wi = 0 for every i ∈ β, and the variables zi = 0
for every i /∈ β, then there is a solution to LCP(M, q) with wi = 0 for every i ∈ γ
and zi = 0 for every i /∈ γ, where γ = (α\β)∪(β\α). Once we know which variables
should be set to 0, the system given by (2.1)-(2.3) becomes a system of n simulta-
neous equations over n variables, which can easily be solved to obtain the precise
values of w and z. Therefore, to solve an LCP it is sufficient to find a solution to
some principal pivot transform of that LCP.
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This fact is useful, because some LCPs are easier to solve than others. For
example, a problem LCP(M, q) has a trivial solution if q ≥ 0. Indeed, if this is the
case then we can set z = 0, and the system given by (2.1)-(2.3) becomes:
w = q,
w, z ≥ 0,
zi · wi = 0 for i = 1, 2 . . . n.
Since q ≥ 0 and z = 0, this can obviously be satisfied by setting w = q. This gives
us a naive algorithm for solving the problem LCP(M, q), which checks, for each α ⊆
{1, 2, . . . , n}, whether LCP(Mα, qα) has a trivial solution. In our setting, where M
is a P-matrix, there is guaranteed to be exactly one principal pivot transform of M
and q for which there is a trivial solution.
2.4 Optimality Equations
Optimality equations are a fundamental tool that is used to study Markov decision
processes and infinite games. The idea is that the value of each vertex can be
characterised as the solution of a system of optimality equations. Therefore, to find
the value for each vertex, it is sufficient to compute a solution to the optimality
equations. Optimality equations will play an important role in this thesis, because
each of the algorithms that we study can be seen as a process that attempts to find
a solution of these equations.
In this section we introduce optimality equations for the average-reward cri-
terion in MDPs, and for mean-payoff and discounted games. We also show, for each
of these models, how the optimality equations can be used to decide if a strategy
is optimal. The key concept that we introduce is whether an action or edge is
switchable for a given strategy. A strategy is optimal if and only if it has no switch-
able edges or actions. This concept will be heavily used by the algorithms that are
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studied in this thesis.
2.4.1 Optimality Equations For Markov Decision Processes
We will begin by describing the optimality equations for the average-reward criterion
in MDPs. In the literature, there are two models of average-reward MDP that are
commonly considered. In the uni-chain setting, the structure of the MDP guarantees
that every vertex has the same value. This allows a simplified optimality equation
to be used. However, the MDPs that will be considered in this thesis do not satisfy
these structural properties. Therefore, we will introduce the multi-chain optimality
equations, which account for the fact that vertices may have different values. In the
multi-chain setting, we have two types of optimality equation, which must be solved
simultaneously. The first of these are called the gain equations. For each vertex v
there is a gain equation, which is defined as follows:
G(v) = max
a∈Av
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, a) ·G(v′). (2.4)
Secondly we have the bias equations. We define Mv to be the set of actions that
achieve the maximum in the gain equation at the vertex v:
Mv = {a ∈ Av : G(v) =
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, a) ·G(v′)}.
Then, for every vertex v, we have a bias equation that is defined as follows:
B(v) = max
a∈Mv
(
r(v, a)−G(v) +
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, a) · B(v′)
)
. (2.5)
For this system of optimality equations, the solution is not necessarily unique. In
every solution the gain will be the same, but the bias may vary. It has been shown
that the gain of each vertex in a solution is in fact the expected average reward from
that vertex under an optimal strategy.
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Theorem 2.6 ([Put05, Theorem 9.1.3]). For every solution to the optimality equa-
tions we have ValueA(v) = G(v), for every vertex v.
We will now describe how these optimality equations can be used to check
whether a strategy σ is optimal. This is achieved by computing the gain and bias of
the strategy σ, which can be obtained by solving the following system of equations.
Gσ(v) =
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, σ(v)) ·Gσ(v′) (2.6)
Bσ(v) = r(v, σ(v)) −Gσ(v) +
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, σ(v)) ·Bσ(v′) (2.7)
It is clear that a strategy σ is optimal in the average-reward criterion if and only if
Gσ and Bσ are a solution to the optimality equations.
It should be noted that the system of equations given in (2.6)-(2.7) may not
have a unique solution, and this will cause problems in our subsequent definitions.
As with the optimality equations, for each strategy σ and each vertex v, there will
be a unique value g such that Gσ(v) = g for every solution to these equations, but
Bσ(v) may vary between solutions. To ensure that there is a unique solution, we
add the following constraint, for every vertex v ∈ V :
W σ(v) =
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, σ(v)) ·W σ(v′)−Bσ(v). (2.8)
Adding Equation 2.8 to the system of equations ensures that the solutions of the gain
and bias equations will be unique [Put05, Corollary 8.2.9]. In other words, for every
vertex v there is a constant g such that every solution of Equations (2.6)-(2.8) has
Gσ(v) = g, and there is a constant b such that every solution of Equations (2.6)-(2.8)
has Bσ(v) = b. The solution of Equation (2.8) itself may not be unique.
Now suppose that the strategy σ is not optimal. We will define the appeal of
an action a under a strategy σ. To do this, we find the unique solution of the system
specified by (2.6)-(2.8). We then define the gain of a to be Gσ(a) =
∑
v′∈V p(v
′|v, a)·
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Gσ(v′), and we define the bias of a to be Bσ(a) = r(v, a)−G(v) +∑v′∈V p(v′|v, a) ·
B(v′). We then define the appeal of the action a to be Appealσ(a) = (Gσ(a), Bσ(a)).
We can now define the concept of a switchable action. To decide if an action
is switchable, the appeal of the action is compared lexicographically with the gain
and bias of the vertex from which it originates. This means that an action a ∈ Av
is switchable in a strategy σ if either Gσ(a) > Gσ(v), or if Gσ(a) = Gσ(v) and
Bσ(a) > Bσ(v).
Clearly, if σ has a switchable action then Gσ and Bσ do not satisfy the
optimality equations, which implies that σ is not an optimal strategy. Conversely,
if σ does not have a switchable action then Gσ and Bσ must be a solution to the
optimality equations. Therefore, we have the following corollary of Theorem 2.6.
Corollary 2.7. A strategy σ is optimal if and only if it has no switchable actions.
2.4.2 Optimality Equations For Games
We now introduce the optimality equations for two player games. We begin by
describing a system of optimality equations for discounted games. For each vertex v,
the optimality equation for v is defined to be:
V (v) = min
(v,u)∈E
(r(v) + β · V (u)) if v ∈ VMin,
V (v) = max
(v,u)∈E
(r(v) + β · V (u)) if v ∈ VMax.
Shapley has shown the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8 ([Sha53]). The optimality equations have a unique solution, and for
every vertex v, we have Value(v) = V (v).
If σ is a strategy for Max and τ is a strategy for Min, then we define
Valueσ,τ (v) = D(Play(v, σ, τ)) to be the payoff that is obtained when Max plays σ
against τ . The optimality equations imply that to solve a discounted game, it is
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sufficient to find a pair of strategies σ and τ such that Valueσ,τ is a solution to the
optimality equations.
Given a positional strategy σ for Max and a positional strategy τ for Min, we
define the appeal of an edge (v, u) to be Appealσ,τ (v, u) = r(v)+β ·Valueσ,τ (u). For
each Max vertex v, we say that the edge (v, u) is switchable in σ if Appealσ,τ (v, u) >
Valueσ,τ (v). For each Min vertex v, we say that the edge (v, u) is switchable in τ if
Appealσ,τ (v, u) < Valueσ,τ (v).
It is clear that Valueσ,τ satisfies the optimality equations if and only if both σ
and τ have no switchable edges. Therefore, we have the following corollary of
Theorem 2.8.
Corollary 2.9. Let σ be a strategy for Max and let τ be a strategy for Min. These
strategies are optimal if and only if neither of them have a switchable edge.
We give a system of optimality equations that characterise optimal values in a
mean-payoff game. These optimality equations are a generalisation of the optimality
equations for the average-reward criterion in the Markov decision process setting.
For each vertex v we have one of the following gain equations:
G(v) = max
(v,u)∈E
G(u) if v ∈ VMax,
G(v) = min
(v,u)∈E
G(u) if v ∈ VMin.
We define M = {(v, u) ∈ E : G(v) = G(u)} to be the set of edges that satisfy the
gain equation. For every vertex v we have one of the following bias equations:
B(v) = max
(v,u)∈M
(r(v)−G(v) +B(u)) if v ∈ VMax,
B(v) = min
(v,u)∈M
(r(v)−G(v) +B(u)) if v ∈ VMin.
As with the MDP setting, we have that the solutions to this system of equa-
tions correspond to the value of the game at each vertex.
33
Theorem 2.10 ([FV97]). For every solution to the system of equations we have
Value(v) = G(v), for every vertex v.
For each pair of strategies σ and τ , we define the gain and bias of these
strategies to be the solution of the following system of equations. For each vertex v,
let χ : V → V be a function such that χ(v) = σ(v) when v ∈ VMax, and χ(v) = τ(v)
when v ∈ VMin. We use this to define, for every vertex v:
Gσ,τ (v) = Gσ,τ (χ(v)), (2.9)
Bσ,τ (v) = r(v) −Gσ,τ (v) +Bσ,τ (χ(v)). (2.10)
Once again, it will be useful to ensure that (2.9)-(2.10) have a unique solution. As
with the MDP setting, this could be achieved by adding an additional equation
for each vertex. However, in the game setting there is a much simpler method
for achieving this. Since σ and τ are both positional strategies, we know that the
infinite path Play(v, σ, τ) consists of a finite initial path followed by an infinitely
repeated cycle, for every starting vertex v. For each cycle formed by σ and τ , we
select one vertex u that lies on the cycle, and set Bσ,τ (u) = 0. It turns out that with
this modification in place, the system given by (2.9)-(2.10) has a unique solution for
each pair of strategies σ and τ .
A switchable edge can now be defined in the same way as a switchable action
was defined for average-reward MDPs. For each edge, we find the unique solution to
the system given by (2.9)-(2.10), and we define Appealσ,τ (v, u) = (Gσ,τ (v), Bσ,τ (v)).
The edge (v, u) is switchable if Appealσ,τ (v, u) is greater than (Gσ,τ (v), Gσ,τ (u))
when compared lexicographically.
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2.5 Reductions
In this section we present a chain of reductions from infinite games to the linear
complementarity problem. We will show that the problem of solving a parity game
can be reduced in polynomial time to the problem of solving a mean-payoff game,
and that the problem of solving a mean payoff game can be reduced in polynomial
time to the problem of solving a discounted game. This shows that the three types
of game are very strongly related.
We go on to describe a polynomial time reduction from the problem of solving
a discounted game to the linear complementarity problem. This shows that the
linear complementarity problem subsumes all of the games that we have introduced,
and motivates the inclusion of this problem in our definitions.
2.5.1 Reductions Between Games
In this section we describe a reduction from parity games to mean-payoff games that
was given by Puri [Pur95], and a reduction from mean-payoff games to discounted
games that was given by Zwick and Paterson [ZP96]. We begin with Puri’s reduc-
tion from parity games to mean-payoff games. The reduction does not change the
structure of the graph, instead it replaces each priority with a reward. More pre-
cisely, if a vertex has priority d in the parity game then it will be assigned a reward
of (−|V |)d in the mean-payoff game. This means that vertices with even priorities
will get positive rewards, and vertices with odd priorities will get negative rewards.
For example, if we applied the reduction to the parity game shown in Figure 2.1,
then we would obtain the mean-payoff game shown in Figure 2.4.
The reduction works because it ensures the following property: the sum of
the rewards on a simple cycle in the mean-payoff game is positive if and only if the
highest priority on that cycle in the parity game is even. Using this property, Puri
showed the following theorem.
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Figure 2.4: The result of reducing the parity game shown in Figure 2.1 to a mean-
payoff game.
Theorem 2.11 ([Pur95]). Let G be a parity game, and let G′ be the reduction of G
to a mean-payoff game. Player Even has a winning strategy from a vertex v in G if
and only if Value(v) > 0 in G′.
Theorem 2.11 implies that we only need to solve the qualitative zero-mean
partition problem for the mean-payoff game in order to solve the parity game. This
is because the partition (WEven,WOdd) in the parity game must be the same as the
partition (WMax,WMin) in the mean-payoff game. Moreover, a winning strategy for
Max on the set WMax is also a winning strategy for Even on the set WEven. The
same property holds for the winning strategies of Min and Odd.
We now turn our attention to the reduction from mean-payoff games to
discounted games given by Zwick and Paterson [ZP96]. The reduction does not
change the structure of the game, or the rewards assigned to the vertices. Instead,
it relies on a smart choice of discount factor for the discounted game. In particular,
they choose the discount factor to be 1−1/(4 · |V |3 ·W ), whereW is maxv∈V (| r(v)|),
which is the reward with the largest magnitude. For example, if we were to reduce
the mean-payoff game shown in Figure 2.4 to a discounted game, we would choose
the discount factor to be 1− 1/(4 · 63 · 66).
To explain why this choice of discount factor is correct, we will use ValueM(v)
to denote the value of a vertex in the mean-payoff game, and ValueD(v) to denote
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the value of the corresponding vertex in the discounted game. Zwick and Pater-
son showed bounds on how far away (1 − β) · ValueD(v) can be from ValueM(v)
as β approaches 1, and they also showed that the two values converge as β ap-
proaches 1. They observed that positional determinacy of mean-payoff games im-
plies that ValueM(v) must be a rational number whose denominator is at most |V |.
Their choice for the discount factor ensures that there can only be one such rational
number that is close enough to (1− β) ·ValueD(v), and therefore ValueM(v) can be
determined from a solution of the discounted game. This gives a polynomial time
reduction from mean-payoff games to discounted games.
2.5.2 Reducing Discounted Games To LCPs
In this section we describe the reduction from discounted games to the P-matrix
linear complementarity problem, given by Jurdzin´ski and Savani [JS08]. Many of
the notations used in this section are taken directly from their exposition. This
reduction assumes that the discounted game is a binary game with rewards placed
on edges.
The reduction will make heavy use of the optimality equations. As we have
seen, these equations consider a pair of strategies, with one strategy for each player.
In order to simplify our definitions, we introduce the concept of a joint strategy,
which specifies the strategy decisions for both players. Formally, a joint strategy is
a function σ : V → V that picks one outgoing edge from each vertex in the game.
The notation σ  Max and σ  Min will be used to refer to the individual strategies
of Max and Min that constitute the joint strategy.
We introduce some notation for binary discounted games with rewards placed
on edges that will ease our exposition. For a vertex v, the function σ(v) gives the
successor of v not chosen by the joint strategy σ. In other words, we have σ(v) = λ(v)
if and only if σ(v) = ρ(v). The functions rσ and rσ both have the form V → Q, and
they give, for each vertex, the reward on the edge chosen by σ and the reward on
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the edge not chosen by σ, respectively.
The concepts that were presented in Section 2.1.3 can easily be adapted for
joint strategies. We define Play(σ, v) to be equal to the path Play(σ  Max, σ 
Min, v). For a given joint strategy σ, the value of a vertex v when σ is played is
then defined to be Valueσ(v) = D(Play(σ, v)). A joint strategy is optimal only if
both σ  Max and σ  Min are optimal, and our objective is to compute an optimal
joint strategy.
The reduction begins with the optimality equations for discounted games.
For binary discounted game with rewards placed on edges, these equations are, for
every vertex v:
V (v) =

min{rλ(v) + β · V (λ(v)), rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(v))} if v ∈ VMin,
max{rλ(v) + β · V (λ(v)), rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(v))} if v ∈ VMax.
(2.11)
As we know, the optimality equations can be used to decide whether a strat-
egy is optimal. Given a joint strategy σ and a vertex v, we define the balance of v to
be the difference between the value of v and the value of the play that starts at v,
moves to σ(v) in the first step, and then follows σ:
Balσ(v) =

Valueσ(v)− (rσ(v) + β ·Valueσ(σ(v))) if v ∈ VMax,
(rσ(v) + β · Valueσ(σ(v))) −Valueσ(v) if v ∈ VMin.
(2.12)
Clearly, there is a switchable edge at a vertex v if and only if Balσ(v) < 0. Since
each vertex can have only one edge that is not chosen by σ, we will say that a vertex
is switchable whenever that vertex has a switchable edge. If Balσ(v) = 0 for some
vertex then that vertex is said to be indifferent.
The reduction modifies the optimality equations for discounted games by
introducing slack variables z, w : V → Q. For each vertex v, the optimality equa-
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tion (2.11) is replaced by the following set of equations:
V (v)− w(v) = rλ(v) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMax, (2.13)
V (v)− z(v) = rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s)) if v ∈ VMax, (2.14)
V (v) + w(v) = rλ(v) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMin, (2.15)
V (v) + z(v) = rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s)) if v ∈ VMin, (2.16)
w(v), z(v) ≥ 0, (2.17)
w(v) · z(v) = 0. (2.18)
We argue that an optimal strategy for the discounted game can be derived
from a solution to the system given by (2.13)-(2.18). The complementarity condition
given in (2.18) insists that one of the two slack variables must be 0 for every vertex.
Let α ⊆ V , and suppose that there is a solution to this system of equations such
that w(v) = 0 for every v ∈ α, and z(v) = 0 for every v /∈ α. Furthermore, suppose
that v ∈ VMax. Applying Equations (2.13) and (2.14) to this solution gives:
V (v) =

rλ(v) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ α,
rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s)) if v /∈ α.
(2.19)
An identical equation can be derived for vertices v ∈ VMin. Therefore, for each
solution of the system of equations, there is a corresponding joint strategy σ for the
discounted game, which is defined to be, for every v ∈ V :
σ(v) =

λ(v) if v ∈ α,
ρ(v) if v /∈ α.
We can then rewrite Equation 2.19 to obtain, for every vertex v:
V (v) = rσ(v) + β · V (σ(s)).
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This implies that V (v) = Valueσ(v), for every vertex v. In summary, for every
solution of the system given by (2.13)-(2.18), there is a joint strategy σ such that
V (v) = Valueσ(v).
For the reduction to be correct, we must argue that the strategy σ is an
optimal strategy in the discounted game. Let v be a vertex such that v ∈ α. We
can rewrite Equations (2.14) and (2.16) as:
z(v) = V (v) − (rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s))) if v ∈ VMax,
z(v) = (rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s))) − V (v) if v ∈ VMin.
By substituting in our knowledge about the strategy σ into the previous equation,
we obtain:
z(v) =

Valueσ(v)− (rσ(v) + β ·Valueσ(σ(s))) if v ∈ VMax,
(rσ(v) + β ·Valueσ(σ(s))) −Valueσ(v) if v ∈ VMin.
An identical derivation can be made for vertices v /∈ α to obtain the same expression
for the variable w(v). Therefore, we have z(v) = Balσ(v) if v ∈ α, and w(v) =
Balσ(v) if v /∈ α. The non-negativity constraint (2.17) insists that these variables
should not be negative, which implies that Balσ(v) ≥ 0 for every vertex v. By
Corollary 2.9, we have that σ is an optimal strategy for the discounted game.
We now argue that the system (2.13)-(2.18) can be rewritten as an LCP.
We will assume that every vertex in V is assigned a unique index in the range
{1, 2, . . . |V |}, which can be used to identify it. For each |V | by |V | matrix A, we
define Â to be A with every element in every column whose index v ∈ VMin negated.
(Â)st =

Ast if t ∈ VMax,
−Ast if t ∈ VMin.
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For every joint strategy σ we define a matrix Tσ to be the adjacency matrix of the
sub-graph defined by σ. Therefore, we define:
(Tσ)st =

1 if σ(s) = t,
0 otherwise.
If rλ and rρ are the vectors of rewards assigned to each vertex, and I is the identity
matrix, then Equations (2.13)-(2.16) can be rewritten in matrix form as:
ÎV = w + Îrλ + βT̂λV,
ÎV = z + Îrρ + βT̂ρV.
By eliminating V from these equations and simplifying, we obtain:
w = (Î − βT̂λ)(Î − βT̂ρ)−1(z + Îrρ)− Îrλ.
Therefore, we can define an LCP with the following inputs:
M = (Î − βT̂λ)(Î − βT̂ρ)−1,
q =MÎrρ − Îrλ.
Jurdzin´ski and Savani proved the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.12 ([JS08]). The matrix M is a P-matrix, and the unique solution
of LCP(M, q) can be used to find an optimal strategy for the discounted game.
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Chapter 3
Algorithms
In this section we describe the algorithms that have been proposed to solve our
problems. The first half of this chapter surveys the known results on these topics.
In the second half of this chapter, we describe in detail the algorithms that will be
studied in this thesis.
3.1 A Survey Of Known Algorithms
There are three prominent techniques that are used to solve Markov decision pro-
cesses. The first is to compute a solution of the optimality equations using value
iteration, which was proposed by Bellman [Bel57]. Secondly, there are reductions
from the problem of solving a Markov decision process to linear programming [d’E63,
Man60]. These reductions allow the use of standard linear programming techniques,
such as the simplex method [WD49, Dan49], the ellipsoid method [Kha80], and the
interior point method [Kar84]. Finally, there is strategy improvement, also known
as policy iteration, which was proposed by Howard [How60]. Strategy improvement
algorithms will be described in detail in Section 3.2.
Most of the complexity results have been shown for the discounted reward
criterion. Tseng has shown that value iteration terminates, and that it is a weakly
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polynomial time algorithm, under the assumption that the discount factor is con-
stant [Tse90]. Puterman has replicated this result for strategy improvement [Put05].
There are two problems with these results, which are the assumption that the dis-
count factor is constant, and the fact that they do not show strongly polynomial
time upper bounds. The linear programming formulation avoids the first prob-
lem, since these linear programs can be solved in weak polynomial time irrespec-
tive of the choice of the discount factor. In attacking the second problem, Ye has
shown a strongly-polynomial time interior point-algorithm for solving these linear
programs [Ye05], and he has shown that strategy improvement can be made to ter-
minate in strongly polynomial time [Ye10]. On the other hand, both of Ye’s results
assume that the discount factor is constant. The problem of finding a strongly poly-
nomial time algorithm that takes the discount factor as part of the input is still
open.
Strategy improvement algorithms for two player games were first devised
by Hoffman and Karp [HK66], who studied a variation of Shapley’s stochastic
games [Sha53]. Their algorithm is a generalisation of Howard’s strategy improve-
ment algorithm for Markov decision processes [How60]. The techniques used by
Hoffman and Karp have been adapted by Puri [Pur95], to produce a strategy im-
provement algorithm that solves discounted games. This algorithm will be described
in detail in Section 3.2.2.
Another possible way of solving a discounted game is to apply Zwick and
Paterson’s reduction [ZP96] from the problem of solving a discounted game to the
problem of solving a simple stochastic game [Con92]. Simple stochastic games com-
bine the traits found in Markov decision processes and two player games: the games
have two players, and the outcome when a player makes a move is determined by a
probability distribution over successor vertices. The two players play a reachability
game: one player is trying to move the token to a target vertex, and the opponent
is trying to prevent the token from arriving at the target vertex. There are various
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algorithms available to solve simple stochastic games [Con93].
The most widely known algorithm for solving mean-payoff games is the
psuedo-polynomial time algorithm given by Zwick and Paterson [ZP96]. The run-
ning time of this algorithm is bounded by O(|V |3 · |E| ·W ), where W is the largest
magnitude of a reward. Therefore, this algorithm will perform well when all rewards
are small. However, this algorithm will not perform well on games with exponen-
tially large rewards, such as those produced by the reduction from parity games to
mean-payoff games.
Two strategy improvement algorithms have been considered for mean-payoff
games. The first is based on the gain-bias optimality equations. Filar and Vrieze
devised a strategy improvement algorithm for a concurrent version of mean-payoff
games [FV97]. In these games, the vertices are not divided between the players.
Instead, at each vertex, the players play a matrix game to decide where the token
is moved. This means that the two players pick their moves concurrently, and the
successor is determined by the combination of these two moves. Mean-payoff games
can be seen as a special case of these games, and the strategy improvement algorithm
of Filar and Vrieze corresponds to a strategy improvement algorithm that uses the
gain-bias optimality equations for this special case.
The second strategy improvement algorithm for mean-payoff games is the al-
gorithm given by Bjo¨rklund and Vorobyov [BV07]. While the strategy improvement
algorithm of Filar and Vrieze computes the exact value for each vertex, this algo-
rithm only computes the zero mean partition of the mean-payoff game. On the other
hand, it can be shown that the running time of this algorithm is always bounded
by O(|V |3 · |E| ·W · (log n+ logW )), which makes this algorithm competitive with
the algorithm of Zwick and Paterson.
The classical algorithm for parity games is a recursive algorithm that was
originally given by McNaughton [McN93]. A reinterpretation of this algorithm was
provided by Zielonka [Zie98]. The best upper bound on the running time of this
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algorithm is O(2|V |). This result can be improved if the game contains many vertices
that are assigned the same priority. In this case, the running time can be bounded
by O(|V |d+1), where d is the number of distinct priorities that are used in the game.
On the other hand, it is known that this algorithm is not polynomial, because
families of games are known for which this algorithm takes an exponential number
of steps [Jur00, Fri10b].
Jurdzin´ski, Paterson, and Zwick present a modified version of the recursive
algorithm that achieves a better running time in the worst case [JPZ06]. The recur-
sive algorithm can take exponential time, because the result of each recursive call
may allow the algorithm to make only a small amount of progress. They show how a
preprocessing step can be added before each recursive call, and how this preprocess-
ing ensures that the result of the recursive call allows a significant amount of progress
to be made. By performing a careful balancing act between the amount of time spent
preprocessing, and the amount of progress that each recursive call achieves, they ob-
tained an algorithm whose worst case running time is sub-exponential: the running
time of their algorithm is bounded by nO(
√
n). This is the best known running time
for solving a parity game in which the number of distinct priorities is large.
The small progress measures algorithm given by Jurdzin´ski is faster than
the recursive algorithm when the number of distinct priorities is small [Jur00]. A
progress measure is a labelling of the vertices that satisfies certain properties. The
existence of a progress measure implies that one of the players has a winning strategy
for a certain set of vertices in the game. Jurdzin´ski showed that a small progress
measure can be computed in O(m · ndd/2e) time, which is better than the recursive
algorithm when the number of distinct priorities is smaller than
√|V |. Jurdzin´ski
also provides an exponential lower bound for this algorithm by providing a family
of polynomially sized games upon which the small progress measure algorithm takes
(dn/de)dd/2e many steps.
Schewe has combined the ideas from the small progress measures algorithm
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with the sub-exponential recursive algorithm to obtain the state of the art algorithm
for parity games with a small number of distinct priorities [Sch07]. The algorithm
of Jurdzin´ski, Paterson, and Zwick uses a brute force method to perform prepro-
cessing. Schewe showed that the small progress measures algorithm can be adapted
to perform this preprocessing faster than the brute force method. Through care-
ful analysis, he obtained a bound of O(m · nd/3+o(1)) for the running time of his
algorithm.
Finally, Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski have proposed a discrete strategy improvement
algorithm for parity games [VJ00]. Most strategy improvement algorithms measure
the worth of a strategy using a vector of rational numbers. However, Vo¨ge and
Jurdzin´ski give a discrete measure that can be used to rate strategies. This is
useful, because the discrete measure provides an attractive platform for analysis of
strategy improvement for parity games.
One simple algorithm for solving a linear complementary problem is Murty’s
least-index algorithm [Mur74]. This is a pivoting algorithm, and it selects the vari-
able that will be pivoted using a least-index rule. This algorithm is guaranteed
to terminate when the input matrix is a P-matrix. However, there are families of
examples upon which this algorithm takes an exponential number of steps to find a
solution to the LCP, even when applied to a P-matrix LCP [Mur78].
The problem of solving a bimatrix game can be reduced to the problem of
solving a linear complementarity problem. Lemke and Howson devised an algorithm
to solve the LCPs that arise from this reduction [LH64]. This was later generalised
by Lemke to provide an algorithm that can be applied to an arbitrary LCP [Lem65].
We will give a detailed description of Lemke’s algorithm in Section 3.3.1.
Lemke’s algorithm is guaranteed to terminate, but it is not guaranteed to
find a solution to the LCP. This is because the methods used by the algorithm may
not be able to process a given LCP. When this occurs, Lemke’s algorithm terminates
in a well defined manner, which is called ray termination. The fact that Lemke’s
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algorithm terminates in this way for a certain LCP does not imply that the LCP
has no solution. It only implies that Lemke’s algorithm is incapable of finding a
solution for that LCP. Fortunately, in the setting that we are interested in, where
the input is a P-matrix, it is known that Lemke’s algorithm will always terminate
with the unique solution to the LCP.
It is known that Lemke’s algorithm can take an exponential number of steps
to find a solution [Mur78, Fat79], even for P-matrix LCPs. However, the behaviour
of the algorithm depends on a user supplied covering vector. For example, Adler
and Megiddo studied the performance of Lemke’s algorithm for the LCPs arising
from randomly chosen linear programming problems [AM85]. They show that if a
natural choice for the covering vector is used, then the expected number of steps
taken by Lemke’s algorithm is exponential. On the other hand, a carefully chosen
covering vector allows Lemke’s algorithm to terminate after an expected quadratic
number of steps on these LCPs.
Another pivoting method for solving a linear complementarity problem is the
Cottle-Dantzig algorithm [DC67]. This method is also known to always terminate
with a solution when it is applied to a P-matrix linear complementarity problem. It
is also known that this algorithm can take an exponential number of steps [Mur88].
This algorithm will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
3.2 Strategy Improvement
In this section we describe the strategy improvement algorithms that have been
proposed for Markov decision processes and for two player games. Each model has
a specific strategy improvement algorithm, however all of these algorithms have
the same basic structure. We will begin by giving an outline of the features that all
strategy improvement algorithms share, and we then go on to describe the particular
details for each specific strategy improvement algorithm.
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The core idea behind strategy improvement is to use a valuation function
Valσ, which assigns a valuation to each vertex. Typically, the valuation of a vertex
will be a rational number, but there are some algorithms that assign more complex
valuations to each vertex. The discrete strategy improvement algorithm for parity
games is one example of such an algorithm. For now we will assume that our
valuation function is of the form Valσ : V → Q. The valuation function measures
how good a strategy is, and it therefore can be used to compare different strategies.
Given two strategies σ and σ′, we we say that σ ≺ σ′ if Valσ(v) ≤ Valσ′(v) for every
vertex v, and Valσ(v) < Valσ
′
(v) for some vertex v. Note that it is possible for two
strategies to be incomparable in the ≺ ordering, and that therefore, the ordering ≺
provides a partial order over strategies.
The principal idea behind strategy improvement is to modify each strategy
that it considers in order to create an improved strategy. To do this, it uses the
concept of a switchable action or edge that was introduced in Section 2.4. Strategy
improvement begins with an arbitrary strategy. In each iteration the algorithm
computes the set of actions or edges that are switchable in the strategy that it is
currently considering, and it then picks some subset of the switchable actions and
switches them. This operation creates a new strategy that will be considered in
the subsequent iteration. The algorithm only terminates when it reaches a strategy
with no switchable actions or edges. Algorithm 1 shows the general structure of a
strategy improvement algorithm.
Algorithm 1 A strategy improvement algorithm.
σ := an arbitrary strategy
while σ has a switchable edge do
Compute Valσ
P := the set of the switchable edges in σ
F := some subset of P
σ := σ with the edges in F switched
end while
return σ
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The key property is that switching a subset of switchable edges creates an
improved strategy. Strategy improvement computes a sequence of strategies that
monotonically increase in the ≺ ordering. Since there are only a finite number of
positional strategies, this process cannot continue forever. This implies that strategy
improvement must eventually find a strategy that has no switchable edges or actions.
The second property that must hold is that if a strategy has no switchable actions or
edges, then it is an optimal strategy for the MDP or game. In other words, strategy
improvement must terminate, and it only terminates when a solution to the MDP
or game has been found.
An important part of a strategy improvement algorithm is the switching pol-
icy. This is a procedure that decides which subset of the switchable edges or actions
should be switched in each iteration. The choice of switching policy has an effect on
the running time of the strategy improvement algorithm. We know that all strategy
improvement algorithms cannot take more iterations than the total number of posi-
tional strategies that are available. However, strategy improvement algorithms can
be shown to have better worst case running bounds when an appropriate switching
policy is chosen.
The proofs of upper bounds on the worst case running time for switching
policies are often independent from the specific strategy improvement algorithms
that use them. This is because all strategy improvement algorithms have an under-
lying combinatorial structure called a unique sink orientation [Wil88]. Many proofs
of worst case running time are in fact proofs that deal with these structures, rather
than with a specific strategy improvement algorithm for a game or an MDP. On the
other hand, proofs of lower bounds for the running time of a switching policy are
often specific to a particular strategy improvement algorithm.
This section begins by giving strategy improvement algorithms for the various
types of MDP, and game, that we are interested in. The second half of this section
gives a survey of the switching policies that have been proposed, and the running
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time bounds that have been proved for these switching policies.
3.2.1 Strategy Improvement For Markov Decision Processes
We will describe the strategy improvement algorithm for the average-reward crite-
rion that was given by Howard [How60]. This algorithm attempts to find a solution
of the gain-bias optimality equations. For each strategy σ, the algorithm computes
the gain and bias of σ by solving the system of equations given in (2.6)–(2.8), and
for every vertex v we define Valσ(v) = (Gσ(v), Bσ(v)). These valuations will be
compared lexicographically: we say that (g, b) < (g′, b′) if g < g′, or if g = g′ and
b < b′.
The algorithm first checks whether there is an action a at a vertex v such
that Gσ(a) > Gσ(v). We will call such an action gain-switchable. If there is such
an action, then the algorithm picks some subset of the gain-switchable actions and
switches them. We denote the operation of switching the action a at the vertex w
in the strategy σ as σ[a], and the strategy σ[a] is defined to be, for every vertex v:
σ[a](v) =

a if v = w,
σ(v) otherwise.
If S is some subset of the switchable actions in σ that contains at most one action
for each vertex, then we define σ[S] to be σ with every action in S switched. It
can be shown that switching a subset of the gain-switchable actions will yield a
strategy with an improved gain. The original proof of this theorem, as shown in
the book of Puterman [Put05, Theorem 9.2.6], only deals with the case where every
gain-switchable action is switched. This can easily be adapted to prove our claim,
by removing the gain-switchable actions that we do not intend to switch, and then
applying the original theorem to the resulting MDP.
Theorem 3.1 ([Put05, Theorem 9.2.6]). In the average-reward criterion, if σ is
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a strategy and σ′ is a strategy that is obtained by switching some subset of gain-
switchable actions in σ then Gσ(v) ≤ Gσ′(v) for every vertex v, and there is at least
one vertex for which this inequality is strict.
If there are no gain-switchable actions, then the algorithm checks whether
there are any bias-switchable actions. An action is bias-switchable if it is switch-
able but not gain-switchable. If there is at least one bias-switchable action, then
the algorithm selects some subset of the bias-switchable actions and switches them.
Once again, it can be shown that switching a subset of the bias-switchable actions
produces an improved strategy. The following theorem can be proved using the The-
orem shown in the book of Puterman [Put05, Theorem 9.2.6], in the same manner
as Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 ([Put05, Theorem 9.2.6]). In the average-reward criterion, if σ is
a strategy and σ′ is a strategy that is obtained by switching some subset of bias-
switchable actions in σ then Gσ(v) ≤ Gσ′(v) for every vertex v, and if Gσ(v) =
Gσ
′
(v), then Bσ(v) ≤ Bσ′(v). Moreover, there is at least one vertex v such that
either Gσ(v) < Gσ
′
(v), or Gσ(v) = Gσ
′
(v) and Bσ(v) < Bσ
′
(v).
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 together imply that the valuation function Valσ must
monotonically increase when a subset of the switchable actions is switched. This im-
plies the correctness of the strategy improvement algorithm that we have described.
3.2.2 Strategy Improvement For Discounted Games
Strategy improvement for two player games uses the same ideas as strategy im-
provement for Markov decision processes. In this section we describe a strategy im-
provement algorithm for discounted games that was originally given by Puri [Pur95].
Strategy improvement algorithms for games choose one player to be the strategy im-
prover, and attempt to find an optimal strategy for that player. In our exposition,
we will choose player Max to take this role.
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The first problem that we have is to define what a valuation should be in this
setting. When we considered MDPs, we could directly use the value of a strategy
as a valuation. This is not possible in the game setting, because even if we fix a
strategy for one of the players, the payoff that is obtained is determined by how the
opponent chooses to play against that strategy. In order to define the valuation for
a given strategy, we assume that the opponent is playing a best response against
that strategy. If Max plays a strategy σ, then a Min strategy τ is a best response if
it satisfies Valueσ,τ (v) ≤ Valueσ,τ ′(v) for every Min strategy τ ′ and every vertex v.
Therefore, our valuation of a Max strategy will be the value that it obtains in the
worst case, which occurs when Min plays a best response.
A best response can be computed by solving a one player discounted game.
Once a Max strategy σ has been fixed, every edge (v, u) such that v ∈ VMax and
σ(v) 6= u can be removed from the game. What remains is a game in which only
Player Min has meaningful strategic decisions, and this can be converted into an
equivalent one player game by giving all the Max vertices to player Min. The
problem of solving a one player discounted game can be formulated as a linear
program, and therefore, a best response to a Max strategy σ can be computed in
polynomial time. Moreover, there is a strongly-polynomial time algorithm for the
linear programs that arise from this reduction [MTZ10].
For a given Max strategy σ, there may be several Min strategies that are best
responses to σ. However, strategy improvement will compute only one best response
for each strategy σ. Therefore, we define the function br : ΠMax → ΠMin, which
selects a best response for each Max strategy. We make no assumptions about
which best response is chosen. The valuation function for the strategy σ will be
Valueσ,br(σ). For this reason, we define Valσ(v) to be shorthand for Valueσ,br(σ)(v).
It is not difficult to see that our valuation function satisfies the condition that
a strategy σ is optimal if and only if it has no switchable edges. The best response is
an optimal counter strategy, which implies that it cannot have any switchable edges
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when it is played against σ. Therefore, if σ also has no switchable edges, then we
know that Valσ(v) is a solution to the optimality equations for discounted games.
If this holds, then σ is an optimal strategy for Max, and that br(σ) is an optimal
strategy for Min.
We must also have that switching some subset of the switchable edges in a
strategy creates an improved strategy. The concept of switching carries over from
Markov decision processes: switching an edge (v, u) in a strategy σ creates a strategy
σ[v 7→ u] where, for every vertex w:
σ[v 7→ u](w) =

u if w = v,
σ(w) otherwise.
If S is a set of edges that contains at most one edge for each vertex, then we once
again define σ[S] to be σ with every edge in P switched.
Theorem 3.3 ([Pur95]). Let σ be a strategy for Max, and let S be a subset of the
switchable edges in σ that contains at most one edge for each vertex. For every
vertex v we have:
Valσ(v) ≤ Valσ[S](v).
Moreover, there is some vertex for which this inequality is strict.
3.2.3 Strategy Improvement For Mean-Payoff Games
The methods that we described in the previous section can easily be adapted to
produce a strategy improvement algorithm for mean-payoff games that uses gain
and bias to measure the quality of each Max strategy. However, Bjo¨rklund and
Vorobyov have given a different strategy improvement algorithm for the zero-mean
partition problem that does not use the gain and bias formulation [BV07]. We will
first describe this algorithm, and we will then explain how it is related to the gain
and bias optimality equations.
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As usual, we will pick Max to be the strategy improver. The first thing that
this algorithm does is to modify the game. The game is modified by adding a special
sink vertex s, and an additional outgoing edge (v, s) will be added from every Max
vertex v.
Definition 3.4 (Modified Game). A mean-payoff game (V, VMax, VMin, E, r) will be
modified to create (V ∪ {s}, VMax, VMin ∪ {s}, E′, r′), where E′ = E ∪ {(v, s) : v ∈
VMax} ∪ {(s, s)}, and:
r′(v) =

0 if v = s,
r(v) otherwise.
The strategy improvement algorithm of Bjo¨rklund and Vorobyov always
works with a modified game. Therefore, whenever we speak about the algorithm we
will assume that the game has been modified in this way. The purpose of modifying
the game is to ensure that Max always has an admissible strategy. A Max strategy σ
is admissible if Min cannot form a non-positive cycle when playing against σ. This
means that M(Play(v, σ, τ)) > 0 for every Min strategy τ .
The algorithm must be initialised with some admissible strategy. If the
user provides an initial admissible strategy then it can be used. Otherwise, the
modification of the game ensures that an admissible strategy can always be found.
This strategy will be called σ0, and it is defined so that σ0(v) = s for every vertex
v ∈ VMax. The strategy σ0 is admissible unless there is some negative cycle that
Min can form without ever passing through a vertex in VMax. However, these cycles,
and the vertices from which Min can force the token to these cycles, can be removed
and added to WMin in a preprocessing step, using Karp’s algorithm for finding the
minimum weighted cycle in a directed graph [Kar78]. Therefore, we can assume
that σ0 is an admissible strategy.
We can now describe the valuation function that this algorithm uses. We
begin by giving a valuation function for a pair of strategies σ and τ , for players Max
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and Min respectively. Suppose that Max plays an admissible positional strategy σ
and Min plays a positional strategy τ . Since both these strategies are positional, the
play that is consistent with σ and τ from a starting vertex v0 must either consist of,
a possibly empty, initial simple path followed by an infinitely repeated simple cycle,
or consist of a finite path that ends at the sink. In the first case, the admissibility
of the strategy σ ensures that the sum of the rewards on the cycle is positive, and
so we define the valuation of the vertex v when σ and τ are played to be ∞. In the
second case, we define the valuation of the vertex v when σ and τ are played to be
sum of the rewards on the path to the sink.
Definition 3.5 (Valuation). Let σ be an admissible positional strategy for Max and
let τ be a positional strategy for Min. We define the function Valσ,τ : V → Z∪ {∞}
as follows. If Play(v0, σ, τ) = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vk, 〈c0, c1, . . . , cl〉ω〉, for some vertex v0,
then we define Valσ,τ (v0) =∞. Alternatively, if Play(v, σ, τ) = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vk, 〈s〉ω〉
then we define Valσ,τ (v0) =
∑k
i=0 r(vi).
Given an admissible strategy σ for Max, a best response is then a strategy
for Min that minimizes the valuation when σ is played. Formally, an Min strategy τ
is a best response to σ if Valσ,τ (v) ≤ Valσ,τ ′(v) for every Min strategy τ ′ and every
vertex v. For an admissible strategy, we can compute a best response by removing,
from each Max vertex, every edge that is not chosen by σ, and then computing the
shortest path from each vertex to the sink. If there is not path to the sink from some
vertex, then the valuation of that vertex must be ∞. We again define br(σ) to be a
function that chooses some best response for the strategy σ. The valuation function
for each Max strategy σ will be Valσ,br(σ), and we again define Valσ = Valσ,br(σ).
We define the appeal of an edge to be Appealσ(v, u) = r(v) + Valσ(u). As
usual, an edge is switchable in the Max strategy σ if Appealσ(v, u) > Valσ(v).
This is equivalent to the condition Valσ(σ(v)) < Valσ(u). As usual, we have that
switching a subset of switchable edges will create an improved strategy.
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Theorem 3.6 ([BV07, Theorem 5.1]). Let σ be an admissible strategy and P be
the set of edges that are switchable in σ. Let F ⊆ P be a subset of the switchable
edges that contains at most one outgoing edge from each vertex. The strategy σ[F ]
is admissible, and we have σ ≺ σ[F ].
Secondly, we have that a strategy with no switchable edges is optimal in the valuation
ordering. A strategy σ is optimal in the valuation ordering if there is no strategy σ′
with Valσ(v) < Valσ
′
(v) for some vertex v.
Theorem 3.7 ([BV07, Theorem 5.2]). A strategy with no switchable edges is optimal
in the valuation ordering.
A solution to the zero mean partition problem can be derived from an optimal
strategy σ: the set WMax = {v ∈ V : Valσ(v) = ∞} and the set WMin = {v ∈ V :
Valσ(v) <∞}.
We now argue that this strategy improvement algorithm is strongly related
to the gain and bias optimality equations. Suppose that we add the edge (s, s) to
the sink vertex s, and consider the mean-payoff game played on this modified game.
If σ is a strategy such that Valσ(v) < ∞ for some vertex v, then we would have
Gσ(v) = 0 in the mean-payoff game, because the path chosen by σ and br(σ) ends
at the sink, and the mean-payoff that is obtained from the sink vertex is 0. Now, if
we rewrite the bias equation with the assumption that Gσ(v) = 0 we obtain:
Bσ(v) =

r(v) +Bσ(σ(v)) if v ∈ VMax,
r(v) +Bσ(br(σ)(v)) if v ∈ VMin.
Therefore, if Play(v, σ,br(σ)) = 〈v = v0, v1, . . . , vk, s, . . . 〉, then we have:
Bσ(v) = Bσ(s) +
k∑
i=0
r(vi).
Since s is a one-vertex cycle, and we insist that some vertex on every cycle should
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have the bias set to 0, we must have Bσ(s) = 0. Therefore, Bσ(v) = Valσ(v) for
every vertex with a finite valuation. In summary, the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy
improvement algorithm modifies the game so that the gain of every strategy is at
least 0, and then uses a simplification of the bias equation for its valuation function.
3.2.4 Switching Policies
The section describes the final component of a strategy improvement algorithm.
Strategy improvement allows for any subset of switchable edges to be switched
in each iteration of strategy improvement. Clearly, in order to have a complete
algorithm, we need a procedure that picks which edges should be switched in each
iteration. We will call this procedure a switching policy. A simple switching policy
can be thought of as a function that picks a subset of the edges or actions that are
switchable in the current strategy. In the average-reward MDP setting, we will have
a switching policy for picking gain switchable actions, and a switching policy for
picking bias switchable actions.
The switching policies that have been studied so far work for both two player
games and Markov decision processes, and the upper bounds for the running time
of these switching policies that have been found are usually the same across the
two models. On the other hand, the lower bounds that have been found are usually
specific to a particular type model. We will indicate the scope of the lower and
upper bound results as we present them. When we give formal definitions of these
switching policies, we will use the game formulation. These definitions can easily be
adapted for the MDP setting.
We begin by stating a trivial upper bound on the number of iterations that
any strategy improvement algorithm can take to terminate. Since strategy improve-
ment algorithms cannot consider the same strategy twice, the number of iterations
is obviously bounded by the total number of positional strategies that can be con-
sidered by the algorithm. Let Degree(v) denote the number of outgoing edges from
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the vertex v in a two player game, or the number of outgoing actions from the ver-
tex v in an MDP. Strategy improvement for two player games must terminate after
at most
∏
v∈VMax Degree(v) iterations, and strategy improvement for MDPs must
terminate after at most
∏
v∈V Degree(v) iterations. These bounds hold no matter
what choices the switching policy makes.
The simplest possible switching policy is to arbitrarily pick a single switchable
edge in each iteration. This switching policy can be defined as Single(F ) = {(v, u)}
where (v, u) is some edge contained in F . It has long been known that strategy
improvement equipped with the single-switch policy can take exponential time. For
games, the examples were originally found by Lebedev, and Bjo¨rklund and Vorobyov
adapted them to show an exponential lower bound on the number of iterations taken
by their strategy improvement algorithm, when it is equipped with the single-switch
policy [BV07]. For MDPs, Melekopoglou and Condon have shown an exponential
lower bound for a single-switch strategy improvement using a very similar family of
examples [MC94].
The most natural class of switching policies are all-switches policies. The idea
here is that the strategy should be switched at every vertex that has a switchable
edge. This defines a class of switching policies, because a vertex may have more
than one switchable edge, and different switching policies may pick different edges
to switch at each vertex. The most natural all-switches policy is the greedy switching
policy, that always picks the edge with maximum appeal.
We formally define the greedy switching policy. We must be aware that there
may be more than one edge that maximizes the appeal at a vertex. For the sake
of simplicity, we will use an index function to break ties: we will assume that each
vertex v is given a unique index in the range {1, 2, . . . , |V |}, which we will denote
as Index(v). The set of edges that the greedy policy will pick for the strategy σ can
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then be defined as follows:
Greedyσ(F ) = {(v, u) : There is no edge (v,w) ∈ F with
Appealσ(v, u) < Appealσ(v,w) or with
Appealσ(v, u) = Appealσ(v,w) and Index(u) < Index(w)}.
The best upper bound that has been shown for strategy improvement algo-
rithms equipped with the greedy policy is O(2n/n) iterations [MS99]. This upper
bound holds for games and for MDPs. For many years, people were unable to find ex-
amples upon which strategy improvement equipped with the greedy policy took sig-
nificantly more than a linear number of iterations to terminate. It was for this reason
that greedy was conjectured to always terminate after a polynomial number of steps.
However, in a breakthrough result, Friedmann found a family of parity games upon
which the strategy improvement algorithm of Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski [VJ00] equipped
with the greedy policy takes an exponential number of steps [Fri09, Fri10a]. It was
later shown that this result can be generalised to prove an exponential lower bound
for the strategy improvement for discounted games [And09]. It is also not difficult
to adapt Friedmann’s examples to produce a set of input instances upon which
the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy improvement algorithm equipped with the greedy
policy takes an exponential number of steps.
Perhaps the most intriguing type of switching policies are optimal switching
policies. A switching policy is optimal if for every strategy σ it selects a subset of
switchable edges F that satisfies Valσ[H](v) ≤ Valσ[F ](v) for every set H that is a
subset of the switchable edges in σ, and for every vertex v. It is not difficult to show
that such a set of edges must always exist, however at first glance it would seem
unlikely that such a set could be efficiently computed. Nevertheless, Schewe has
given an algorithm that computes such a set in polynomial time for the Bjo¨rklund-
Vorobyov strategy improvement algorithm [Sch08]. Therefore, optimal switching
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policies can realistically be implemented for solving parity and mean-payoff games.
No analogue of this result is known for discounted games or for MDPs.
Although, using an optimal switching policy would seem likely to produce
better results than the greedy policy, Friedmann has shown that his exponential
time examples for the greedy policy can be adapted to provide a family of exam-
ples upon which an optimal switching policy will take an exponential number of
steps [Fri10a]. Therefore, optimal switching policies perform no better than greedy
switching policies in the worst case. It should be noted that the word optimal is
used to describe the set of edges that an optimal switching policy chooses to switch.
It does not imply that a strategy improvement algorithm equipped with an optimal
policy will have an optimal running time. There may be switching policies that
do not always make the maximal increase in valuations in every iteration, but still
perform better in terms of worst case complexity.
Randomized switching policies have been shown to have better worst case
complexity bounds. Mansour and Singh considered a switching policy that selects
a subset of switchable edges uniformly at random [MS99]. They showed that this
switching policy will terminate after expected O(20.78n) number of iterations for
binary games, and an expected O((1 + 2/ log k) · k/2)n) number of iterations for
games with out-degree at most k. These upper bounds hold for both games and
MDPs.
The switching policy with the best currently-known worst case complexity
bound is the random-facet switching policy. This switching policy is based on the
randomized simplex methods for linear programming given by Kalai [Kal92] and
Matousˇek, Sharir, and Welzl [MSW96]. The first switching policy based on this
method was given by Ludwig [Lud95], which terminates after an expected 2O(
√
n)
number of iterations. However, his switching policy only works for binary games.
This shortcoming has been rectified by the switching policy described by Bjo¨rklund
and Vorobyov [BV05], which terminates after an expected 2O(
√
n logn) number of
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iterations for both games and MDPs.
In a recent result, Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick have found a family of
parity games upon which this bound is almost tight: the random-facet switching
policy will take an expected 2Ω(
√
n/ logn) iterations to terminate [FHZ10]. This lower
bound can be extended to cover the strategy improvement algorithm for discounted
games, and the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy improvement algorithm for the zero
mean partition. This lower bound is not known to hold for strategy improvement
for MDPs.
3.3 Algorithms for LCPs
3.3.1 Lemke’s Algorithm
Lemke’s algorithm modifies the LCP with a positive covering vector d and a positive
scalar z0. The scalar z0 becomes a new variable in the modified problem. The
covering vector can be chosen to be any positive vector. The LCP is modified by
replacing the matrix equation (2.1) with:
w =Mz + q + dz0. (3.1)
We are interested in almost complementary solutions to this modified system. A
solution is almost complementary if it has n basic variables, and if there is at most
one pair of complementary variables that are non-basic in the solution (recall that a
variable is basic if it is allowed to be non-negative in the solution). Lemke’s algorithm
will compute a sequence of almost complementary solutions to the modified system.
An initial almost complementary solution can be found easily. Let e =
min(qi/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n). If e is positive, then every element of q must be positive,
so the LCP has a trivial solution, and the algorithm can terminate. Otherwise, if
we set z0 = −e, then we have that setting w = q + dz0 and z = 0 is an almost
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complementary solution. The two vectors clearly satisfy Equation 3.1 and they
obviously satisfy the complementarity condition. They satisfy the non-negativity
constraint, because for each variable wi we have wi = q−d ·e ≥ 0. Moreover, for the
index i where qi = e we have wi = q− d · e = 0 and zi = 0. The algorithm proceeds
by performing a pivot operation between the variable z0 and the variable wi.
For example, consider the following P-matrix linear complementarity prob-
lem:
M =
2 1
1 3
 , q =
−2
−3
 .
If we choose the covering vector to be di = 1 for every i, then we have that
min(qi/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is −3. It can easily be verified that if z0 is set to −3,
then q + d · z0 is positive. Moreover, the second component of w is 0. The algo-
rithm would therefore perform a pivot operation between the variable z0 and the
variable w2.
This pivot operation is implemented as follows. To begin, the algorithm
constructs the tableaux [I,M, d, q], which is:
1 0 2 1 1 −2
0 1 1 3 1 −3
 .
The column associated with z0 is the column that contains the covering vector d,
and the column associated with w2 is the second column of the identity matrix.
These two columns are swapped to obtain the following tableaux:
1 1 2 1 0 −2
0 1 1 3 1 −3
 .
The algorithm then performs Gauss-Jordan elimination to transform the first two
columns back to an identity matrix. It can easily be seen that subtracting the
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second row from the first row will achieve this. Therefore, the algorithm arrives at
the following tableaux: 1 0 1 −2 −1 1
0 1 1 3 1 −3
 .
The new LCP can be read off from this tableaux, to give:
M =
1 −2
1 3
 , d =
−1
1
 , q =
 1
−3
 .
In this LCP, the variable z0 is the second variable in w, and the variable w2 is
multiplied by the covering vector d. It can easily be verified that setting w1 = q1,
z0 = 3, and all other variables to 0 gives an almost complementary solution to this
LCP.
We now discuss how Lemke’s algorithm moves from one almost complemen-
tary solution to the next. Since each almost complementary solution has exactly n
basic variables, one of which will be z0, the solution must contain a complementary
pair of variables wi and zi where both wi = 0 and zi = 0. One of these variables will
be chosen to be the driving variable. In the next almost complementary solution,
the driving variable will be basic, and some basic variable in the current solution
will be made non-basic. The difficulty is choosing which basic variable in the cur-
rent solution can be made non-basic while ensuring that we still have an almost
complementary solution. In particular, we want to ensure that all basic variables in
the next solution are positive.
In each step of the algorithm our almost complementary solution will have
the following form:
xB =M
′xN + q′.
Where xB is the n dimensional vector of basic variables, xN is the n+1 dimensional
vector of nonbasic variables,M ′ is an n by n+1 matrix which is the result of applying
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pivot operations to M and d, and q′ is the result of applying pivot operations to q.
Suppose that the driving variable ni is the i-th component of xN . In the next
solution, we will allow ni to become basic, which means that ni will rise from 0 to
some positive value. The question we are interested in is: how far can ni be raised
before some basic variable becomes negative? If e is the i-th column of M ′, then for
each basic variable bj we have:
bj = ej · ni + q′j.
If ej is positive then the value of the basic variable bj will rise as the value of ni
rises. On the other hand, if ej is negative then ni can only be increased to −q′j/ej
before the variable bj becomes negative.
This gives us the following minimum ratio test to decide which variable
should be made non-basic:
min{−q′j/ej : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} and ej < 0}. (3.2)
The minimum ratio test gives us the smallest amount that ni can be increased
before some basic variable becomes negative. The basic variable bj that achieves
this minimum is called the blocking variable. Lemke’s algorithm will perform a pivot
operation between the driving variable and the blocking variable.
After the pivot operation has taken place, we can set the driving variable be
basic, and the blocking variable to be non-basic. We can then compute a solution
to our new system of equations. By using the minimum ratio test, it is guaranteed
that all of our basic variables will be positive in this new solution. Moreover, in the
previous iteration there was exactly one complementary pair of variables that were
non-basic. Since we chose one of those variables to be the driving variable, it follows
that there can be at most one pair of complementary variables that are non-basic
in the current iteration. Since z0 is still a basic variable, we also have that there
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is at least one pair of complementary variables that are non-basic. Therefore, we
have arrived at an almost complementary solution, which can be taken into the next
iteration.
To complete our description of the algorithm, we must specify which variable
will be chosen to be the driving variable in each iteration. As we have noted, there
will always be some complementary pair of variables wi and zi that are non-basic.
In the first iteration, the algorithm selects zi to be the driving variable. In each
subsequent iteration, the algorithm selects the complement of the blocking variable
from the previous iteration. The algorithm continues until z0 is the blocking variable.
After this occurs, the variable z0 will become non-basic, and a solution to the original
LCP is recovered.
Let us return to our example. In the first iteration the variables w2 and z2
are both non-basic. Since w2 was pivoted with z0, the algorithm will select z2 to be
the driving variable in this iteration. The column associated with z2 is the second
column of M ′, which means that the vector e will be (−2, 3). Only the first element
of this vector is negative, therefore, the variable w1 must be chosen as the blocking
variable in this iteration. Therefore, the variable z2 will be exchanged with the
variable w1 in a pivot operation to obtain an LCP in which the first element of w
is z2 and the second element of w is z0.
In general, Lemke’s algorithm may not find a solution to the LCP. This is
because there may not be a basic variable bj such that ej is negative, and therefore
the minimum ratio test given in (3.2) is not well defined. In this situation, no basic
variable will ever become negative, no matter how much nj is increased. If Lemke’s
algorithm ever encounters such a situation, then it will give up, and terminate
without a solution. This is called ray termination. Fortunately, this situation can
never arise when the input matrix M is a P-matrix.
Proposition 3.8 ([CPS92]). If M is a P-matrix, then for every q, Lemke’s algo-
rithm will terminate with a solution when it is applied to LCP(M, q).
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3.3.2 The Cottle-Dantzig Algorithm
The Cottle-Dantzig algorithm allows the non-negativity constraint to be broken.
We say that a partial solution to the LCP is a pair of vectors w and z that satisfy
the conditions given by (2.1) and (2.3), and may or may not satisfy the condition
given by (2.2). The algorithm goes through a sequence of major iterations, where
it attempts to modify its partial solution to satisfy the non-negativity constraint.
Each major iteration begins with a partial solution where there are k indices at
which either wi < 0 or zi < 0. The objective of the major iteration is to find a
partial solution where there are strictly less than k indices at which either wi < 0
or zi < 0. Therefore, after n major iterations the algorithm will arrive at a partial
solution that also satisfies the non-negativity constraint, which is a solution to the
LCP.
Finding an initial partial solution is easy. Setting w = q and z = 0 obviously
satisfies the conditions given by (2.1) and (2.3). If every element of q is non-negative,
then this also satisfies the non-negativity constraint, and the LCP has a trivial
solution. Otherwise, for each partial solution α we define the set Pα, which contains
every index i such that wi ≥ 0 and zi ≥ 0 in α. The objective of a major iteration
is to find a partial solution β such that Pα ⊂ Pβ . This means that we want the
non-negativity constraint to be satisfied at some complementary pair that does not
satisfy this constraint in α. Moreover, we do not want the non-negativity constraint
to be broken for any complementary pairs that already satisfy this constraint in α.
We now describe how a major iteration is implemented. The major iteration
begins with some partial solution α, and it picks some basic variable bi such that
i /∈ Pα, to be the distinguished variable. Our goal is to find a partial solution in which
this variable and its complement satisfy the non-negativity constraint. To achieve
this, we temporarily violate the complementarity condition, by allowing both bi
and its complement to be basic variables. The idea is to increase the value of the
complement of bi until bi becomes 0. At this point, the variable bi becomes non-
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basic, and compliance with the complementarity condition is restored. Moreover,
since the complement of bi was increased away from 0, both bi and its complement
satisfy the non-negativity constraint. The only problem is preventing variables in Pα
from decreasing below 0.
To achieve this, the algorithm uses the same machinery as Lemke’s algorithm.
Whereas Lemke’s algorithm pivoted between almost complementary solutions to
the modified system, this algorithm pivots between almost complementary partial
solutions to the original LCP. To be more precise, this algorithm pivots between
partial solutions with n basic variables and n non-basic variables. The distinguished
variable and its complement are always both basic variables in these solutions, and
the solutions contain exactly one pair of complementary variables that are both
non-basic. We can use the methods that are used in Lemke’s algorithm to pivot
between almost complementary partial solutions.
The first driving variable is chosen to be the complement of the distinguished
variable. In each iteration we use a modified version of the minimum ratio test to
find the blocking variable. As with Lemke’s algorithm, each iteration will have a
system of the form:
IxB =M
′xN + q′,
whereM ′ and q′ are obtained through a sequence of pivots toM and q. If the driving
variable is ni, whose corresponding column in M
′ is e, then we use the following
modified minimum ratio test to compute the blocking variable:
min{−q′j/ej : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}, ej < 0 and j ∈ Pα}.
This minimum ratio test is only concerned with basic variables bj such that bj ≥ 0
in α. By using this minimum ratio test, we ensure that none of these variables ever
have a negative value in the sequence of almost complementary partial solutions
that we compute.
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As with Lemke’s algorithm, the blocking variable and the driving variable
are exchanged in a pivot operation. The major iteration terminates when the dis-
tinguished variable is chosen as the blocking variable. After this has occurred,
compliance with the complementarity condition will have been restored, and the
major iteration iteration can terminate.
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Chapter 4
Linear Complementarity
Algorithms For Infinite Games
In this chapter, we study how pivoting algorithms for the linear complementarity
problem behave on the LCPs that arise from Jurdzin´ski and Savani’s reduction from
discounted games, which was described in Section 2.5.2. There are other reductions
from games to the linear complementarity problem, such as the reductions from
simple stochastic games [GR05, SV07], the reduction of Jurdzin´ski and Savani gives
particularly natural linear complementarity problems. It is for this reason that this
chapter focuses on this reduction.
The reduction allows linear complementarity algorithms to be applied in or-
der to solve discounted games. However, very little is known about their behaviour.
Our goal in this chapter is to describe how these algorithms behave when the input
is a discounted game. Moreover, we want to prove lower bounds for the running
time of these algorithms.
The first part of this chapter describes how Lemke’s algorithm and the Cottle-
Dantzig algorithm behave when the input is a discounted game. This exposition
will be in the form of an algorithm that works directly on the discounted game. We
provide proofs of correctness and termination for these algorithms. These proofs do
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not rely on the correctness and termination of the corresponding LCP algorithms.
This exposition is for the benefit of readers who are interested in infinite games, but
who may lack experience in the literature on the linear complementarity problem.
We then argue that the two algorithms are in fact the same as the two
algorithms for LCPs. In order to achieve this, we argue that there is a direct
correspondence between the steps made by the discounted game algorithm, and the
steps made by the corresponding LCP algorithm. Therefore, any lower bound on
the running time of the discounted game version of an algorithm also holds for the
LCP version of that algorithm.
Finally, we show exponential lower bounds for both Lemke’s algorithm and
the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm when the input is a discounted game. It is known
that both of these algorithms can take an exponential number of steps when the
input is an arbitrary LCP, however this lower bound did not necessarily hold for the
class of LCPs that arise from the reduction of Jurdzin´ski and Savani. We describe a
family of parity games upon which both algorithms take an exponential number of
steps. Therefore, we establish lower bounds for parity, mean-payoff, and discounted
games.
4.1 Algorithms
4.1.1 Lemke’s Algorithm For Discounted Games
The key idea behind Lemke’s algorithm is to consider modified versions of the in-
put game. In particular, these games will be modified by adding or subtracting a
parameter z0 from the rewards on the left edges at each vertex. As with the LCP
version of the algorithm, the user is allowed to pick a positive covering vector. For
each v ∈ V there will be a positive covering value which is denoted as dv .
Definition 4.1 (Modified Game For Lemke’s Algorithm). For each real number z,
we define the game Gz to be the same as G but with a modified left-edge reward
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Figure 4.1: The discounted game that will be used to demonstrate Lemke’s algo-
rithm.
function, denoted by rλz , and defined, for every vertex v, by:
rλz (v) =

rλ(v)− dv · z v ∈ VMax,
rλ(v) + dv · z v ∈ VMin.
(4.1)
For each modified game Gz, the function r
σ
z will give the rewards on the
edges chosen by a joint strategy σ. The notations Valueσz and Bal
σ
z will give the
values and the balances of the vertices in the game Gz , respectively.
Lemke’s algorithm begins with an arbitrarily chosen joint strategy σ0. It then
chooses a parameter z0 so that σ0 is an optimal strategy in the game Gz0 . The idea
is to transform the modified game back to the original one, while always maintaining
the invariant that the current strategy is optimal in the modified game. Therefore,
the algorithm should produce a sequence of pairs 〈(σ0, Gz0), (σ1, Gz1), . . . (σk, Gzk)〉,
where z0 > z1 > · · · > zk, and zk = 0. For each joint strategy σi, the following three
properties will hold:
1. The strategy σi is optimal for the game Gzi .
2. For every parameter y < zi, the strategy σi is not optimal for the game Gy.
3. There is at least one vertex v with Balσizi (v) = 0.
The first property ensures that the algorithm is correct, because the fact thatG = G0
implies that σk is an optimal strategy for the original game. The second property en-
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Figure 4.2: The game Gz where G is the game shown in Figure 4.1.
sures that the algorithm terminates, because once a strategy σi has been considered,
it can never satisfy the first property again.
Throughout this section, we will use the example shown in Figure 4.1 to
demonstrate how Lemke’s algorithm works. The discount factor of this game is
chosen to be β = 0.9. The right-hand edges are specified as follows: we have
ρ(b) = a, ρ(c) = b, and ρ(e) = d. The figure only shows one outgoing edge for the
vertices a, d, and s, but this edge is duplicated to ensure that the game is a binary
game. For example, we have λ(a) = ρ(a) = s, and we have rλ(a) = rρ(a) = −8. It
is important to note that the strategy decision at these three vertices is irrelevant,
because the same value is obtained no matter what edge is chosen at these vertices,
and the balance will always be 0. Therefore, we are trying to find an optimal strategy
for the vertices b, c, and e. We will use the unit covering vector in our exposition,
which means that dv = 1 for every vertex v.
We begin by describing how the algorithm finds the initial pair (σ0, z0). We
will pick the joint strategy σ0 = ρ to be the strategy that selects the right successor
for every vertex in the game. This allows the user to pick an arbitrary starting
strategy by swapping the left and right edges at each vertex. Let us consider how
the parameter z0 can be found for the game shown in Figure 4.1. The modification
of this game is shown in Figure 4.2. We must pick a parameter that makes the
joint strategy ρ optimal, and we know that in an optimal strategy no vertex has
a negative balance. We can derive the following expression for the balance of the
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Figure 4.3: The balance of each vertex under the joint strategy ρ in the game Gz .
vertex b in the game Gz:
Balρz(b) = −4− β · 8− (−5− z + β · 7) = −12.5 + z.
Therefore, if we set the parameter z = 12.5, the balance at the vertex b will not be
negative. We can derive similar expressions for the vertices c and e:
Balρz(c) = −20.35 + z,
Balρz(e) = −14.5 + z.
Figure 4.3 shows a plot of these three functions. It can clearly be seen that
setting z0 = 20.35 will cause the pair (ρ, z0) to satisfy the three properties that we
are after. The joint strategy ρ is optimal in the game Gz0 because the balance of all
three vertices is non-negative. For every parameter y < z0, we have that ρ is not an
optimal strategy in the game Gy, because the balance of c will be negative in the
game Gy. Finally, the vertex c is switchable when ρ is played in Gz0 , because it has
a balance of 0.
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In general, the algorithm can initialise itself by selecting z0 to be the negative
balance with the largest magnitude. If σ0 happens to be an optimal strategy for
the original game, then the algorithm can set z0 = 0 and terminate. Otherwise, the
algorithm picks z0 = max{−Balσ0(v)/dv : v ∈ V }. We can prove that the pair
(σ0, z0) will satisfy the three properties.
Proposition 4.2. Let z0 = max{−Balσ0(v)/dv : v ∈ V }. The joint strategy σ0
is optimal in Gz0 and the vertex v in V that maximizes −Balσ0(v) is indifferent.
Moreover, there is no value y < z0 for which σ0 is optimal in Gy.
Proof. We begin by arguing that Valueσ0z0 (v) = Value
σ0(v) for every vertex v. This
holds because the modifications made in Definition 4.1 only change the rewards on
the left edges, and by definition σ0 only chooses right edges. Therefore, we have
rσz0(v) = r
σ(v) for every vertex v. It is then easy to see that Valueσ0z0 (v) = Value
σ0(v)
by noticing that the characterisation of Valueσ(v) given in (4.2) uses only the rewards
rσ(v).
We now prove that σ0 is optimal in Gy, by arguing that Bal
σ0
z0 (v) ≥ 0 for every
state v. Applying the knowledge that we have gained in the previous paragraph,
along with the definition of rλz0 gives, for every Max vertex v:
Balσ0z0 (v) = Value
σ0
z0 (v)− (rσ0z0 (v) + β · Valueσ0z0 (σ(v)))
= Valueσ0(v)− (rλz0(v) + β · Valueσ0(σ(v)))
= Valueσ0(v)− (rλ(v)− dv · z0 + β · Valueσ0(σ(v)))
= Balσ0(v) + dv · z0.
A similar derivation can be made in order to obtain an identical expression for
every Min vertex. Let x be a vertex such that z0 = −Balσ0(x)/dv , and note that
by assumption we have that z0 > 0. If Bal
σ0(v) ≥ 0 then clearly Balσ0z0 (v) > 0. If
Balσ0(v) < 0, then by choice of z0, we have that Bal
σ0(x) ≤ Balσ0(v), and therefore
we also have Balσ0z0 (v) > 0.
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To prove that there is at least one vertex that is indifferent, we again consider
the vertex x such that z0 = −Balσ0(x)/dv . For this vertex we have:
Balσ0z0 (x) = Bal
σ0(x) + dv · z0 = Balσ0(x)− dv · Bal
σ0(x)
dv
= 0.
Therefore, the vertex x is indifferent when σ0 is played in Gz0 . To finish the proof we
must argue that σ0 is not optimal in every game Gy where y < z0. At the vertex x
we have:
Balσ0y (x) = Bal
σ0(x) + dv · y < Balσ0(x) + dv · z0 = 0.
Therefore, the vertex x will be switchable when σ0 is played on Gy, and Corollary 2.9
therefore implies that σ0 is not optimal for Gy.
We now describe how the algorithm moves from the pair (σi, Gzi) to the pair
(σi+1, Gzi+1). We begin by describing how σi+1 is computed. By assumption there
is some vertex w that is indifferent when σi is played in Gzi . We switch this vertex
to create σi+1. For every vertex v we define:
σi+1(v) =

σi(v) if v = w,
σi(v) otherwise.
It is easy to see from the optimality equations that switching an indifferent vertex in
an optimal strategy will produce another optimal strategy. Therefore, σi+1 is also
an optimal strategy for Gzi .
The next task is to find the value zi+1 that is the smallest value for which σi+1
is an optimal strategy in Gzi+1 . Let us return to the example shown in Figure 4.1.
The vertex c was indifferent when σ0 was played in Gz0 , and so this vertex will be
switched to create the joint strategy σ1. Figure 4.4 shows the function Bal
σ1
z for
each of the vertices. Since the vertex c has been switched, the function Balσ1z (c) has
been reflected in the axis. This is because the balance of a vertex is computed as
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Figure 4.4: The balance of each vertex under the joint strategy σ1 in the game Gz .
the difference between the value of the vertex and the value of the alternate suc-
cessor. By switching this vertex, we cause these two quantities to be interchanged.
Therefore, we have:
Balσ1z (c) = −z + β · 4 + β2 · 7− (−1 + β · −4 + β2 · −8) = 20.35 − z.
This means that the value of c will now rise as z is decreased instead of falling.
The plot shown in Figure 4.4 gives a good outline of the situation that occurs
after a vertex has been switched. There is a range of values z ∈ [a, b] for which the
joint strategy σ1 is optimal in Gz. We know that the upper bound of this range
is z0, and our task is to compute the lower bound. This occurs when the balance
of some other vertex falls below 0. It can also be seen that the joint strategy σ1 is
not optimal in Gz for every value of z that lies outside this range. This is because
there is always some vertex that has a negative balance.
To compute zi+1 we will need to understand, for every vertex v, the rate at
which Value
σi+1
z (v) changes as z is decreased. For a joint joint strategy σ, we denote
the rate of change of the value as z decreases as ∂−z Valueσz (v), which is equal to
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−∂z Valueσz (v). It will turn out that this relationship is linear, this means that if we
decrease z by a constant c then:
Valueσz−c(v)−Valueσz (v) = ∂−z Valueσz (v) · c.
In our running example, we would have ∂−z Valueσ1z (c) = 1. This is because
Valueσ1z (c) can be rewritten as
Valueσ1z (c) = −z + β · 4 + β2 · 7 = 9.27 − z.
Therefore, as z is decreased, the value of the vertex c will increase.
We now explain how a formula for Valueσz (v) can be derived for every joint
strategy σ. This formula will be based on relationship between the rewards that
an infinite path passes through, and the payoff of that path. If a play begins at a
vertex v and follows a positional joint strategy σ then we know that the resulting
infinite path can be represented by a simple path followed by an infinitely repeated
cycle. If Play(σ, v) = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vk−1, 〈c0, c1, . . . , cl−1〉ω〉, then it is then easy to see
that:
Valueσ(v) =
k−1∑
i=0
βi · rσ(vi) +
l−1∑
i=0
βk+i
1− βl · r
σ(ci). (4.2)
We are interested in how the rewards given by rσ(vi) and r
σ(ci) affect
Valueσ(v). Specifically, we will frequently want to know how much Valueσ(v)
changes when we increase or decrease one of these rewards. This will be given
by the contribution coefficient.
Definition 4.3 (Contribution Coefficient). For vertices v and u, and for a positional
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joint strategy σ, we define:
Dvσ(u) =

βi if u = vi for some 0 ≤ i < k,
βk+i
1−βl if u = ci for some 0 ≤ i < l,
0 otherwise.
Using this notation, we have that Valueσ(v) =
∑
u∈V D
v
σ(u) · rσ(vi). There-
fore, if rσ(u) is increased by δ then Valueσ(v) will be increased by Dvσ(u) · δ. This
fact is used in the next proposition to give a characterisation of ∂−z Valueσz (v) for
every joint strategy σ. For a proposition p, we define [p] to be equal to 1 if p is true,
and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 4.4. For a vertex v and a joint strategy σ, let L be the set of vertices
for which σ picks the left successor, L = {v ∈ V : σ(v) = λ(v)}. The rate of
change of the value of v is:
∂−z Valueσz (v) =
∑
u∈L
([u ∈ VMax]− [u ∈ VMin]) · dv ·Dvσ(u).
Proof. Using the definition of rλz given in (4.1), gives the following formula for the
rewards on the edges chosen by σ. For every vertex v we have:
rσz−c(v) =

rσz (v) + dv · c if v ∈ VMax and σ(v) = λ(v),
rσz (v)− dv · c if v ∈ VMin and σ(v) = λ(v),
rσz (v) otherwise.
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We can now apply the characterisation of the value given by (4.2) to obtain:
Valueσz−c(v)−Valueσz (v)
=
∑
u∈V
Dvσ(u) · rσz−c(u)−Valueσz (v)
=
∑
u∈V
Dvσ(u)(r
σ
z (u) + [u ∈ VMax] · dv · c− [u ∈ VMin] · dv · c)−Valueσz (v)
=Valueσz (v) +
∑
u∈L
([u ∈ VMax]− [u ∈ VMin])Dvσ(u) · dv · c−Valueσz (v)
=
∑
u∈L
([u ∈ VMax]− [u ∈ VMin])Dvσ(u) · dv · c.
Now that we know how the value changes as z is decreased, we can use this
to compute the rate of change of the balance as z is decreased. We will denote this,
for each vertex v, as ∂−z Balσz (v). As with our notation for the rate of change of the
value, we will have:
Balσz−c(v)− Balσz (v) = ∂−z Balσz (v) · c. (4.3)
In our example, we would have ∂−z Balσ1z (v) = 1, because we have already shown
that Balσ1z (c) = 20.35−z. The next proposition gives a characterisation of Balσz−c(v)
for every vertex v and every joint strategy σ.
Proposition 4.5. For a vertex v and a joint strategy σ, if v ∈ VMax then:
∂−z Balσz (v) = ∂−zValue
σ
z (v)− ([σ(v) = λ(v)] · dv + β · ∂−zValueσz (σ(v))),
and if v ∈ VMin then:
∂−z Balσz (v) =−[σ(v) = λ(v)] · dv + β · ∂−zValueσz (σ(v)) − ∂−zValueσz (v).
Proof. We will prove the claim for a vertex v ∈ VMax. The proof for vertices v ∈ VMin
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is symmetric. The following is obtained by using the definition of Balσ, rearrange-
ment, and by using the definition of ∂−z Valueσz .
Balσz−c(v)− Balσz (v)
=(Valueσz−c−(rσz−c(v)+β ·Valueσz−c(σ(v)))) − (Valueσz −(rσz (v) + β · Valueσz (σ(v))))
=(Valueσz−c−Valueσz (v)) − (rσz−c(v) − rσz (v) + β · (Valueσz−c(σ(v)) −Valueσz (σ(v)))
=∂−z Valueσz (v) · c− (rσz−c(v) − rσz (v) + β · ∂−z Valueσz (σ(v)) · c).
To obtain the required form, we must deal with the expression rσz−c(v) − rσz (v). If
σ(v) = ρ(v), then we have that rσz−c(v) = rσz (v), and therefore rσz−c(v) − rσz (v) = 0.
On the other hand, if σ(v) = λ(v), then we have rσz−c(v) = rσz (v) + dv · c, and
therefore rσz−c(v) − rσz (v) = dv · c. From these two facts, we can conclude that
rσz−c(v)−rσz (v) = [σ(v) = λ(v)] ·dv ·c. This characterisation can be used to complete
the proof.
∂−z Valueσz (v) · c− (rσz−c(v)− rσz (v) + β · ∂−z Valueσz (σ(v)) · c)
=∂−z Valueσz (v) · c− ([σ(v) = λ(v)] · dv · c+ β · ∂−z Valueσz (σ(v)) · c)
=(∂−z Valueσz (v)− ([σ(v) = λ(v)] · dv + β · ∂−z Valueσz (σ(v)))) · c.
Now that we have a characterisation of ∂−z Balσz (v), we can explain how it
will be used. The following is a simple rearrangement of (4.3).
Balσz−c(v) = Bal
σ
z (v) + ∂−z Bal
σ
z (v) · c. (4.4)
From this it can be seen that if ∂−z Balσz (v) is positive for some vertex v, then
the balance of v under the strategy σ will increase as z is decreased. Likewise, if
∂−z Balσz (v) is negative, then the balance of v under the strategy σ will decrease as z
is decreased.
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To find the first vertex whose balance falls below 0, we only need to consider
the vertices v for which ∂−z Balσz (v) is negative. Then, for each vertex v we have
that the following ratio gives the amount that zi can be decreased by in order to for
the balance of v to be 0.
Bal
σi+1
zi (v)
−∂−z Balσi+1z (v)
.
Therefore, to find the smallest amount by which z can be decreased, we simply take
the minimum over these ratios. The next proposition shows that this minimum ratio
test is correct.
Proposition 4.6. Suppose that σi+1 is an optimal joint strategy for the game Gzi .
We define:
zi+1 = zi −min{ Bal
σi+1
zi (v)
−∂−z Balσi+1z (v)
: v ∈ V and ∂−z Balσi+1z (v) < 0}. (4.5)
The following three properties hold.
1. The strategy σi+1 is optimal for the game Gzi+1.
2. For every parameter y < zi+1 the strategy σi is not optimal for the game Gy.
3. There is at least one vertex v with Bal
σi+1
zi+1 (v) = 0.
Proof. We begin by proving the first property. We can ignore the vertices v with
∂−z Bal
σi+1
z (v) ≥ 0, because the balance of these vertices will not decrease as we
decrease the parameter. Let v be a vertex with ∂−z Bal
σi+1
z (v) < 0, and let cv =
Bal
σi+1
zi (v)/ − ∂−z Balσi+1z (v). Substituting this into (4.4) gives:
Balσ
i+1
zi−cv(v) = Bal
σi+1
zi (v)− Balσ
i+1
zi (v) = 0.
Clearly, for every value c < cv we have Bal
σi+1
zi−c(v) > 0. Therefore, by setting
c = min{Balσi+1zi (v)/ − ∂−z Balσi+1z (v) : v ∈ V and ∂−z Balσi+1z (v) < 0} we ensure
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that no vertex has a balance below 0 in the game Gzi+1 . Therefore σi+1 is optimal
in the game Gzi+1 .
To prove the third property, it suffices to note that there is some vertex x
for which cx = c. Therefore, we have Bal
σi+1
zi+1 (x) = 0. This also proves the second
property, because for every value y < zi+1 we have Bal
σi+1
y (x) < 0.
It is possible that there is no value y < zi for which σi+1 is optimal in Gy.
In this case we will have zi+1 = zi. This is known as a degenerate step. We
will postpone discussion about degeneracy until Section 4.1.3, and for now we will
assume that no degenerate steps occur during the execution of the algorithm. This
implies that for every i we have zi+1 < zi.
Algorithm 2 Lemke(G)
i := 0; σ0 := ρ; z0 := max{−Balσ0(v) : v ∈ V }
while zi > 0 do
σi+1 := σi[σi(v)/v] for some vertex v with Bal
σi
zi (v) = 0
zi+1 := zi −min{ Bal
σi+1
zi
(v)
−∂−z Balσi+1z (v)
: v ∈ V and ∂−z Balσi+1z (v) < 0}
i := i+ 1
end while
Lemke’s algorithm is shown as Algorithm 2. Since in each step we know that
there is no value y < zi for which σi is optimal in Gy and zi+1 < zi, it follows that
we can never visit the same strategy twice without violating the condition that the
current strategy should be optimal in the modified game. Therefore the algorithm
must terminate after at most 2|V | steps, which corresponds to the total number of
joint strategies. The algorithm can only terminate when z has reached 0, and G0
is the same game as G. It follows that whatever strategy the algorithm terminates
with must be optimal in the original game. Therefore, we have shown following
theorem.
Theorem 4.7. Algorithm 2 terminates, with a joint strategy σ that is optimal for G
after at most 2|V | iterations.
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4.1.2 The Cottle-Dantzig Algorithm For Discounted Games
The reader should be aware that in this section we will override many of the nota-
tions that were used to describe Lemke’s algorithm. In the future, whenever these
notations are used the algorithm that is being referred to will always be clear from
the context.
The Cottle-Dantzig algorithm begins with an arbitrary joint strategy σ0, and
it produces a sequence of joint strategies 〈σ0, σ1, . . . , σk〉. The process of moving
from σi to σi+1 is called a major iteration. Let Pi = {v ∈ V : Balσi(v) ≥ 0} denote
the set of vertices with non-negative balance in σi. The key property of a major
iteration is that Pi ⊂ Pi+1. This means that at least one vertex with a negative
balance in σi will have a non-negative balance in σi+1, and that every vertex with a
non-negative balance in σi still has a non-negative balance in σi+1. Since P ⊂ Pi+1
for every i, the algorithm can go through at most |V | iterations before finding a
joint strategy σj for which Pj = V . By Corollary 2.9, we have that σj is an optimal
strategy.
The bulk of this section will be dedicated to describing how a major iteration
is carried out. A major iteration begins with a joint strategy σi. The algorithm then
picks a vertex v with Balσi(v) < 0 to be the distinguished vertex. Throughout this
section, we will denote this vertex as d. The distinguished vertex will have the
property Balσi+1(d) ≥ 0, and we will therefore have Pi ∪ {d} ⊆ Pi+1. Once a
distinguished vertex has been chosen, the algorithm then temporarily modifies the
game, by adding a bonus to the edge chosen by σi+1 at d. This modification will
last only for the duration of the current major iteration.
Definition 4.8 (Modified Game For The Cottle-Dantzig Algorithm). For a rational
number w, a joint strategy σ, and a distinguished vertex d, we define the game Gw
to be the same as G but with a different reward on the edge chosen by σ at d. If σ
chooses the left successor at d then the left reward function is defined, for every u
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in V , by:
rλw(u) =

rλ(u) + w if u = d and u ∈ VMax,
rλ(u)− w if u = d and u ∈ VMin,
rλ(u) otherwise.
If σ chooses the right successor at d then rρ modified in a similar manner.
The reward on the edge chosen by σ at v in the game Gw is denoted as r
σ
w(v).
For a joint strategy σ and a vertex v, the value and balance of v for the strategy σ
in the game Gw are denoted as Value
σ
w(v) and Bal
σ
w(v), respectively.
To see why the game is modified in this way, it is useful to look at the balance
of d in the modified game. The properties that we describe will hold no matter who
owns d, but for the purposes of demonstration we assume that d ∈ VMax. The
balance of d for σi in Gw is then:
Balσiw (d) = Value
σi
w (d)− (rσiw (v) + β · Valueσiw (σi(v))).
Since rσiw (v) = r
σi(v)+w, we can see that Valueσiw (d) must increase as w is increased.
It may also be the case that Valueσiw (σi(v)) increases as w is increased, however due
to discounting, it must increase at a slower rate than Valueσiw (d). Therefore, as w is
increased Balσiw (d) will also increase.
The algorithm will use machinery that is similar to the methods employed by
Lemke’s algorithm. In each major iteration the algorithm will produce a sequence
of pairs 〈(σi = σi,0, w0), (σi,1, w1), . . . , (σi,k, wk)〉, with w0 < w1 < · · · < wk, which
satisfies the following properties.
1. For every vertex v ∈ Pi we have Balσi,jwj (v) ≥ 0.
2. For every value y > wj there is some vertex v ∈ Pi with Balσi,jwj (v) < 0.
3. There is some vertex v ∈ Pi with Balσi,jwj (v) = 0.
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Much like in Lemke’s algorithm, the first property ensures correctness, by never
allowing a vertex in Pi to have a negative balance, and the second property ensures
termination, by preventing the algorithm from considering the same joint strategy
twice. The third property ensures that there is always some vertex v ∈ Pi in σi,j
that can be switched to produce σi,j+1.
Each step of a major iteration begins with a joint strategy σi, and value
wi−1, for which σi satisfies the first property in Gwi−1 . For σ0, we can use w−1 = 0
to obtain this property. Much like in Lemke’s algorithm, we want to compute the
value wi = wi−1 + c that satisfies all of the properties. We therefore need to know
the rate at which the balance of a vertex increases as we increase c. For each joint
strategy σ, we denote this as ∂w Value
σ
w(u), with the understanding that:
Valueσw+c(v)−Valueσw(v) = ∂w Valueσw(v) · c.
The following proposition is a trivial consequence of the characterisation of Valueσ
given by (4.2).
Proposition 4.9. Consider a vertex u and a joint strategy σ. Suppose that v is the
distinguished vertex. The rate of change ∂w Value
σ
w(u) is D
u
σ(v).
Once again, we define the rate of change of the balance of a vertex v in a
joint strategy σ to be ∂w Bal
σ
w(v), with the understanding that:
Balσw+c(v)− Balσw(v) = ∂w Balσw(v) · c.
We can obtain an expression for ∂w Bal
σ
w(v) by substituting the result of Proposi-
tion 4.9 into the definition of balance given in (2.12).
Proposition 4.10. Consider a vertex u and a joint strategy σ in the game Gw such
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that σ chooses the edge with the bonus at d. The rate of change ∂w Bal
σ
w(u) is:
∂w Bal
σ
w(u) =

∂w Value
σ
w(u)− β · ∂w Valueσw(σ(u)) if u ∈ VMax,
β · ∂w Valueσw(σ(u))− ∂w Valueσw(u) if u ∈ VMin.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 4.5. The proof of this
proposition is simpler, because the bonus w is guaranteed to be on an edge chosen
by σ. Therefore, we have rσw(v) = r
σ(v) for every vertex v, and so the careful
consideration of rσw(v) in Proposition 4.5 does not need to be repeated.
With Propositions 4.9 and 4.10 in hand, the minimum ratio test from Lemke’s
algorithm can be reused with very little modification. The proof of the following
proposition is identical to the proof given for Proposition 4.6.
Proposition 4.11. Let σi,j be a joint strategy, and let wj−1 be a rational value.
Suppose that for every vertex v ∈ Pi we have Balσi,jwj−1(v) ≥ 0. If we set:
wi = wi−1 +min{ Bal
σ
w(v)
−∂w Balσw(v)
: v ∈ Pi and ∂w Balσw(v) < 0},
then all of the following properties hold.
1. For every vertex v ∈ Pi we have Balσi,jwj (v) ≥ 0.
2. For every value y > wj there is some vertex v ∈ Pi with Balσi,jwj (v) < 0.
3. There is some vertex v ∈ Pi with Balσi,jwj (v) = 0.
As with Lemke’s algorithm, it is possible that the algorithm could make a
degenerate step, where wi+1 = wi. These cases will be discussed in Section 4.1.3,
and for now we will assume that wi+1 > wi.
Once wi has been computed, the algorithm then switches a vertex that is
indifferent when σi,j is played on Gwj . This produces the joint strategy σi,j+1 that
will be considered in the next step of the major iteration. The algorithm stops when
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it finds a pair (σi,k, wk) for which Bal
σi,k
wk (d) ≥ 0. We define σi+1 to be σi,k with the
vertex d switched to the edge σi(d). We now argue that this correctly implements
a major iteration.
Proposition 4.12. For every vertex v ∈ Pi ∪ {d} we have Balσi+1(v) ≥ 0.
Proof. Since Bal
σi,k
wk−1(d) < 0 and Bal
σi,k
wk (d) ≥ 0, we know that there is some value
wk−1 < y < wk such that Bal
σi,k
y (d) = 0. Consider the joint strategy σi,k played in
the game Gy. Since d is indifferent, switching it does not change the value of any
vertex, and therefore Bal
σi+1
y (v) ≥ 0 for every vertex v ∈ Pi ∪ {d}.
We must now argue that Balσi+1(v) ≥ 0 for every vertex v ∈ Pi ∪ {d}. For
every vertex v ∈ Pi, this holds because σi+1 does not use the edge to which the
bonus y has been attached. Therefore, the characterisation given by (4.2) implies
that Value
σi+1
y (u) = Value
σi+1(u) for every vertex u. This implies that Bal
σi+1
y (u) =
Balσi+1(u) for every vertex u 6= d.
The above reasoning does not hold for the vertex d, because d is the only
vertex at which rσi(d) 6= rσiy (d). However, if d ∈ VMax then:
Balσiy (d) = Value
σi
y (v)− (rσiy (v) + β · Valueσiy (σi(v)))
= Valueσi(v)− (rσi(v) + y + β · Valueσi(σi(v)))
≤ Valueσi(v)− (rσi(v) + β · Valueσi(σi(v)))
= Balσi(d).
Therefore, Balσiy (d) must be positive. The proof for the case where d ∈ VMin is
symmetric.
The Cottle-Dantzig algorithm for discounted games is shown as Algorithm 3.
Note that in major iteration i, the algorithm only ever switches vertices in Pi. There-
fore, the algorithm can consider at most 2|Pi| joint strategies in major iteration i.
Therefore, the largest number of joint strategies that the algorithm can consider
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Algorithm 3 Cottle-Dantzig(G, σ)
i := 0; σ0 = σ;
P0 := {v ∈ V : Balσ0(v) ≥ 0}
while P 6= V do
j := 0; σi,0 = σi; w−1 := 0;
Pi := {v ∈ V : Balσi(v) ≥ 0}
d := Some vertex in V \ Pi
while Balσwi(d) < 0 do
wi+1 := wi +min{− Bal
σ
wi
(u)
∂w Bal
σ
w(u)
: u ∈ Pi} and ∂w Balσw(u) < 0}
σi,j := σ[σ(v)/v] for some vertex v with Bal
σ
wi(v) = 0
j := j + 1
end while
σ := σ[σ(d)/d]; i := i+ 1
end while
over all major iterations is
∑|V |−1
i=0 2
i = 2|V | − 1. Therefore, we have shown the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.13. Algorithm 3 terminates, with the optimal joint strategy, after at
most 2|V | − 1 iterations.
4.1.3 Degeneracy
Until now, we have ignored the possibility of reaching a joint strategy σ in which
there is more than one indifferent vertex. In LCP algorithms this is known as a
degenerate step. There are several methods in the LCP literature that can be used
to resolve degeneracy. One method for is Bland’s rule, which uses a least-index
method to break ties, and another is to use lexicographic perturbations. Both of
these methods are well-known, and are also used with the simplex method for linear
programming [Chv83]. We will describe how a degenerate step in Lemke’s algorithm
can be resolved by Bland’s rule. Our description can easily be adapted to resolve
degenerate steps for the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm. Bland’s rule has been chosen
because it has a particularly simple interpretation in terms of discounted games.
In each degenerate step, we have a joint strategy σ and a parameter z such
that σ is an optimal strategy in Gz , and there is more than one vertex v such that
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Balσz (v) = 0. Furthermore, we know that z cannot be decreased any further, because
there is at least one vertex v with Balσz (v) = 0 and ∂−z Bal
σ
z (v) > 0. This means
that the balance of v would fall below 0 if z were decreased.
The task of the degeneracy resolution algorithm is to find a joint strategy σ′
that is optimal for the game Gz such that every vertex v with Bal
σ
z (v) = 0 has
∂−z Balσz (v) < 0. Moreover, only indifferent vertices may be switched during the
procedure. Bland’s rule assigns each vertex a unique index in the range 1 to |V |.
Then, in each iteration, the algorithm switches the smallest vertex v such that
∂−z Balσz (v) > 0.
Bland’s rule works because it can never cycle, and because there must be at
least one joint strategy in which every vertex v with Balσz (v) = 0 has ∂−z Bal
σ
z (v) < 0.
If there are k indifferent vertices, then Bland’s rule must terminate after at most 2k
steps. This exponential upper bound shows that the choice of degeneracy resolution
method can have a severe effect on the running time of the algorithm. However, we
are not aware of any discounted games upon which Bland’s rule achieves this upper
bound.
4.2 The Link With LCPs
We have given two algorithm that solve discounted game, and we have proved their
correctness. These algorithms are clearly inspired by their LCP counterparts, how-
ever in this section we will show a stronger property: each algorithm for discounted
games behaves identically to the corresponding algorithm for LCPs.
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part we justify the definition
of the modified games used in the discounted game algorithms by showing how they
correspond to the almost complementary solutions that are considered by the LCP
versions of these algorithms. In the second part we argue that Lemke’s algorithm for
discounted games will perform the same sequence of steps as Lemke’s algorithm for
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LCPs. Since the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm uses the same machinery to perform each
major iteration, this reasoning can easily be adapted to argue that the discounted
game version of the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm will behave in the same way as the
LCP version.
4.2.1 Correctness Of The Modified Games
We begin by considering Lemke’s algorithm. The LCP version of Lemke’s algorithm
considers almost complementary solutions to the modified game, and the discounted
game version of this algorithm considers positional joint strategies that are optimal
for a modified game. We will show that there is a link between these two concepts:
for each almost complementary solution found by the LCP version of the algorithm,
there is a positional joint strategy and a modified game that correspond to this
solution.
Recall that Lemke’s algorithm modifies the LCP with a positive covering
vector d, and a scalar z0. The following Proposition shows how these modifications
affect the optimality equations for the discounted game.
Proposition 4.14. Let M and q be the result of reducing a discounted game to an
LCP. Every solution of:
w =Mz + q + d · z0,
w, z ≥ 0,
zi · wi = 0 for i = 1, 2 . . . , n,
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corresponds to a solution of:
V (v)− w(v) = (rλ(v)− dv · z0) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMax,
V (v) − z(v) = rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s)) if v ∈ VMax,
V (v) + w(v) = (rλ(v) + dv · z0) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMin,
V (v) + z(v) = rρ(v) + β · V (ρ(s)) if v ∈ VMin,
w(v), z(v) ≥ 0,
w(v) · z(v) = 0.
Proof. We will reverse the manipulations that were used to find M and q in Sec-
tion 2.5.2. By substituting the definitions of M and q into w =Mz + q + d · z0, we
obtain:
w = (Î − βT̂λ)(Î − βT̂ρ)−1(z + Îrρ)− Îrλ + d · z0.
If we define V = (Î −βT̂ρ)−1(z+ Îrρ), then we can rewrite the above equation, and
then rearrange it as follows:
w = (Î − βT̂λ)V − Îrλ + d · z0,
Î · V − w = Îrλ − d · z0 + βT̂λ · V. (4.6)
We can also rearrange V = (Î − βT̂ρ)−1(z + Îrρ) to obtain:
Î · V − z = Îrρ + βT̂ρ · V. (4.7)
Rewriting Equations 4.6 and 4.7 in component form gives the desired system of
equations.
Proposition 4.14 shows how the modifications made by Lemke’s algorithm can
be seen as modifying the rewards on the left hand edges at each vertex. Note that the
91
modifications made in Definition 4.1 precisely capture this change. Therefore, the
system of equations that we found in Proposition 4.14 correspond to the optimality
equations for Gz0 .
We now argue that each almost complementary solution that is considered
by the LCP version of the algorithm corresponds to a pair (σ, z) such that σ is
an optimal strategy for Gz. Let α be an almost complementary solution to the
modified system of equations. We will define a joint strategy σα that uses the edges
for which the corresponding slack variables are non-basic in α (recall that a variable
is non-basic if it is chosen to be 0). By definition, we have that there is exactly one
index v such that both wv = 0 and zv = 0. The LCP version of Lemke’s algorithm
will select one of these two variables to be the next driving variable. At this vertex,
the joint strategy σα will choose the edge whose corresponding slack variable is the
next driving variable. For every v ∈ V we define:
σα(v) =

λ(v) if wi = 0 and either zi > 0 or wi is the next driving variable,
ρ(v) otherwise.
Since α is a solution to w =Mz+ q+ d · z0, where both w and z satisfy both
non-negativity constraint and the complementarity condition, we have that Valueσα
must be a solution to the optimality equations for Gz0 . This implies that σα is an
optimal strategy for the game Gz0 .
In summary, we have shown that each almost complementary solution α
that is considered by the LCP version of the algorithm can be represented as a pair
(σα, z0) such that σα is an optimal strategy for Gz0 . Therefore, it is possible for the
discounted game version of the algorithm to behave in the same way as the LCP
version. In the next section, we will argue that this is indeed the case.
We now turn our attention to the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm. Recall that this
algorithm considers almost complementary partial solutions, which allow both the
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distinguished variable and its complement to be basic variables. This is problematic
for the discounted game algorithm, because positional strategies can only capture
solutions in which at least one of the two slack variables associated with each vertex
is 0. The modified games considered by the discounted game version of the Cottle-
Dantzig algorithm overcome this problem by representing the second non-zero slack
variable at the distinguished vertex as a modification to the game.
Suppose that zv is the distinguished variable in some major iteration. We
can rewrite Equations (2.13) and (2.14) as:
V (v) = (rλ(v) + w(v)) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMax,
V (v) = (rλ(v)− w(v)) + β · V (λ(s)) if v ∈ VMin.
This implies that we can view the additional non-zero slack variable wv as modifying
the reward on left hand edge at v. Since there is no longer a slack variable on the
left hand side of the equation, this characterisation only holds for positional joint
strategies σ such that σ(v) = λ(v). If wv was chosen to be the driving variable, then
the additional slack variable zv would modify the rewards on the right hand edges
in a similar fashion. These observations are implemented by the modified games
given in Definition 4.8.
Once again, for each almost complementary partial solution α, we define
a joint strategy σα. This strategy is similar to the strategy used for Lemke’s al-
gorithm, with the condition that, if v is the index of the distinguished variable,
then σα(v) should always choose the edge whose slack variable is the complement
of the distinguished variable.
σα(v) =

λ(v) if wi = 0 and either zi > 0 or wi is the next driving variable,
λ(v) if zi is the distinguished variable
ρ(v) otherwise.
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Therefore, for each almost complementary partial solution α, there is a pair (σα, x),
where x is the complement of the distinguished variable, that represents this solu-
tion. Therefore, it is possible for the discounted game version of the algorithm to
behave in the same way as LCP version.
4.2.2 Lemke’s Algorithm
In this section we argue that Lemke’s algorithm for discounted games behaves in the
same way as Lemke’s algorithm for LCPs. Since the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm uses
the same machinery, similar arguments can be used to show that the Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm for discounted games behaves in the same way as the Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm for LCPs.
We argue that the two algorithms initialise themselves in the same way. The
algorithm for LCPs starts by selecting every variable wi to be basic, and every vari-
able zi to be non-basic. It then finds an initial almost complementary solution α0,
by finding the index i that minimizes min(qi/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and swaps z0 with wi
in a pivot operation. Therefore zi will be the driving variable in the next iteration.
The algorithm for discounted games starts with the joint strategy ρ, which always
picks the right-hand successor of each vertex, and it is easy to see that this is the
strategy σα0 .
We now argue that the first parameter computed by the discounted game
version of the algorithm is the same as the value of z0 in α0. To see why this holds,
we will state a result that was proved by Jurdzin´ski and Savani.
Proposition 4.15 ([JS08]). If the vector q arises from the reduction of a discounted
game, then for each v ∈ V we have qv = Balρ(v).
This implies that Proposition 4.2 also uses min(qi/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n) to find
the initial parameter. Therefore, the discounted game version of the algorithm will
choose the pair (σα0 , x), where x is the value of z0 in α.
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We now argue that if the LCP version of the algorithm moves from αi to
αi+1, then the discounted game version of the algorithm will move from (σαi , x) to
(σαi+1 , y), where x is the value of z0 in αi, and y is the value of z0 in αi+1. The
most obvious difference between the two algorithms is that the discounted game
algorithm always tries to decrease the parameter z, whereas the LCP version of the
algorithm has a driving variable that it tries to increase. We argue that these two
operations are equivalent.
Recall that in each iteration the LCP algorithm has a system of the following
form:
xB =M
′xN + q′.
The vector xB is the n-dimensional set of basic variables, the vector xN is the (n+
1)-dimensional vector of non-basic variables, the n by n + 1 matrix M ′ has been
obtained through a sequence of pivot operations applied to the matrix M and the
covering vector d, and the vector q′ has been obtained by the same sequence of pivot
operations applied to q. If the driving variable is the i-th component of xN , z0 is
the j-th component of xB, and e is the i-th column in M , then we have have:
z0 = ej · (xN )i + q′j.
This implies that there is a linear dependence between z0 and the driving variable
(xN )i. It turns out that if M is a P-matrix, then ej is always negative. This means
that increasing the driving variable causes z0 to decrease, and decreasing z0 causes
the driving variable to increase.
This relationship means that both algorithms will compute the same blocking
variable. If the LCP algorithm finds that it can increase (xN )i to some value y
without a basic variable becoming negative, then the discounted game algorithm
will find that it can decrease z by −ej · (xN )i before the balance of some vertex
becomes negative.
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When the LCP algorithm has computed a blocking variable, it performs a
pivot to swap the driving variable with the blocking variable. This means that the
driving variable becomes basic, and the blocking variable becomes non-basic. If v
is the vertex that corresponds to the driving variable, then we know that both wv
and zv were non-basic in αi. If we suppose that wv was the driving variable, then we
know that the joint strategy σαi chose σ(v) = λ(v). In αi+1, we know that wv will
be basic, and zv will be non-basic. This means that the joint strategy σαi+1 must
choose σαi+1(v) = ρ(v). This corresponds exactly to the behaviour of the discounted
game algorithm.
4.3 Exponential Lower Bounds
In this section we will present exponential lower bounds for the algorithms that
we have described. Figure 4.5 shows the family of examples that will be used to
prove these bounds. These examples have been considered before: Bjo¨rklund and
Vorobyov showed that the single switch policy could take an exponential number
of iterations when it is used with their strategy improvement algorithm [BV07],
and a similar example was used by Melekopoglou and Condon to show that single
switch strategy improvement for Markov decision processes could take an exponen-
tial number of steps [MC94]. It turns out that both Lemke’s algorithm and the
Cottle-Dantzig algorithm can be made to take exponential time on these examples.
Figure 4.5 presents a family of mean-payoff games, and it is easy to see that
these examples could be expressed as parity games. If each reward ±|V |c is replaced
with a priority c, then applying the reduction of Puri shown in Section 2.5.1 will
produce the exactly the same game. To obtain a discounted game, we would then
apply the reduction of Zwick and Paterson shown in the same section. Therefore,
we will establish exponential lower bounds even in the case where the input is a
parity or mean-payoff game.
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Figure 4.5: The game Gn.
The reduction of Zwick and Paterson will set the discount factor to be very
close to 1. To simplify the exposition in this section, we will assume that the discount
factor β is actually equal to 1. This assumption is forbidden by the definition of a
discounted game, however since the game contains one cycle, and since the sum of
the rewards on this cycle is 0, the value of every vertex under every joint strategy
will still be finite. The discount factor chosen by the reduction from mean-payoff
games is close enough to 1 to ensure that the algorithms will behave as we describe.
Every play in the game Gn must eventually arrive at the sink vertex s, af-
ter which no further reward can be earned. We will therefore be interested in the
finite prefix of each play that occurs before the sink is reached. If Play(v0, σ) =
〈v0, v1, . . . vn, s, s, . . . 〉 for some joint strategy σ, then we define Prefix(v0, σ) =
〈v0, v1, . . . vn〉. In our setting, where the discount factor is 1, we have Valueσ(v) =∑
u∈Prefix(v,σ) r
σ(u).
The game Gn consists of 2n states {v1, v2, . . . , vn}∪{u1, u2, . . . un} and a sink
vertex s. Note that although the vertices vn, un, and s only have one outgoing edge,
we can express this game in our model by duplicating the outgoing edges from these
vertices. For example, we have λ(un) = ρ(un) = s, and we have r
λ(un) = r
ρ(un) =
|V |2n. For every other vertex, we define the right-hand edge to be the edge that
leads to the vertex owned by the same player. This means that ρ(vi) = vi+1 and
ρ(ui) = ui+1, for all i < n.
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4.3.1 Lemke’s Algorithm
In this section, we describe how Lemke’s algorithm behaves when it is applied to the
example. We will show that the behaviour of Lemke’s algorithm depends on which
vertices are switchable in the original game. In fact, we will show that Lemke’s
algorithm always switches the switchable vertex with the smallest index. We go on
to show that this property causes Lemke’s algorithm to take an exponential number
of steps to find an optimal strategy for the original game.
Lemke’s algorithm allows the user to pick the covering vector. Our exponen-
tial lower bound will be for the case where this is a unit vector. In other words, we
set dv = 1, for every vertex v.
We say that a joint strategy σ is symmetric if for all i in the range 1 ≤ i < n
we have that σ(vi) = vi+1 if and only if σ(ui) = ui+1. In other words, a symmetric
joint strategy is symmetric in the horizontal line separating the vertices vi from
the vertices ui in Figure 4.5. We have introduced this concept because Lemke’s
algorithm will always switch the vertex vi directly before or after it switches the
vertex ui. Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to considering only symmetric joint
strategies in this section.
We begin by analysing the balance of each vertex in the original game when
a symmetric joint strategy is played. The next proposition shows that for every
index i we have Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(ui), and gives a formula that can be used to derive
the balance of these vertices. In this section, we will prove properties about Balσ(vi).
The equality that we are about to prove implies that these properties also hold for
the vertices ui.
Proposition 4.16. For every symmetric joint strategy σ, and every index i < n,
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we have:
Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(ui) =

Balσ(vi+1)− |V |2(i+1) − |V |2i+1 if σ(vi) = ρ(vi),
−Balσ(vi+1) + |V |2(i+1) + |V |2i+1 if σ(vi) = λ(vi).
Proof. We begin by proving that Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(ui) for every index i < n. For
each vertex vi we can use the fact that r
λ(vi) = r
ρ(vi) to obtain:
Balσ(vi) = Value
σ(vi)− (rσ(vi) + Valueσ(σ(vi))
= Valueσ(σ(vi))−Valueσ(σ(vi)). (4.8)
Applying the same technique to the vertex ui gives:
Balσ(ui) = Value
σ(σ(ui))−Valueσ(σ(ui)).
The fact that Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(ui) then follows because, by symmetry of σ, we have
that σ(ui) = σ(vi) and σ(ui) = σ(vi).
We now prove the characterisation for Balσ(vi). We first consider the case
of σ(vi) = ρ(vi). In this case, we can use the formula given by (4.8) as follows:
Balσ(vi) = Value
σ(σ(vi))−Valueσ(σ(vi))
= Valueσ(vi+1)−Valueσ(ui)
= Valueσ(σ(vi+1))−Valueσ(σ(ui))− |V |2(i+1) − |V |2i+1
= Valueσ(σ(vi+1))−Valueσ(σ(vi))− |V |2(i+1) − |V |2i+1
= Balσ(vi+1)− |V |2(i+1) − |V |2i+1.
The case where σ(vi) = λ(vi) can be proved using identical methods.
We now give a simple characterisation for when a vertex is switchable in the
original game when a symmetric joint strategy is played. This characterisation is
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derived from the rewards on the outgoing edges of vn and un. Max wants to avoid
reaching the vertex vn because it has a very large negative reward, and Min wants
to avoid reaching the vertex un because it has a very large positive reward. In a
symmetric joint strategy σ, we have that vn is reached from some vertex vi if and
only if Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges. This is the characterisation
that is used in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.17. If σ is a symmetric joint strategy, then a vertex v is switchable
if and only if Prefix(v, σ) uses an even number of left edges
Proof. We will prove this claim by induction over the indices i. The inductive
hypothesis is as follows. If Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of edges then:
Balσ(vi) ≤ −|V |2n − |V |2n−1 +
2n−2∑
j=2i+1
|V |j .
On the other hand, if Prefix(vi, σ) uses an odd number of left edges then:
Balσ(vi) ≥ |V |2n + |V |2n−1 −
2n−2∑
j=2i+1
|V |j .
This inductive hypothesis is sufficient to prove the claim, because |V |2n+ |V |2n−1−∑2n−2
j=i+2 |V |j is positive for all i ≥ 0, and −|V |2n−|V |2n−1+
∑2n−2
j=i+2 |V |j is negative
for all i ≥ 0. In this proof we will only consider the vertices vi, this is because
Proposition 4.16 has shown that Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(ui) for all i.
In the base case, we consider the vertex vn−1. It can easily be seen that:
Balσ(vn−1) =

−|V |2n − |V |2n−1 if σ(vn−1) = ρ(vn−1),
|V |2n + |V |2n−1 if σ(vn−1) = λ(vn−1).
Therefore, the induction hypothesis is satisfied at the state vi.
For the inductive step, we consider a vertex vi. We will prove the claim for the
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case where σ(vi) = λ(vi) and where Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges.
The other cases can be proved using identical methods. Applying Proposition 4.16
and the inductive hypothesis gives:
Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(vi+1) + |V |2(i+1) + |V |2i+1
≤ (−|V |2n − |V |2n−1 +
2n−2∑
j=2(i+1)+1
|V |j) + |V |2(i+1) + |V |2i+1
≤ −|V |2n − |V |2n−1 +
2n−2∑
j=2i+1
|V |j .
We now begin to analyse the behaviour of Lemke’s algorithm on these ex-
amples. In order to achieve this, we must know the value of ∂−z Balσz (v) for every
vertex v and every joint strategy σ. It turns out that our simplifying assumption
of β = 1 gives us a simple formula for this quantity. This formulation also depends
on how many left edges are used by Prefix(v, σ).
Proposition 4.18. If σ is a symmetric joint strategy, then ∂−z Balσz (v) is −1 if v
is switchable, and 1 otherwise.
Proof. We will give a proof for the case where vi ∈ VMax, and vi is switchable. The
other three cases can be proved with similar methods. Since vi is switchable in σ,
Proposition 4.17 implies that the path Prefix(σ, vi) = 〈vi = xi, xi+1, . . . , xn〉 must
use an even number of left edges. We define CMax = {xj ∈ Prefix(σ, vi) ∩ VMax :
σ(xi) = λ(xi)} to be the set of vertices in Prefix(vi, σ) at which σ chooses a left
edge, and we define a similar set CMin = {xj ∈ Prefix(σ, vi)∩VMin : σ(xi) = λ(xi)}
for Min. We argue that |CMax| = |CMin|. This holds because whenever a player
chooses a left edge, they do not regain control until their opponent chooses a left
edge. We use Proposition 4.4, and the fact that Dvi(u) = 1 for every vertex u to
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obtain:
∂−z Valueσz (vi) =
∑
u∈CMax∪CMin
([u ∈ VMax] ·Dv(u)− [u ∈ VMin] ·Dv(u))
=
∑
u∈CMax∪CMin
([x ∈ VMax]− [x ∈ VMin])
=
∑
u∈CMax
1−
∑
u∈CMin
1 = 0.
If Prefix(σ(vi), σ) = 〈xi+1, . . . , xn〉 then pi = 〈vi, xi+1, . . . , xn〉 is the path that
starts at vi, takes the edge chosen by σ(v), and then follows σ. We begin by proving
that this path uses an odd number of left edges. If σ(vi) = ρ(vi) = vi+1, then the
fact that Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges implies that Prefix(vi+1, σ)
uses an even number of left edges, and by symmetry we have that Prefix(σ(vi), σ)
uses an even number of left edges. Since σ(vi) chooses a left edge at vi, we have that
the path 〈vi, xi+1, . . . , xn〉 must use an odd number of left edges. The case where
σ(vi) = λ(vi) = vi+1 is similar.
Since the path pi starts at vi ∈ VMax and it uses an odd number of left edges,
we can use a similar argument to the first paragraph to conclude that [σ(vi) =
λ(vi)] + β · ∂−z Valueσz (σ(vi)) = 1. Substituting this into the formula given by
Proposition 4.5 gives:
∂−z Balσz (vi) = ∂−z Value
σ
z (vi)−([σ(vi) = λ(vi)]+β ·∂−z Valueσz (σ(vi))) = 0−1 = −1.
We claim that for every symmetric joint strategy σ, Lemke’s algorithm will
choose z = |Balσ(vi)|, where i is the smallest index for which vi is switchable when σ
is played in the original game. In order to prove this claim, we must argue that no
vertex has a negative balance in the game Gz. We begin by considering the vertices
that are switchable in the original game. Proposition 4.18 implies that these vertices
have ∂−z Balσz (v) = −1. Therefore, in order for these vertices to not be switchable
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in the game Gz, we must have that Bal
σ(vi) > Bal
σ(v) for each vertex v that is
switchable when σ is played in the original game. The next Proposition confirms
that this is the case.
Proposition 4.19. If vi and vj are both switchable in a symmetric joint strategy σ,
and i < j, then Balσ(vi) < Bal
σ(vj).
Proof. Let S = {i : vi is switchable in σ} be the set of indices of the switchable
vertices in σ. We begin by arguing that for each vertex vi such that i ∈ S, we have
vj ∈ Prefix(vi, σ), where j = min(S ∩ {i+1, i+2, . . . , n}). Proposition 4.17 implies
that for every i ∈ S we have that Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges,
and for every i /∈ S we have that Prefix(vi, σ) uses an odd number of left edges. We
have two cases to consider. If σ(vi) = ρ(vi) = vi+1, then Prefix(vi+1, σ) must use an
even number of left edges, which implies that i+ 1 ∈ S.
The other case is when σ(vi) = λ(vi) = ui+1. In this case we have that
〈vi, ui+1, ui+2, . . . , ui+k, vi+k+1〉 is a prefix of Prefix(vi, σ), and we argue that i+k+
1 ∈ S and that there is no element j in the range i < j < i+ k+1 such that j ∈ S.
Since Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges, and σ chooses a left edge at vi,
we have that Prefix(ui+j, σ) uses an odd number of left edges for every j in the
range 1 ≤ j ≤ k. By symmetry of σ, we also have that for every j in the range
1 ≤ j ≤ k, the path Prefix(vi+j, σ) uses an odd number of left edges, and therefore
j /∈ S. Since σ must use a left edge when moving from ui+k to vi+k+1, we have that
Prefix(vi+k+1, σ) must use an even number of left edges, and therefore j ∈ S.
We now prove that for each i ∈ S we have Balσ(vi) < Balσ(vj), where j =
min(S∩{i+1, i+2, . . . , n}). From our arguments so far, we know that Prefix(vi, σ)
starts at vi, and then passes through a (potentially empty) set of Min vertices
{ui+1, ui+2, . . . , ui+k} before arriving at vj. Repeated application of Proposition 4.16
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gives:
Balσ(vi) = Bal
σ(vj)− |V |2j − |V |2j−1 +
2j−2∑
k=2(i+1)+1
|V |k ≤ Balσ(vj).
The next Proposition proves a similar property for a vertex v that is not
switchable when σ is played in the original game. In this case, Proposition 4.18
implies that ∂−z Balσz (v) = 1. Therefore, in order for the balance of v to remain
positive when σ is played in Gz, we must have that |Balσ(vi)| ≤ Balσ(v). The next
proposition confirms that this property holds.
Proposition 4.20. Let i be the smallest index such that vi is switchable in a sym-
metric joint strategy σ. For every vertex v that is not switchable in σ we have
|Balσ(vi)| ≤ Balσ(v).
Proof. We begin by arguing that this property holds for every index j < i. Propo-
sition 4.17 implies that Prefix(vi, σ) uses an even number of left edges, and that
Prefix(vi−1, σ) uses an odd number of left edges. Therefore, we have σ(vi−1) =
λ(vi−1). Proposition 4.16 gives:
Balσ(vi−1) = −Balσ(vi) + |V |2i + |V |2i−1.
This implies that the proposition holds for the vertex vi−1. Since i is the smallest
index such that vi is switchable, we have that σ(vj) = ρ(vj) for every index j < i+1.
Repeated application of Proposition 4.16 gives:
Balσ(vj) = −Balσ(vi) + |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−2∑
k=j+1
(|V |2(k+1) + |V |2k+1) > −Balσ(vi).
Since Balσ(vi) is negative, we have that |Balσ(vi)| ≤ Balσ(v).
We now turn our attention to the vertices vj with j > i. We know that
Prefix(vi) must pass through either vj or uj , and we know that Bal
σ(vj) = Bal
σ(uj).
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Let k be the largest index such that k < j, and σ(vk) = λ(vk). Proposition 4.16
implies that:
Balσ(vk) = −Balσ(vj) +
j−1∑
l=k
(|V |2(l+1) + |V |2l+1).
Moreover, no matter what moves σ makes on the indices between i and k, we have
the following inequality:
Balσ(vi) ≥ −Balσ(vj) +
j−1∑
l=k
(|V |2(l+1) + |V |2l+1)−
k−1∑
l=i
(|V |2(l+1) + |V |2l+1)
≥ −Balσ(vj).
Since Balσ(vj) is positive, we have that |Balσ(vi)| ≤ Balσ(v).
We can now prove the most important claim, which is that Lemke’s algorithm
will always choose z = |Balσ(vi)|. The next proposition shows that this value of z
satisfies all three invariants that Lemke’s algorithm requires, and it is not difficult
to see that no other value of z can satisfy all three of these requirements. Therefore,
Lemke’s algorithm must choose this value for z when it considers the joint strategy σ.
Proposition 4.21. Let σ be a symmetric joint strategy, let i be the smallest index
for which vi is switchable, and let z = −Balσ(vi). The following statements are
true.
1. The strategy σ is optimal for the game Gz.
2. For every parameter y < z the strategy σ is not optimal for the game Gy.
3. We have Balσz (vi) = Bal
σ
z (ui) = 0.
Proof. If v is a vertex that is switchable when σ is played inG0, then Proposition 4.19
combined with Proposition 4.18 implies that Balσz (v) ≥ 0. On the other hand, if v
is a vertex that is not switchable when σ is played in G0, then Proposition 4.20
combined with Proposition 4.18 implies that Balσz (v) ≥ 0. Therefore, we have that
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Balσz (v) ≥ 0 for every vertex v, which implies that σ is an optimal strategy for the
game Gz .
Proposition 4.18 implies that ∂−z Balσz (vi) = −1. Therefore, we have that
both Balσz (vi) = 0, and Bal
σ
z (ui) = 0. We also have that both Bal
σ
y (vi) < 0, and
Balσy (ui) < 0, for every parameter y < z.
Finally, we must argue that this behaviour forces Lemke’s algorithm to take
an exponential number of steps. The property given by Proposition 4.21 implies
that Lemke’s algorithm works from the right: it must find an optimal strategy for
the vertices v1 through vi−1 and u1 through ui−1, before it can switch the vertices vi
or ui. After these vertices are switched, every prefix that used an even number
of left edges now uses an odd number of left edges, and every prefix that used an
odd number of left edges now uses an even number of left edges. In other words,
a vertex vj with j < i is switchable after this operation, if and only if it was not
switchable before the operation. We can use this property to prove that Lemke’s
algorithm takes exponential time.
Theorem 4.22. Lemke’s algorithm performs 2n+1 − 2 iterations on the game Gn.
Proof. Suppose that Lemke’s algorithm passes through the sequence of strategies
〈σ0, σ1, . . . , σk〉 before it switches one of the vertices vi or ui for the first time.
Lemke’s algorithm will produce two strategies σk+1 and σk+2 in which is switches
the vertices vi and ui in an order that is determined by the degeneracy resolution
rule. Since Lemke’s algorithm works from the right, we know that Lemke’s algorithm
cannot switch a vertex vj with j > i before it finds an optimal strategy for the
vertices v1 through vi, and u1 through ui. Our principal claim is that Lemke’s
algorithm will take k more iterations before it achieves this.
For each joint strategy σj, let σ
′
j be that strategy with the vertices vi and ui
switched, and note that σk+2 = σ
′
k. We argue that Lemke’s algorithm will move
from the strategy σ′j to the strategy σ
′
j−1. To see why, suppose that k is the smallest
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index such that vk is switchable when σ
′
j is played on G0. Lemke’s algorithm will
switch both vk and uk to produce the strategy τ . Since every vertex with index
smaller than k was not switchable in σ′j , we have that every vertex with index
smaller than k is switchable in τ . We also have that vk and uk are not switchable
in τ . Furthermore, if τ ′ is the strategy τ with the vertices vi and ui switched, then
we have that the vertices vk and uk are switchable in τ
′, and that no vertex with
index smaller than k is switchable in τ ′. It follows that τ ′ = σj−1, and that τ = σ′j−1.
Therefore, after arriving at the strategy σk+2 = σ
′
k, Lemke’s algorithm will move
through the sequence of strategies 〈σ′k, σ′k−1, . . . , σ′0〉.
Therefore, we have the following recursion for the first time that Lemke’s
algorithm arrives at a joint strategy that is optimal for the first i indices. The
expression T (1) is derived from the fact that the initial strategy selects ρ(v1) and
ρ(u1), and that Lemke’s algorithm will spend two iterations switching these vertices
to λ(v1) and λ(u1).
T (1) = 2,
T (n) = T (n− 1) + 2 + T (n− 1).
It can easily be verified that T (n) = 2n+1 − 2.
4.3.2 The Cottle-Dantzig Algorithm
In this section, we show that the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm takes an exponential
number of steps when it is applied to the family of examples Gn. There are two
parameters that the user is allowed to choose for this algorithm: the initial joint
strategy and the order in which the vertices are chosen as the distinguished vertex.
We define the initial joint strategy σ0 to be σ0(vi) = ρ(vi) and σ0(ui) = λ(ui), for
all i.
It is not difficult to verify that each vertex ui has a positive balance in σ0,
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Figure 4.6: The joint strategy σ0 that is considered at the start of major iteration i
for the first i vertices.
and each vertex vi has a negative balance. Therefore, the set P0 will contain every
vertex ui, and these vertices cannot be chosen as distinguished variables. For major
iteration i, we will choose the vertex vi to be the distinguished variable. In other
words, the vertices vi are chosen in order from 1 to n. To establish our exponential
lower bound, we will prove that major iteration i takes 2i−1 steps to be completed.
The joint strategy σ0 that the algorithm considers at the start of major
iteration i is represented by the dashed lines in Figure 4.6. It is not difficult to
see that in major iteration i the algorithm will only modify the strategy at the
vertices vj and uj with j < i. This follows from the fact that there is no path from
any vertex uj with j > i to the distinguished vertex vi, and therefore the balance of
these vertices cannot be affected by the bonus that is added to the outgoing edge
of vi.
Unlike Lemke’s algorithm, the overall strategy will not be symmetric until the
optimal strategy is found, but during major iteration i the strategy will be symmetric
on the vertices vj and uj with j < i. This is shown as the symmetric portion in
Figure 4.6. In this section, we will call a strategy symmetric if it is symmetric for
every vertex index that is smaller than i. The Cottle-Dantzig algorithm will always
switch the vertex vi immediately before or after it switched the vertex ui, and
therefore it can be seen as a process that moves between symmetric joint strategies.
Our first proposition gives a simple characterisation of ∂z Bal
σ
z (v) for each
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vertex in the symmetric portion, and for every joint strategy σ. Once again, this
relies on whether an odd or even number of left edges are used by Prefix(v, σ).
However, for the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm, we are only interested in the portion of
Prefix(v, σ) that lies in the symmetric portion. We are not interested in the number
of left edges used by Prefix(v, σ) after it has passed through either vi or ui.
Proposition 4.23. Suppose that the algorithm is in the major iteration i and is
considering a symmetric joint strategy σ, and let v be some vertex vj or uj with
j < i. If pi = 〈v = x0, x1, . . . xk〉 is the prefix of Prefix(v, σ) such that xk is either vi
or ui, then we have:
∂z Bal
σ
z (v) =

−1 If pi uses an odd number of left edges,
1 otherwise.
Proof. We will prove this proposition for a vertex vj with j < i. The proof for the
vertices uj will be entirely symmetrical. If pi uses an odd number of left edges, then
we must have that xk = ui. This implies that ∂z Value
σ
z (vj) = 0. The symmetry
of σ implies that Prefix(σ(vj), σ) must pass through the vertex vi. Therefore, we
have that ∂z Value
σ
z (σ(vj)) = 1. Substituting these into the definition of ∂z Bal
σ
z (v)
gives:
∂z Bal
σ
z (vj) = ∂z Value
σ
z (vj)− β · ∂z Valueσz (σ(vj)) = 0− 1 = −1.
On the other hand, if pi uses an even number of left edges, then we must have
that xk = vi. This implies that ∂z Value
σ
z (vj) = 1 and ∂z Value
σ
z (σ(vj)) = 0. By
performing the same substitution, we can conclude that ∂z Bal
σ
z (vj) = 1.
Proposition 4.23 implies that for the initial joint strategy σ0 in major iter-
ation i, every vertex vj or uj with j < i has ∂z Bal
σ0
z (v) = −1. This means that
as w is increased, the balance of every vertex in the symmetric portion will decrease.
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Therefore, to find the first parameter w that is chosen in each major iteration, we
must find the vertex in the symmetric portion that has the smallest balance. The
next proposition gives a characterisation for the balance of each vertex in the sym-
metric portion for the initial strategy, which can easily be verified by tracing the
paths used by the strategy shown in Figure 4.6.
Proposition 4.24. For every index j where j < i, we have:
Balσ0(vi) = Bal
σ0(ui) = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−1∑
k=j+1
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
This proposition indicates that in the initial strategy, the vertices v1 and u1
have the smallest balance among the vertices in the symmetric portion. Therefore,
the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm will choose a parameter w that makes these vertices
indifferent.
Recall that our goal is to show that major iteration i will take 2i − 2 steps.
Our proof of this will be by induction over the first time that a vertex vj has
balance 0. We define, for 1 ≤ j < i, the quantity kj to be the number of strategies
that the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm passes through before the vertex vj has balance 0
for the first time. Furthermore, we define wj to be the value of the parameter when
this occurs. The inductive hypothesis is as follows.
• For each j we have that kj = 2j+1 − 2.
• For each j we have that wj = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
∑i−1
k=j+1(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
• In the first kj iterations, no vertex with index larger than j will be switched.
From our arguments so far, we know that k1 = 0 and w1 = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −∑i−1
k=2(|V |2k + |V |2k−1), and we know that no vertex with index larger than 1 has
been switched. This proves the base case of the induction.
We will now prove the inductive step. Suppose that the algorithm has passed
through the sequence of strategies 〈σ0, σ1, . . . σkj 〉, to arrive at the joint strategy σkj
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in which the vertex vj has balance 0 for the first time. We know that the parameter w
has been set to wj in this iteration.
By the inductive hypothesis, we know that no vertex vl with l in the range
j < l < i has been switched since the start of this major iteration. This implies that
σkj = σ0 on these vertices. It follows that the balance of vl has been continuously
decreasing since the start of the major iteration, and therefore we have Bal
σkj
wj (vl) =
Balσ00 (vl)−wj. The first thing that we will prove is that the balance of vl will remain
positive even if w is raised to 2wj − w1.
Proposition 4.25. If w = 2wj −w1 then Balσ0w (vl)−w ≥ 0 and Balσ0w (ul)−w ≥ 0
for each l in the range j < l < i.
Proof. We prove the proposition for the vertices vl with l in the range j < l < i.
The proof for the vertices ul is entirely symmetric. Proposition 4.24 implies that
the balance of vl in G0 was:
Balσ0(vl) = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−1∑
k=l+1
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
The inductive hypothesis gives the following two equalities.
wj = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−1∑
k=j+1
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1)
w1 = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−1∑
k=2
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1)
Simple arithmetic gives the following expression for 2wj − w1:
|V |2i + |V |2i−1 −
i−1∑
k=j+1
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1) +
j∑
k=2
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
111
Finally, we obtain:
Balσ0(vl)− (2 · wj − w1) =
l∑
k=j+1
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1)−
j∑
k=2
(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
Since l ≥ j + 1, this expression must be positive.
Our next task is to show that the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm will pass through
kj + 2 further strategies after it has reached the joint strategy σkj . For each joint
strategy σi we define:
σ′l(v) =

σl(v) if v = vj or v = uj,
σl(v) otherwise.
In other words, σ′l is σl in which the vertices with index j have been switched. To
prove this claim, we will show that the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm passes through
each of the strategies σl with 1 ≤ l ≤ kj .
Proposition 4.26. After arriving at the joint strategy σkj , the Cottle-Dantzig al-
gorithm will pass through kj + 2 further strategies while raising the parameter w to
at most 2wj −w1. No vertex vl with l in the range j < l < i is switched during this
sequence.
Proof. Since both vertices with index j are indifferent in σkj the algorithm will
produce two strategies σkj+1 and σkj+2, in order to switch these two vertices. Note
that σkj+2 = σ
′
kj
. Proposition 4.23 implies that for every l in the range 1 ≤ l ≤ kj
and every vertex vm with m < j we have:
∂z Bal
σl
z (vm) = −∂z Balσ
′
l
z (vm).
This is because after switching the vertex pair with index j the path from every
vertex with index less than j sees an extra left edge. So, as w is increased the
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balance of every vertex σ′l will move in a direction that is opposite to the way that
it moved in σl. Therefore, if w is raised to 2wj −w1 then Cottle-Dantzig algorithm
will pass through the sequence of strategies 〈σ′kj , σ′kj−1, . . . σ′0〉. This is because w
was increased by wj − w1 as the algorithm moved from σ0 to σkj . Proposition 4.25
confirms that no vertex with index greater than j can be switched during this
process.
We have provided a proof for the first and third conditions of the inductive
hypothesis. To complete the proof, the next proposition shows that the vertices vj+1
and uj+1 have balance 0 for the first time in the iteration where the Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm considers the joint strategy σ′0.
Proposition 4.27. We have kj+1 = 2
j+2 − 2 and wj+1 = |V |2i + |V |2i−1 −∑i−1
k=j+2(|V |2k + |V |2k−1).
Proof. We must show that after arriving at the joint strategy σ′0, The Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm sets the parameter w to wj+1, and that the balance of vj+1 is 0 when σ
′
0
is played in Gwj+1 . Note that in σ
′
0 the path from every vertex vl with l < j uses
precisely two left edges: one which belongs to either vj or uj and one that belongs
to vi−1 or ui−1. From this we can conclude, by Proposition 4.23, that ∂z Bal
σ′0
z (v) = 1
for every vertex v with index smaller than or equal to j. This implies that once the
algorithm has reached σ′0 it can continue to raise w until the balance of some vertex
with index greater than j becomes 0.
We know that the balance of every vertex with index higher than j has
decreased in every iteration. Therefore, to find the first vertex whose balance be-
comes 0 as w is increased we need only to find the vertex whose balance was the
smallest, among those vertices with indices higher than j, at the start of major it-
eration i. From Proposition 4.24 this is clearly the vertex vj+1. Moreover, we know
that w must be set to |V |2i+ |V |2i−1−∑i−1k=j+2(|V |2k + |V |2k−1) in order to achieve
this.
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We now know that each major iteration must take at least 2i − 2 steps. We
have therefore shown the following theorem, which is an exponential lower bound
for the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm.
Theorem 4.28. Consider an order in which all Min vertices precede Max vertices,
and Max vertices are ordered from right to left. The Cottle-Dantzig algorithm per-
forms 2n+1 − 2n − 1 iterations.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have studied two classical pivoting algorithms from the LCP liter-
ature. We have shown how these algorithms can be interpreted as strategy iteration
algorithms when they are applied to discounted games. We have also constructed a
family of examples upon which both of these algorithms take exponential time.
It should be stressed that the lower bounds that have been shown in this
chapter depend on specific choices for user-supplied parameters. The exponential
lower bound for Lemke’s algorithm requires that the covering vector is chosen to
be a unit vector, and the lower bound for the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm requires
a specific ordering over the choice of the distinguished vertex. There are other
choices of these parameters for which the algorithms behave well: there is a choice
of covering vector that makes Lemke’s algorithm terminate in a linear number of
steps on our examples, and there is an ordering for distinguished vertices that makes
the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm terminate in a linear number of steps.
This situation can be compared with the choice of switching policy in strategy
improvement. The fact that some switching policies take exponential time does not
rule out the possibility of a switching policy that always terminates in polynomial
time. Therefore, the effect that the choice of covering vector and ordering over
distinguished vertices has upon the running time of the respective algorithms should
be studied. For example, in strategy improvement it is known that for each input
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instance there is a switching policy that causes strategy improvement to terminate
after a linear number of iterations. It would be interesting to see if this result can
be replicated for our algorithms. This would involve proving that for each example
there is a choice of covering vector that makes Lemke’s algorithm terminate in
polynomial time, or that there is a choice of ordering over distinguished vertices that
makes the Cottle-Dantzig algorithm terminate in polynomial time. On the other
hand, if this property does not hold, then it would also be interesting to extend our
lower bound for arbitrarily chosen covering vectors and arbitrarily chosen orderings
over distinguished vertices.
A more challenging problem is to show that these parameters can be chosen
in a way that guarantees that the algorithms will terminate quickly. There are
previous results that indicate that this may be fruitful. Adler and Megiddo studied
the performance of Lemke’s algorithm for the LCPs arising from randomly chosen
linear programs [AM85]. They showed that if a unit covering vector is used, then the
expected running time of Lemke’s algorithm is exponential. On the other hand, they
carefully construct a covering vector that causes Lemke’s algorithm to terminate
after an expected quadratic number of steps.
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Chapter 5
Greedy Strategy Improvement
For Markov Decision Processes
The greedy switching policy for strategy improvement is probably the most nat-
ural switching policy. It was long thought that strategy improvement algorithms
equipped with this switching policy could be proved to terminate in polynomial time.
In the game setting, these hopes were dashed by the result of Friedmann [Fri09],
which gives a family of parity games upon which the strategy improvement algo-
rithm of Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski [VJ00] took exponential time. It was later shown that
these examples could be generalised to provide exponential lower bounds for strategy
improvement on mean-payoff, discounted, and simple stochastic games [And09].
However, the lower bounds that have been discovered so far apply only to
games. The running time of greedy strategy improvement for Markov decision pro-
cesses has been left open. It is possible to imagine that greedy strategy improvement
could be exponential for games and polynomial for MDPs. This possibility is high-
lighted by the fact that critical structures in Friedmann’s examples rely on the
behaviour of the second player.
In this chapter we show how Friedmann’s examples can be adapted to provide
exponential lower bounds in the Markov decision process setting. We show how the
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second player in Friedmann’s examples can be replaced with a random action in the
Markov decision process setting. We produce a family of Markov decision processes
upon which greedy strategy improvement for the average-reward criteria take an
exponential number of steps.
5.1 The Strategy Improvement Algorithm
The family of examples that will be used to show the exponential lower bound
have a special form. Each example contains a sink, which is a vertex s with a
single outgoing action (s, s) such that r(s, s) = 0. Moreover, every run under every
strategy that is considered by the strategy improvement algorithm will arrive at this
sink. This means that we will produce an exponential sequence of strategies, such
that Gσ(v) = 0 for each strategy σ in this sequence, and for every vertex v in the
example.
This property allows us to simplify our notation. Recall that the strategy
improvement algorithm for the average-reward criterion has two different types of it-
eration: if there is a gain-switchable action, then the algorithm will only switch gain-
switchable actions, and if there are no gain-switchable actions, then the algorithm
will switch bias-switchable actions. However, since the gain of each strategy is al-
ways 0, we know that the algorithm algorithm can never encounter a gain-switchable
action. From this, it follows that only bias switchable actions are switched during
our exponential sequence of strategies. Therefore, we can completely ignore the gain
component of each strategy during our proofs.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we will use this knowledge to simplify
the optimality equations given in (2.6)-(2.7). Since we know that Gσ(v) = 0 for
every strategy σ that we will consider, we can simplify Equation 2.7 to obtain the
117
following optimality equation:
B(v) = max
a∈Av
(
r(v, a) +
∑
v′∈V
p(v′|v, a) ·B(v′)
)
. (5.1)
Note that this equation bears some resemblance to the optimality equation that
is used in the total-reward setting [Put05, Chapter 7]. However, our proof will
not imply an exponential lower bound for the total-reward criterion, because our
examples do not fall into a class of models upon which strategy improvement has
been shown to be correct.
We now define some simplified notation that will be used with the optimality
equation (5.1). Since the gain component is being ignored, we define Valσ(v) =
Bσ(v) for every vertex v. We define the appeal of an action a under a strategy σ to
be:
Appealσ(a) = r(v, a) +
∑
v′∈S
p(v′|v, a) ·Valueσ(v′).
The action a is switchable at a vertex v in a strategy σ if Appealσ(a) > Valσ(v).
Theorem 3.2 implies that if σ′ is obtained from σ by switching a subset of the
switchable actions, then we have Valσ(v) ≤ Valσ′(v) for every vertex v, and there is
some vertex at which this inequality is strict. In this context, the greedy switching
policy chooses, at every vertex v, the switchable action a such that Appealσ(a) ≥
Appealσ(b), for every switchable action b. Ties are broken using the same methods
that were shown in Section 3.2.4.
5.2 The Family of Examples
In this section we describe the family of examples that will be used to show the
exponential lower bound for greedy strategy improvement on Markov decision pro-
cesses. Our goal is to force greedy strategy improvement to mimic a binary counter.
We will define the family of examples Gn, where n is the number of bits in the binary
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Figure 5.1: The structure for the bit with index i.
counter. In this section, we will describe how to construct the game Gn.
5.2.1 The Bit Gadget
Figure 5.1 shows the gadget that will be used to represent a bit of the binary
counter. It consists of a vertex bi, which has a special action ai. The action ai is a
probabilistic action that has reward 0. When the action ai is chosen at bi there is a
very large probability of returning to the vertex bi, and a very small probability of
moving to the vertex gi. There will be n copies of this structure in the example Gn,
which will be indexed with the integers 1 through n. The bit with index 1 will be
the least significant bit, and the bit with index n will be the most significant bit.
For each strategy σ, the state of the bit represented by bi will be determined
by the choice that σ makes at bi. The bit is a 1 in the strategy if σ(bi) = ai, and
it is a 0 if σ(bi) 6= ai. We will represent the configuration of a binary counter as a
non-empty set B ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} that contains the indices of the bits that are 1. If a
configuration B is a strict subset of {1, 2, . . . n}, then we say that B is improvable.
Definition 5.1 (Configuration). A configuration is a set B ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} such
that B 6= ∅. An improvable configuration is a set B ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that B 6= ∅.
119
A strategy σ represents a configuration B if σ(bi) = ai for every index i ∈ B,
and σ(bi) 6= ai for every every index i /∈ B. For a set of natural numbers B we define
B>i to be the set B \ {k ∈ N : k ≤ i}. We define analogous notations for <, ≥,
and ≤.
Our objective is to force greedy strategy improvement to pass through at
least one strategy for each configuration: we will begin at a strategy that represents
the configuration {1}, and after visiting at least one strategy that represents each
configuration, we will finally arrive at a strategy that represents the configuration
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Since the MDPs that we will construct will be polynomially sized in
n, if this property can be achieved, then an exponential lower bound will obviously
follow. As we have mentioned, the algorithm will will traverse configurations in
the same order as a binary counter. Suppose that greedy strategy improvement is
currently considering a strategy that represents the improvable configuration B. If
i = min({1, 2, . . . , n} \ B), then we want to force greedy strategy improvement to
move to a strategy that represents the configuration (B \ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1}) ∪ {i}.
This operation occurs in two phases. In the flip phase, greedy strategy
improvement moves from a strategy that represents the configuration B to a strategy
that represents the configuration B ∪ {i}, where i is the smallest index such that
i /∈ B. In other words, in the first phase, the vertex bi must be switched to the
action ai, and the strategy at each other vertex bj must not be changed. Once
this has occurred, greedy strategy improvement will enter the reset phase where it
moves to a strategy that represents the configuration (B \ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1}) ∪ {i}.
This means that every vertex bj with j < i will be switched away from the action aj .
Once this strategy has been reached, greedy strategy improvement will return to the
flip phase for the new configuration.
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Figure 5.2: The deceleration lane.
Figure 5.3: The outgoing actions from the vertex bi.
5.2.2 The Deceleration Lane
Figure 5.2 shows a gadget called the deceleration lane. The example Gn will contain
one instance of this gadget. It consists of two vertices x and y, which have outgoing
actions to other parts of the example, and a sequence of vertices di. Each vertex di
with i > 0 has an action to the vertex di−1 with reward −1, an action to the
vertex x with reward 0, and an action to the vertex y with reward 0. The vertex d0
is different: it has an action to the vertex y with reward 4n+1 and an action to the
vertex x with reward 4n+ 1.
The deceleration lane plays a key role in implementing the flip phase. In
this phase, we must ensure that the action ai is switched at the vertex bi, where i
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is the smallest index such that i /∈ B, and that no other bit changes state. This
is achieved by connecting each bit vertex to the deceleration lane, and Figure 5.3
shows how each vertex bi is connected to the deceleration lane. The vertex bi has
exactly 2i outgoing actions to the deceleration lane, and these actions lead to the
vertex d1 through d2i.
The principal idea is that the deceleration lane can prevent the action ai
from being switched at the vertex bi for exactly 2i iterations. It does this by going
through a sequence of 2n strategies. Consider an index i such that i /∈ B. In the
first strategy, the action (bi, d1) will be the most appealing action at the vertex bi,
and in the j-th strategy, the action (bi, dj) will be the most appealing action at the
vertex bi. Since the most appealing action at this vertex is not ai, greedy strategy
improvement cannot switch this action. Therefore, the bit with index i cannot be
set to 1 during this sequence.
We can now see why the smallest 0 bit is set to 1. If i is the smallest index
such that i /∈ B, then every vertex bj with j > i has at least two more outgoing
actions to the deceleration lane. Therefore, the action ai can be switched at the
vertex bi at least two iterations before the action aj can be switched at the vertex bj .
This allows greedy strategy improvement to move to a strategy that represents the
configuration B ∪ {i}, which correctly implements the flip phase.
The deceleration lane also has an important role to play in the reset phase.
During this phase, the deceleration lane must be switched back to its initial strategy,
which was the strategy where the action (bi, d1) is the most appealing action at every
vertex bj with j /∈ (B ∪ {i}) \ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1}. This must occur in order for greedy
strategy improvement to continue with the flip phase for the next configuration
immediately after the reset phase has been completed. We will later show how the
choice of outgoing actions from the vertices x and y achieves this.
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fi+1fn+1 ...
Figure 5.4: The structure associated with the vertex bi.
5.2.3 Reset Structure
Each vertex bi has an associated structure that is called the reset structure, which
is shown in Figure 5.4. The vertex ci is called the choice vertex. The idea is that
the action (ci, fi) should be chosen at the vertex ci if and only if the index i ∈ B. It
is not difficult to see why this should be the case: if i ∈ B then choosing the action
(ci, fi) results in a penalty from the edge (fi, bi), but this is offset by the larger
reward on the edge (gi, ri). On the other hand, if i /∈ B then only the penalty on
the edge (fi, bi) is seen.
During the flip phase, greedy strategy improvement does not switch any
vertex in the reset structure. However, during the reset phase, it is the reset structure
that causes each vertex bj with j < i to be switched away from the action aj .
This occurs because each vertex bj has an action (bj , fk) for every index k > j.
When the vertex bi is switched to the action ai, the valuation of the vertex fi rises,
because of the reward on the action (gi, ri). This rise is enough to ensure that
each action (bj , fi) is the most appealing action at the vertex bj, for each j < i.
Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will move to a strategy that represents the
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Vertex Target Range Reward
d0 y 4n+ 1
d0 x 4n+ 1
di x 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n 0
di y 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n 0
di di−1 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n −1
bi x 1 ≤ i ≤ n 0
bi y 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1
bi dj 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2i 2j
bi fj 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i < j ≤ n 4n+ 1
ci fi 1 ≤ i ≤ n 4n+ 1
ci ri 1 ≤ i ≤ n 0
cn+1 cn+1 0
fi bi 1 ≤ i ≤ n −(10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n
gi ri 1 ≤ i ≤ n (10n + 4)2i
ri cj 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i < j ≤ n+ 1 −1
y cj 1 ≤ j ≤ n 0
x fj 1 ≤ j ≤ n 0
Table 5.1: The deterministic actions in the game Gn.
configuration (B ∪ {i}) \ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1}.
Figure 5.4 also specifies the outgoing actions from the vertices x and y. There
is an action (y, ci) with reward 0 for every i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and there is an
action (x, fi) with reward 0 for every i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We have now completed the description of our examples. We will now for-
mally specify Gn. The MDP contains the vertices x and y and the vertices ci, fi, bi, gi,
and ri for i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It also contains the vertex cn+1, and the ver-
tices di for every i in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n. The deterministic actions in the MDP
are given by Table 5.2.3. Each vertex bi also has a probabilistic action ai with re-
ward 0, where p(gi|bi, ai) = 1/((10n + 4)2n) and p(bi|bi, ai) = 1 − 1/((10n + 4)2n).
Figure 5.5 shows the example G2.
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5.3 The Flip Phase
We begin by describing the sequence of strategies that greedy strategy improvement
will pass through during the flip phase. We will specify a sequence of partial strate-
gies for each gadget individually, and then combine these into a sequence of full
strategies for the entire example.
For the deceleration lane, we begin with a strategy that picks the action
(di, y) for every vertex di. In the first iteration, the action (d1, d0) will be switched.
The action (di, di−1) can only be switched after every action (dj , dj−1) with j < i
has been switched. Therefore, we have the following sequence of partial strategies
for the deceleration lane. For every j such that j ≥ 0 we define a partial strategy:
σj(s) =

dk−1 if s = dk and 1 ≤ k ≤ j,
y otherwise.
(5.2)
We will give two sequences of partial strategies for the vertices bi, one strat-
egy for the vertices where i ∈ B, and one strategy for the vertices where i /∈ B.
As we have described, these vertices should follow the updates made by the decel-
eration lane. By this we mean that greedy strategy improvement will switch the
action (bi, dj) in the iteration immediately after the action (dj , dj−1) is switched in
the deceleration lane. The initial strategy for bi will select the action y, and the be-
haviour that we have described will hold from the second iteration onwards. In the
first iteration, greedy strategy improvement will switch the edge (bi, d2i). Formally,
for every j in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ 2i + 1 we define a partial strategy for the vertices
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in the deceleration lane and each vertex bi:
σoj (s) =

σj(s) if s = dk for some k,
y if j = 0 and s = bi,
d2i if j = 1 and s = bi,
dj−1 if 2 ≤ j ≤ 2i+ 1 and s = bi.
We also give a sequence of strategies for the vertices bi, where i ∈ B. In order
for the configuration to remain constant, these vertices should not switch away from
the action ai as the deceleration lane is being updated. Formally, for every j such
that j ≥ 0, we define a partial strategy:
σcj(s) =

σj(s) if s = dk for some k,
ai if s = bi.
Finally, we give a strategy for the vertices in the reset structure. Let B be a
configuration. As we know, the vertices in the reset structure will not be switched
away from this strategy while the deceleration lane is being updated. We have
already described how the choice at the vertex ci depends on whether i ∈ B. Each
vertex ri selects the action (ri, cj), where j is the smallest index such that j > i and
j ∈ B. If i is the largest index in B then the vertex ri moves directly to the sink
vertex cn+1. The vertices x and y both move to the reset structure associated with
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the smallest index i such that i ∈ B.
σB(ci) =

fi if i ∈ B,
ri if i /∈ B,
σB(ri) = cmin(B>i∪{n+1}),
σB(y) = cmin(B),
σB(x) = fmin(B).
We can now define the sequence of strategies that greedy strategy improve-
ment will pass through during the flip phase, which combines the partial strategies
that we have defined. For each improvable configuration B, we define Sequence(B) =
〈σB0 , σB1 , . . . σB2j+1〉, where j = min({1, 2, . . . , n} \B) and:
σBj (s) =

σj(s) if s = dk for some k,
σcj(s) if s = bi where i ∈ B,
σoj (s) if s = bi where i /∈ B,
σB(s) otherwise.
We also define the strategy σ
{1,2,...,n}
0 analogously. The rest of this section is dedi-
cated to showing that if greedy strategy improvement is applied to the strategy σB0 ,
then it will pass through the sequence of strategies in Sequence(B).
5.3.1 Breaking The Example Down
In order to simplify our exposition, we will provide proofs for each gadget separately.
To do this, we first need to provide some preliminary proofs that will be used to break
the example down into pieces. These proofs concern the valuation of the vertices ci.
These vertices are important, because they are on the border between the gadgets
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in the example. For example, we know that the vertex y in the deceleration lane
always chooses an action of the form (y, ci), and by knowing bounds of the valuation
of ci we will be able to prove properties of the deceleration lane irrespective of the
strategy that is being played on the vertices in the reset structure.
Recall that for each improvable configuration B, the strategy σBj chooses the
action (ci, fi) if and only if i ∈ B. This implies that if we follow the strategy σBj
from some vertex ci where i ∈ B, then we will pass through every vertex ck where
k ∈ B>i. On the other hand, if we follow the strategy σBj from some vertex ci
where i /∈ B, then we will move to the vertex ri, and then to the vertex ck where
k = min(B>i ∪{n+1}). The next proposition uses these facts to give a formula for
the valuation of each vertex ci in terms of the configuration B.
Proposition 5.2. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). For every i we have:
Valσ(ci) =

∑
j∈B≥i(10n + 4)(2
j − 2j−1) if i ∈ B,∑
j∈B≥i(10n + 4)(2
j − 2j−1)− 1 otherwise.
Proof. We first consider the case where i ∈ B. If k = min(B>i ∪ {n+ 1}) then the
definition of σ gives:
Valσ(ci) = r(ci, fi) + r(fi, bi) + Val
σ(bi)
= r(ci, fi) + r(fi, bi) + r(gi, ri) + r(ri, ck) + Val
σ(ck)
= (4n + 1)− ((10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n) + (10n + 4)2i − 1 + Valσ(ck)
= (10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1) + Valσ(ck).
If k = n+ 1 then we are done because Valσ(cn+1) = 0. Otherwise, repeated substi-
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tution of the above expression for Valσ(ck) gives:
Valσ(ci) =
∑
j∈B≥i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + Valσ(cj+1)
=
∑
j∈B≥i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1).
We now consider the case where i /∈ B. If k = min(B>i∪{n+1}), then the definition
of σ gives:
Valσ(ci) = r(ci, ri) + r(ri, ck) + Val
σ(ck)
= Valσ(ck)− 1
=
∑
j∈B≥i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1)− 1.
The characterisation given by Proposition 5.2 gives some important prop-
erties about the valuation of the vertex ci. One obvious property is that passing
through a vertex bi, where i ∈ B, provides a positive reward. Therefore, if i and j
are both indices in B and i < j, then the valuation of ci will be larger than the
valuation of cj .
Proposition 5.3. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). For every i ∈ B and j ∈ B such that i < j, we have Valσ(ci) >
Valσ(cj).
Proof. Let C = B≥i∩B<j be the members of B that lie between indices i and j−1.
Proposition 5.2, the fact that i ∈ C, and the fact that 2j−2j−1 is positive for every j
imply that:
Valσ(ci) =
∑
j∈C
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + Valσ(cj) > Valσ(cj).
Proposition 5.3 provides a lower bound for the valuation of a vertex ci in
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terms of a vertex cj with j > i. Some of our proofs will also require a corresponding
upper bound. The next proposition provides such a bound.
Proposition 5.4. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). For every i ∈ B and j ∈ B such that j > i, we have:
Valσ(ci) ≤ Valσ(cj) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2i−1).
Proof. Let C = B≥i∩B<j be the members of B that lie between indices i and j−1.
Using Proposition 5.2 gives:
Valσ(ci) =
∑
k∈B≥i
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1)
=
∑
k∈C
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1) + Valσ(cj).
We use the fact that (10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1) > 0 for all k and the fact that i > 0 to
obtain:
∑
k∈C
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1) ≤
j−1∑
k=i
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1)
= (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2i−1).
Therefore, we have:
Valσ(ci) ≤ Valσ(cj) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2i−1).
5.3.2 The Deceleration Lane
In this section we will prove that the deceleration lane behaves as we have described.
In particular, we will provide a proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5. If Valσi(y) > Valσi(x) for every i in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n,
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then applying greedy strategy improvement to σ0 produces the sequence of strategies
〈σ0, σ1, . . . , σ2n〉.
This Proposition may seem strange at first sight, because each strategy σi is
a partial strategy that is defined only for the vertices of the deceleration lane, and
strategy improvement works only with full strategies. However, since the vertices x
and y are the only vertices at which it is possible to leave the deceleration lane,
placing an assumption on the valuations of these vertices will allow us to prove how
greedy strategy improvement behaves on the deceleration lane. These proofs will
hold irrespective of the decisions that are made outside the deceleration lane. In
other words, if greedy strategy improvement arrives at a strategy σ that is consistent
with σ0 on the vertices in the deceleration lane, and if Val
σ(y) > Valσ(x), then
Proposition 5.5 implies that greedy strategy improvement will move to a strategy σ′
that is consistent with σ1 on the vertices in the deceleration lane. This approach
allows us to prove properties of the deceleration lane without having to worry about
the behaviour of greedy strategy improvement elsewhere in the example.
Of course, this approach will only work if we can prove that Valσ(y) >
Valσ(x). The next proposition confirms that this property holds for every strategy
in Sequence(B).
Proposition 5.6. For every improvable configuration B and every strategy σ in
Sequence(B) we have Valσ(y) > Valσ(x).
Proof. By the definition of σ, we have that there is some index i ∈ B such that
σ(y) = ci and σ(x) = fi. Moreover, since i ∈ B we have that σ(ci) = fi. We
therefore have the following two equalities:
Valσ(y) = r(y, ci) + r(ci, fi) + Val
σ(fi) = Val
σ(fi) + 4n + 1,
Valσ(x) = r(x, fi) + Val
σ(fi) = Val
σ(fi).
Clearly, since 4n + 1 > 0 we have Valσ(y) > Valσ(x).
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We now turn our attention to proving that greedy strategy improvement
moves from the strategy σi to the strategy σi+1. To prove properties of greedy
strategy improvement, we must know the appeal of every action leaving the ver-
tices dj . The next proposition gives a characterisation for the appeal of the actions
(dj , dj−1) for each strategy σi.
Proposition 5.7. For each strategy σi we have:
Appealσi(dj , dj−1) =

Valσi(y) + 4n− j + 1 if 1 ≤ j ≤ i+ 1,
Valσi(y)− 1 if i+ 1 < j ≤ 2n.
Proof. We begin by considering the case where 1 ≤ j ≤ i + 1. By the definition
of σi we have that σi(dj) = dj−1 for all vertices dj with 1 ≤ j ≤ i, and we have
that σi(d0) = y. Using the definition of appeal, and applying the optimality equa-
tion (5.1) repeatedly gives, for every action (dj , dj−1) with 0 ≤ j ≤ i+ 1:
Appealσi(dj , dj−1) = r(dj , dj−1) + Valσi(dj)
=
j∑
k=1
r(dk, dk−1) + r(d0, y) + Valσi(y)
= −j + (4n+ 1) + Valσi(y).
We now consider the case where i+ 1 < j ≤ 2n. By definition we have that
σi(dj−1) = y. Using the definition of appeal and the optimality equation gives:
Appealσi(dj , dj−1) = r(dj , dj−1) + Valσi(dj−1)
= r(dj , dj−1) + r(dj−1, dy) + Valσi(y)
= Valσi(y)− 1.
Proposition 5.7 confirms that an action (dj , dj−1) is switchable only after
every action (dk, dk−1) with k < j has been switched by greedy strategy improve-
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ment. It can clearly be seen that the only action of this form that is switchable in
the strategy σi is the action (di+1, di). Every other action of this form has either
already been switched, or is obviously not switchable.
We must also consider the actions (di, x). The next proposition confirms that
these actions will not be switchable in the strategy σi.
Proposition 5.8. If Valσi(x) < Valσi(y) then Appealσi(dj , x) < Appeal
σi(dj , y) for
all j.
Proof. Using the definition of appeal for the vertex dj gives two equalities:
Appealσi(dj , y) = r(dj , y) + Val
σi(y),
Appealσi(dj , x) = r(dj , x) + Val
σi(x).
Observe that for all j we have r(dj , y) = r(dj , x). Therefore we can conclude that
when Valσi(x) < Valσi(y) we have Appealσi(dj , x) < Appeal
σi(dj , y).
In summary, Proposition 5.7 has shown that there is exactly one action of the
form (dj , dj−1) that is switchable in σi, and that this action is (di+1, di). Proposi-
tion 5.8 has shown that no action of the form (dj , x) is switchable in σi. It is obvious
that no action of the form (dj , y) is switchable in σi. Therefore, greedy strategy im-
provement will switch the action (di+1, di) in the strategy σi, which creates the
strategy σi+1. Therefore, we have shown Proposition 5.5.
5.3.3 Zero Bits
In this section we will prove that greedy strategy improvement behaves as we de-
scribe for the vertices that represent the 0 bits of a configuration. As with our proof
of the deceleration lane behaviour, we will provide a proof that deals with partial
strategies under the assumption that Valσ(y) > Valσ(x) always holds. Proposi-
tion 5.6 implies that this assumption is valid. Therefore, this section is concerned
134
with proving the following proposition.
Proposition 5.9. If Valσ
o
j (y) > Valσ
o
j (x) for every j in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ 2i + 1,
then applying greedy strategy improvement to σo0 produces the sequence of strategies
〈σo0, σo1, . . . , σo2i+1〉.
The key property that will be used to prove this Proposition is that the
appeal of the action ai at each vertex bi, where i /∈ B, is bounded. Since greedy
strategy improvement always switches the action with maximal appeal, we will prove
this proposition by showing that there is always some action at bi that has a larger
appeal than the action ai. The next proposition gives the bound for the action ai.
Proposition 5.10. For every improvable configuration B, and every strategy σ in
Sequence(B), we have that if σ(bi) 6= ai then Appealσ(bi, ai) < Valσ(bi) + 1.
Proof. To prove this, we will first show that Valσ(bi) > 0, and that Val
σ(gi) ≤
(10n+4)2n, for each strategy σ. We begin by showing that Valσ(bi) > 0. We know
that σ(bi) = dk for some k, and that σ(dl) = dl−1 for all l in the range 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
We can therefore apply Proposition 5.7 and Proposition 5.2 to get:
Valσ(bi) = 4n+ k + 1 + Val
σ(y)
= 4n+ k + 1 +
∑
j∈B≥i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1).
Since k > 0 we have that (4n + k + 1) > 0, and we have already argued that the
summation will be non-negative. This implies that the entire expression will be
positive. Therefore, we have shown that Valσ(bi) > 0 for all i.
Secondly, we argue that Valσ(gi) ≤ (10n + 4)2n. If k = min(B ∪ {n + 1})
then we have:
Valσ(gi) = (10n + 4)2
i +Valσ(ri) = (10n + 4)2
i − 1 + Valσ(ck).
If k = n+1 then we are done because Valσ(cn+1) = 0 and (10n+4)2
i−1 < (10n+4)2n
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for all i ≤ n. Otherwise, we can apply Proposition 5.2 and the fact that k − 1 ≥ i
to obtain:
Valσ(gi) ≤ (10n + 4)2i − 1 + Valσ(cn+1) + (10n + 4)(2n − 2k−1)
≤ Valσ(cn+1) + (10n + 4)2n − 1
≤ (10n + 4)2n.
Finally, we can use these two inequalities to prove the proposition:
Appeal(bi, ai) = r(bi, ai) +
∑
s∈S
p(s|bi, ai)Valσ(s)
= 0 + (1− 2
−(n)
10n + 4
)Valσ(bi) +
2−(n)
10n+ 4
Valσ(gi)
< Valσ(bi) +
2−n
10n+ 4
Valσ(gi)
≤ Valσ(bi) + 2
−n
10n+ 4
· (10n + 4)2n
= Valσ(bi) + 1.
Recall that Proposition 5.7 gave a characterisation for the appeal of the
action (dk, dk−1) in terms of the current strategy for the deceleration lane. The next
proposition provides an analogous characterisation for the actions (bi, dk) in terms
of the strategies σoj and σ
c
j .
Proposition 5.11. If σ is either σoj or σ
c
j then we have:
Appealσ(bi, dk) =

Valσ(y) + 4n + k + 1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ j,
Valσ(y) + 2k if j < k ≤ 2i.
Proof. We first consider the case where 1 ≤ k ≤ j. Since σ(dk) = σj(dk) for every
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vertex dk, we have:
Appealσ(bi, dk) = r(bi, dk) + Val
σ(dk)
= 2k + (Valσ(y) + 4n− k + 1)
= Valσ(y) + 4n+ k + 1.
In the case where j < k ≤ 2i, the fact that σ(dk) = y when 1 < k ≤ 2n gives:
Appealσ(bi, dk) = r(bi, dk) + Val
σ(dk)
= r(bi, dk) + r(dk, y) + Val
σ(y)
= 2k +Valσ(y).
The characterisation given by Proposition 5.11 explains the behaviour of
greedy strategy improvement for bit vertices that represent a 0. In the strategy σo0,
no vertex dk can satisfy 1 ≤ k ≤ j, because j = 0. This implies that every action
(bi, dk) will have appeal 2k. Therefore, the most appealing action of this form will
be (bi, d2i), and switching this action creates σ
o
1. In each subsequent iteration, it
is obvious that the most appealing action of this form in σoj will be (bi, dj), and
switching this action creates σoj+1.
The key property to note here is that the appeal of the action (bi, dj) in
the strategy σoj is Val
σoj (bi) + 1. Proposition 5.10 implies that the appeal of the
action ai must be smaller than Val
σoj (bi) + 1, which means that the action ai will
not be switched by greedy strategy improvement at the vertex bi in this strategy.
So far, we have only considered actions of the form (bi, dk). To complete
the proof of Proposition 5.9 we must also consider the other actions that leave the
vertex bi. It is obvious that the actions (bi, x) and (bi, y) will not be switchable in
any strategy σoj . However, this still leaves the actions (bi, fj) for each j > i. The
next proposition confirms that these actions are not switchable in any strategy in
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Sequence(B), which completes the proof of Proposition 5.9.
Proposition 5.12. Let B be an improvable configuration and let σ be a member
of Sequence(B). For each action (bi, fj) where i /∈ B, we have Appealσ(bi, fj) <
Valσ(bi).
Proof. To prove this proposition we must consider two cases. Firstly, when j ∈ B
we can apply Proposition 5.11, the fact that k ≥ 0, the fact that min(B) ≤ j, and
Proposition 5.3 to give:
Valσ(bi) = Val
σ(y) + 4n + k + 1 ≥ Valσ(cmin(B)) + 4n+ 1
≥ Valσ(cj) + 4n + 1
= Valσ(fj) + 8n+ 2
> Valσ(fj) + 4n+ 1 = Appeal
σ(bi, fj).
Secondly, we consider the case where j /∈ B. In this case, the fact that
σ(bi) = σ(bj) gives:
Appealσ(bi, fj) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σ(fj)
= −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 1 + Valσ(bj)
= −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 1 + Valσ(σ(bj))
= −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 1 + Valσ(σ(bi)) < Valσ(σ(bi)).
5.3.4 One Bits
In this section, we consider the vertices bi that represent 1 bits in a configuration. We
must prove that greedy strategy improvement never switches away from the action ai
at these vertices. As usual, we will consider the partial sequence of strategies defined
by σcj . The purpose of this section is to provide a proof for the following proposition.
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Proposition 5.13. If Valσ
c
i (y) > Valσ
c
i (x) for every i in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ 2i + 1,
then applying greedy strategy improvement to σc0 produces the sequence of strategies
〈σc0, σc1, . . . , σc2i+1〉.
Proposition 5.11 gives an upper bound for the appeal of an action (bi, dk)
in terms of the valuation of the vertex y. It implies that no action of this form
can have an appeal that is larger than Valσ(y) + 6n + 1. In order to show that
greedy strategy improvement never switches away from the action ai, we must show
that the valuation of the vertex bi is always larger than this amount. The next
proposition provides a proof of this fact, which implies that no action of the form
(bi, dk) where i ∈ B is switchable.
Proposition 5.14. For every improvable configuration B and every strategy σ in
Sequence(B) we have Valσ(y) + 6n+ 1 < Valσ(bi), for every index i ∈ B.
Proof. The definition of σ implies that σ(y) = cmin(B). Applying Proposition 5.2
gives:
Valσ(y) = Valσ(cmin(B))
≤ Valσ(ci) + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 2min(B)−1).
Since i ∈ B we have σ(ci) = fi. Therefore we can apply the optimality equation,
Proposition 5.4, and the fact that min(B)− 1 ≥ 0 to obtain:
Valσ(y) ≤ Valσ(ci) + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 2min(B)−1)
≤ Valσ(ci) + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 20)
= Valσ(fi) + (4n+ 1) + (10n + 4)(2
i−1 − 1)
= Valσ(bi)− (10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n+ (4n+ 1) + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 1)
= Valσ(bi)− (10n + 3).
139
It is now clear that Valσ(y) + 6n+ 1 < Valσ(bi).
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.13 we must consider the other actions
that leave the vertex bi. The actions (bi, x) and (bi, y) are obviously not switchable,
which leaves only the actions of the form (bi, fj) with j > i. The next proposition
is an analog of Proposition 5.12, which confirms that no action of this form can be
switchable. This implies that there are no switchable actions at the vertex bi, and so
greedy strategy improvement will never switch away from the action ai. Therefore,
after proving this proposition, we will have completed the proof of Proposition 5.13.
Proposition 5.15. Let B be an improvable configuration and let σ be a member
of Sequence(B). For each action (bi, fj) where i ∈ B, we have Appealσ(bi, fj) <
Valσ(bi).
Proof. We begin by considering the case where j ∈ B. In this case we can use the
fact that min(B>i) ≤ j, Proposition 5.3, and the fact that i > 0 to obtain:
Valσ(bi) = (10n + 4)2
i +Valσ(ri)
= (10n + 4)2i − 1 + Valσ(cmin(B>i))
≥ (10n + 4)2i − 1 + Valσ(cj)
= (10n + 4)2i + 4n+Valσ(fj)
> Valσ(fj) + 4n+ 1 = Appeal
σ(bi, fj).
Secondly, we consider the case where j /∈ B. The fact that k ≤ 2n, implies:
Appealσ(bi, fj) = −(10n+ 4)2j + 1 + Valσ(bj)
= −(10n+ 4)2j + 4n+ k + 2 + Valσ(y)
≤ −(10n+ 4)2j + 6n+ 2 + Valσ(cmin(B)).
Let l = min(B>j ∪ {n + 1}) be the smallest bit in the configuration that is larger
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than j. By Proposition 5.2, and the fact that there is no bit in the configuration
with an index m in the range j ≤ m < l, we have:
Valσ(cmin(B)) =
∑
j∈B<j
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + Valσ(cl)
≤ Valσ(cl) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 20).
Therefore, we have:
Appealσ(bi, fj) ≤ Valσ(cl) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 1− 2j) + 6n+ 2
≤ Valσ(cl) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2j)
< Valσ(cl).
However, Proposition 5.3, and the fact that i ≥ 0 imply:
Valσ(bi) = (10n + 4)2
i +Valσ(ri) = (10n + 4)2
i − 1 + Valσ(cmin(B>i))
≥ (10n + 4)2i − 1 + Valσ(cl)
≥ Valσ(cl).
5.3.5 The Reset Structure
In this section, we will prove that greedy strategy improvement passes through the
sequence of strategies given by Sequence(B). Since each strategy in this sequence is a
complete strategy, we are now proving the behaviour of greedy strategy improvement
for the full example. The purpose of this section is give a proof of the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.16. For every improvable configuration B, if greedy strategy im-
provement is applied to σB0 , then it will pass through the sequence of strategies given
by Sequence(B).
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Propositions 5.5, 5.9, and 5.13 provide a proof of this proposition for the
vertices dk for all k, and for the vertices bi for all i. Therefore, in this section we will
concern ourselves with the vertices x and y, and the vertices ci and ri for all i. Note
that none of the vertices are switched during Sequence(B), so we must therefore
show that there is never a switchable action at these vertices.
We begin with the vertex y. This vertex has an outgoing action (y, cj) for
each j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1. We have already described the properties of the
vertex ci in Section 5.3.1. The next proposition uses these properties to show that
the vertex ci with i = min(B) has the largest valuation amongst the vertices cj .
Since each action (y, cj) has the same reward, this implies that no action can be
switchable at the vertex y. Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will not switch
away from this action as it passes through Sequence(B).
We will prove a version of the proposition that is more general than is needed
for the vertex y. This is because, we also want to apply the proposition to prove
that each vertex ri is not switched by greedy strategy improvement. Whereas the
vertex y always chooses the action (y, cj) such that j = min(B), the vertex ri must
choose the action (ri, ck) such that k = min(B
>i). The next proposition will also
show that the vertex ck has a largest valuation amongst the vertices cl with l ∈ B>i.
As usual, since every action leaving the vertex ri has the same reward, this implies
that no action at ri will become switchable.
Proposition 5.17. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). For each k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ n, if i = min(B>k) then we have
Valσ(ci) > Val
σ(cj) for every j such that j > k and j 6= i.
Proof. Proposition 5.3 implies that the vertex ci has a higher valuation than ev-
ery other vertex cj with j ∈ B>k. To complete the proof we must eliminate the
vertices cj with j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . n} \ B>k. We will accomplish this by argu-
ing that for every such vertex cj there is some index l ∈ B>j ∪ {n + 1} such that
Valσ(cl) > Val
σ(cj). We choose l = min(B
>j ∪ {n + 1}) to be the smallest index
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in B>j that is larger than j, or the index of the sink if j is the largest index in B>k.
Since j /∈ B>k we have:
Valσ(cj) = r(cj , rj) + r(rj , ck) + Val
σ(ck)
= Valσ(ck)− 1 < Valσ(ck).
We now turn our attention to the vertex x. Much like the vertex y, this
vertex has an outgoing action (x, fj) for each j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Our proof
for this vertex will split into two cases. We begin by considering the actions (x, fj)
for which j /∈ B. The next proposition shows that these actions are not switchable
for any strategy in Sequence(B).
Proposition 5.18. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). If i /∈ B we have Valσ(fi) + 4n + 1 < Valσ(ck) − 1, where k =
min(B>i ∪ {n + 1}).
Proof. Using Proposition 5.11, and the fact that i ≤ n, gives the following expression
for the value of fi.
Valσ(fi) ≤ −(10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n+ 6n+ 1 + Valσ(y)
= −(10n + 4)2i−1 + 2n+ 1 +Valσ(y).
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Using Proposition 5.2 to obtain the valuation of y in terms of the vertex ck gives:
Valσ(fi) = −(10n + 4)2i−1 + 2n+ 1 +
∑
j∈B<i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + Valσ(ck)
≤ −(10n + 4)2i−1 + 2n+ 1 +
i−1∑
j=0
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + Valσ(ck)
= −(10n + 4)2i−1 + 2n+ 1 + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 20) + Valσ(ck)
= 2n+ 1 +−(10n+ 4) + Valσ(ck)
= −8n− 3 + Valσ(ck).
Therefore Valσ(fi) + 4n+ 1 < Val
σ(ck)− 1.
Now that we know that each action (x, fj) where j /∈ B cannot be switchable,
we can consider the actions (x, fj) where j ∈ B. We know that σ(cj) = fj for each
j ∈ B. Therefore, the valuation of the vertex fj is strongly related to the valuation
of cj , when j ∈ B. Since we know that the vertex ci where i = min(B) has a larger
valuation than any other vertex cj , we can use this connection to argue that the
vertex fi has a larger valuation than any other vertex fj. Since each action (x, fj)
has the same reward, this implies that no action will become switchable at x as
greedy strategy improvement moves through the strategies in Sequence(B).
Proposition 5.19. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). If i = min(B) then we have Valσ(fi) > Val
σ(fj) for every j 6= i.
Proof. We begin by arguing that Valσ(fi) > Val
σ(fj) for the case where j ∈ B.
Since Valσ(ck) = Val
σ(fk) + 4n + 1 for every k ∈ B, we can apply Proposition 5.3
to obtain:
Valσ(fi) = Val
σ(ci)− 4n− 1 > Valσ(cj)− 4n − 1 = Valσ(fj).
We now complete the proof by arguing that for every vertex fj with j /∈ B, there is
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some vertex fk with k ∈ B such that Valσ(fk) > Valσ(fj). Proposition 5.18 implies
that Valσ(fi) + 4n+ 1 < Val
σ(ck) where k = min(B ∪ {n+ 1}). Therefore we have:
Valσ(fj) < Val
σ(ck)− (4n+ 1) = Valσ(fk).
Now we consider the vertex ci. The action chosen at this vertex depends on
whether the index i is contained in B. The next proposition shows that in either
case, the vertex ci will not be switched away from the action that it chose in the first
strategy in Sequence(B). After proving this proposition we will have shown that
greedy strategy improvement will not switch the vertices x and y, or the vertices ci
and ri for every i. Therefore, we will have completed the proof of Proposition 5.16.
Proposition 5.20. Let B be an improvable configuration and σ be a member of
Sequence(B). The vertex ci will not be switched away from σ(ci).
Proof. First we will consider the case where i ∈ B, where we must show that
the vertex ci does not switch away from the action (ci, fi). In this case, the fact
2i − 2i−1 > 0 implies:
Appealσ(ci, fi) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1) + 1 + Valσ(ri)
> Valσ(ri) = Appeal
σ(ci, ri).
Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will not switch away from the action (ci, fi).
Now we consider the case where i /∈ B. In this case Proposition 5.18 implies
that if k = min(B>i ∪ {n+ 1}) then:
Appealσ(ci, fi) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σ(fi) < Val
σ(ck)− 1.
We also have that Valσ(ci) = Val
σ(ck)− 1. Therefore, greedy strategy improvement
will not switch away from the current action at ck.
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5.4 The Reset Phase
In this section, we finish our description of the behaviour of greedy strategy improve-
ment on the examples Gn by describing the reset phase. Let B be an improvable
configuration, and let i = min({1, 2, . . . , n} \ B) be the smallest index that is not
in B. We define the configuration B′ = (B ∪ {i}) \ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1}, which is the
configuration that a binary counter would move to from B. We will show that
greedy strategy improvement moves from the final strategy in Sequence(B) to the
strategy σB
′
0 .
We begin by describing the sequence of strategies that greedy strategy im-
provement passes through. The sequence begins at the final strategy in Sequence(B),
which is σB2i+1. At every vertex other than bi, greedy strategy improvement moves
to the strategy σB2i+2. However, since this strategy cannot be switched at the vertex
bi, the action ai is switched instead. Note that σ2i+2 is well defined even if i = n.
This is because, although σo2i+2 is not well defined in this case, every vertex bj with
j 6= i must play σc2i+2, and this strategy is well defined. This comment also applies
to the strategy σB2i+3, which is used in subsequent reset strategies. Therefore, greedy
strategy improvement will move to the strategy σBR1, which is defined as, for every
vertex v:
σBR1(v) =

ai if v = bi,
σB2i+2(v) otherwise.
Switching the action ai to create σ
B
R1 will cause the valuation of the vertex fi
to dramatically increase. This causes greedy strategy improvement to switch the
action (x, fi), the action (ci, fi), and the actions (bj , fi) for j < i. The vertex bi
is not switched away from the action ai, and every other vertex is switched to the
strategy σB2i+3. Therefore, greedy strategy improvement moves to the strategy σ
B
R2,
which is defined as, for every vertex v:
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σBR2(v) =

ai if v = bi
fi if v = x or v = ci or v = bj with j < i,
σB2i+3(v) otherwise.
When greedy strategy improvement moves to the strategy σBR2 it switches the
vertex x to the action (x, fi), which causes the valuation of x to increase. This causes
greedy strategy improvement to switch the action (dk, x) at every state dk, and the
action (bj , x) at every state bj with j /∈ B′. The increase in valuation that occurred
when the vertex ci was switched to (ci, fi) causes greedy strategy improvement to
switch the action (y, ci), and the actions (rj , ci), with j < i. It is worth noting that
at this point that the vertices in the set {cj , rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {bj : j ∈ B′} ∪ {x} are
now playing σB
′
0 . For every vertex v, we define the strategy σ
B
R3 as:
σBR3(v) =

σB
′
0 (v) if v ∈ {cj , rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {bj : j ∈ B′} ∪ {x},
ci v = y or v = rj with j < i,
x v = dk for some k or v = bj with j /∈ B′,
σB2i+3(s) if v = cj with j < i.
We can now describe how greedy strategy improvement behaves once it has
arrived at the strategy σBR3. The increase in valuation that was obtained when
the vertex y was switched to the action (y, ci) causes greedy strategy improvement
to switch the actions (dk, y) for every vertex dk, and the actions (bj , y) for every
vertex bj with j /∈ B′. Also, for every j in the range 1 < j < i the increase in
valuation that was obtained when the vertex rj was switched to the action (rj , ci)
causes greedy strategy improvement to switch the action (cj , rj). After making these
147
switches, greedy strategy improvement arrives at the strategy σB
′
0 , which completes
the reset phase for the configuration B. In the remainder of this section, we will
prove that greedy strategy improvement behaves as we have described.
5.4.1 The First Reset Strategy
The purpose of this section is to provide a proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 5.21. Greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σB2i+1 to
the strategy σB
R1
.
We will begin by considering the vertex bi. At this vertex we must show that
greedy strategy improvement switches the action ai. The next proposition shows
that ai is indeed the most appealing action at bi in σ
B
2i+1. This proposition also
proves the claim for the strategy σBR1, as this fact will be needed in the subsequent
section.
Proposition 5.22. If σ is σB2i+1 or σ
B
R1
, then the action ai is the most appealing
action at bi.
Proof. We will begin by showing that every action other than ai is not switchable
in σ. Note that since Valσ
B
R1(bi) > Val
σB
2i+1(bi), it is sufficient to prove that the
appeal of every action is strictly less than Valσ
B
2i+1(bi).
We first consider the actions of the form (bi, dk). It is not difficult to verify
that Valσ
B
2i+1(dk) = Val
σB
R1(dk) for every k ≤ 2i. Applying Proposition 5.11 to the
strategy σB2i+1, using the fact that k ≤ 2i gives:
Appealσ(bi, dk) = Val
σB
2i+1(y) + 4n+ k + 1
≤ ValσB2i+1(y) + 4n+ 2i+ 1
= Appealσ
B
2i+1(bi, d2i) = Val
σB
2i+1(bi).
We now consider the actions (bi, y) and (bi, x). Again, it can easily be verified
148
that Valσ
B
2i+1(v) = Valσ
B
R1(v) when v = y and when v = x. Therefore, for the action
(bi, y) we have:
Appealσ(bi, y) = Val
σB
2i+1(y) + 1 < Valσ
B
2i+1(y) + 4n+ 2i+ 1 = Valσ
B
2i+1(bi).
For the action (bi, x), Proposition 5.6 gives:
Appealσ(bi, x) = Val
σB
2i+1(x) < Valσ
B
2i+1(y) < Valσ
B
2i+1(bi).
Finally, we consider the actions (bi, fj) with j > i. Again, it can easily be
verified that Valσ
B
2i+1(fj) = Val
σB
R1(fj) for the vertices fj with j > i. Proposition 5.12
implies that Appealσ
B
2i+1(bi, fj) < Val
σB
2i+1(bi).
We now complete the proof by considering the action ai. In the strategy
σBR1, we have σ
B
R1(bi) = ai. Therefore, the fact that no action is switchable at bi
in σBR1 implies that ai is the most appealing action at bi. In the strategy σ
B
2i+1, we
will show that the action ai is switchable. We begin by showing that Val
σB
2i+1(gi) >
Valσ
B
2i+1(bi). Let k = min(B
>i ∪ {n + 1}) be the smallest index in B that is bigger
than i, or the index of the sink if i is the highest bit. Using Proposition 5.11, the
fact that i ≤ n, and Proposition 5.2 gives:
Valσ
B
2i+1(bi) ≤ 6n + 1 + ValσB2i+1(y)
= 6n + 1 +
∑
j∈B≤i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + ValσB2i+1(ck)
≤ 6n + 1 +
i−1∑
j=1
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1) + ValσB2i+1(ck)
= 6n + 1 + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 20) + ValσB2i+1(ck)
= (10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n− 3 + ValσB2i+1(ck).
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The valuation of the vertex gi is:
Valσ
B
2i+1(gi) = (10n + 4)2
i +Valσ
B
2i+1(ri) = (10n + 4)2
i − 1 + ValσB2i+1(ck).
Since (10n+4)2i−1 > (10n+4)2i−1−4n−3 for every i, we have that ValσB2i+1(gi) >
Valσ
B
2i+1(bi). Now we can conclude:
Appealσ
B
2i+1(bi, ai) = (1− 2
−n
10n + 4
)Valσ
B
2i+1(bi) +
2−n
10n + 4
Valσ
B
2i+1(gi)
> (1− 2
−n
10n + 4
)Valσ
B
2i+1(bi) +
2−n
10n + 4
Valσ
B
2i+1(bi)
= Valσ
B
2i+1(bi).
Now that we know that the vertex bi is switched to the action ai, we must
consider every other vertex in the MDP. We must argue that these vertices are
switched from the strategy σB2i+1 to the strategy σ
B
2i+2. Proposition 5.16 provides a
proof that greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σBj to the strategy
σBj+1 when j ≤ 2i + 1. No modifications are needed in order to reuse this proof
to show that greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σB2i+1 to the
strategy σB2i+2 at every vertex other than bi. This is because the vertex bi is the only
strategy at which σB2i+2 is not well defined. Therefore, the proof of Proposition 5.21
has been completed.
5.4.2 The Second Reset Strategy
The purpose of this section is to provide a proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 5.23. Greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σB
R1
to
the strategy σB
R2
.
For the vertex bi, the fact that greedy strategy improvement does not switch
away from the action ai is implied by Proposition 5.22. The following proposition
will prove useful throughout this proof.
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Proposition 5.24. For every vertex v such that v 6= bi and v 6= fi, we have
Valσ
B
R1(v) = Valσ
B
2i+2(v).
Proof. The only difference between σBR1 and σ
B
2i+2 is that the vertex bi selects the
action ai in the strategy σ
B
R1. Note that if we select a vertex v such that v 6= bi and
v 6= fi, and apply the strategy σBR1, then the vertex bi will never be reached from v.
Therefore, we must have that Valσ
B
R1(v) = Valσ
B
2i+2(v).
Consider a vertex v in the set V \ ({bi, fi, x, ci} ∪ {bj : j < i}). Proposi-
tion 5.24 implies that we can apply Proposition 5.16 to argue that greedy strategy
improvement moves to σB2i+3 at this vertex. This is because there is no outgoing
edge from v to bi or fi, and therefore greedy strategy improvement will switch the
same actions as it would in σB2i+2 at the vertex v.
All that remains is to prove that every vertex that has an outgoing action to
the vertex fi will switch to that action. The following proposition shows that the
vertex fi has a larger valuation than every other vertex fj.
Proposition 5.25. We have Valσ
B
R1(fi) > Val
σB
R1(fj) for every j 6= i.
Proof. For every vertex fj where j 6= i, Proposition 5.24 implies that ValσBR1(fj) =
Valσ
B
2i+2(fj). Therefore, we can apply Proposition 5.19 to argue that, if k = min(B),
then Valσ
B
R1(fk) > Val
σB
R1(fj), for every j such that j 6= i and j 6= k. Therefore, to
prove this claim it is sufficient to show that Valσ
B
R1(fi) > Val
σB
R1(fk).
If l = min(B>i ∪ {n+ 1}), then we have:
Valσ
B
R1(fi) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1)− 4n − 1 + ValσBR1(cl).
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Moreover, we can express the valuation of fk as:
Valσ
B
R1(fk) =
∑
j∈B<i
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1)− 4n− 1 + ValσBR1(cl)
≤
i−1∑
j=1
(10n + 4)(2j − 2j−1)− 4n− 1 + ValσBR1(cl)
= (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 20)− 4n− 1 + ValσBR1(cl).
Since (10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1) > (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 20) for every i > 0 we can conclude
that Valσ
B
R1(fi) > Val
σB
R1(fk).
Firstly, we will consider the vertex x. Proposition 5.25 implies that x will
be switched to the action (x, fi). This is because every outgoing action from x
has the form (x, fj), and each of these actions has the same reward. Therefore,
the fact that Valσ
B
R1(fi) > Val
σB
R1(fj) for all j 6= i implies that AppealσBR1(x, fi) >
Appealσ
B
R1(x, fj) for all j 6= i.
Now we will prove the claim for the vertex ci. Using the fact that 2
i−2i−1 > 0
for every i gives:
Appealσ
B
R1(ci, fi) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1) + 1 + ValσBR1(ri)
> Valσ
B
R1(ri) = Appeal
σB
R1(ci, ri).
Therefore (ci, fi) is the most appealing action at the vertex ci.
Finally, we will consider the vertices bj with j < i. We will begin by
proving that every action at bj other than (bj , fi) is not switchable. Proposi-
tion 5.24 implies that, for every action a at the state bj other than (bj , fi), we
have Appealσ
B
R1(a) = Appealσ
B
2i+2(a). Since j ∈ B, Proposition 5.16 implies that
greedy strategy improvement would not switch away from the action aj at the ver-
tex bj in the strategy σ
B
2i+2. This implies that Appeal
σB
2i+2(a) ≤ ValσB2i+2(bj), and
therefore we have Appealσ
B
R1(a) ≤ ValσBR1(bj). To complete the proof, we must argue
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that the action (bj , fi) is switchable at the vertex bj.
In the proof of Proposition 5.25 we derived an expression for the valuation
of fi in terms of the vertex cl, where l = min(B
>i ∪ {n + 1}). We can use this to
obtain:
Appealσ
B
R1(bj , fi) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1) + ValσBR1(cl)
= (10n + 4)2i−1 +Valσ
B
R1(cl).
We can also express the valuation of the vertex bj as:
Valσ
B
R1(bj) = (10n + 4)2
j − 1 +
∑
k∈B>j∩B<j
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1) + ValσBR1(cl)
≤ (10n + 4)2j − 1 +
i−1∑
k=j+1
(10n + 4)(2k − 2k−1) + ValσBR1(cl)
= (10n + 4)2j − 1 + (10n + 4)(2i−1 − 2j) + ValσBR1(cl)
= (10n + 4)2i−1 − 1 + ValσBR1(cl).
Since (10n+4)2i−1 > (10n+4)2i−1−1 we have that AppealσBR1(bj, fi) > ValσBR1(bj).
Since (bj , fi) is the only switchable action at the vertex bj, we have that this action
must be switched by greedy strategy improvement at every vertex bj with j < i.
5.4.3 The Third Reset Strategy
The purpose of this section is to provide a proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 5.26. Greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σB
R2
to
the strategy σB
R3
.
We will begin by considering the vertices in the set {rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {cj : j ∈
B′}. For each vertex v in this set, we have that σBR2(v) = σB
′
0 (v). We must show
that greedy strategy improvement does not switch away from the strategy σB
′
0 . The
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following proposition shows that the value of each of these vertices under σBR2 is the
same as it is under σB
′
0 (v).
Proposition 5.27. We have Valσ
B
R2(v) = Valσ
B′
0 (v) for every v ∈ {cj , rj : j ≥
i} ∪ {bj , fj : j ∈ B′}.
Proof. This follows from the fact that σBR2(v) = σ
B′
0 (v) on every vertex in v ∈ S =
{cj , rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {bj : j ∈ B′}, and we also have that σBR2(v) ∈ S for every vertex
v ∈ S. Therefore, we must have that ΩσBR2v = Ωσ
B′
0
v for every vertex v ∈ S, which
implies the claimed result.
We can now argue that a vertex rj with j ≥ i will not be switched away from
the strategy σB
′
0 (rj). Since every outgoing action from the vertex rj is of the form
(rj , v), where v ∈ {cj : j > i}, Proposition 5.27 implies that AppealσBR2(rj , v) =
Appealσ
B′
0 (rj , v) for every outgoing action from rj . The claim then follows from the
fact that Proposition 5.16 implies that if greedy strategy improvement is applied to
σB
′
0 , then it will not switch away from σ
B′
0 .
The same argument can also be used to prove that a vertex cj with j ∈ B′
will not be switched away from the strategy σB
′
0 (cj). Once again, this is because
we have that every outgoing action from the vertex cj is of the form (cj , v) where
v ∈ {cj , rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {bj , fj : j ∈ B′}. Therefore, we can apply Propositions 5.27
and 5.16 in the same way in order to prove the claim.
Next, we will move on to consider the vertex x, and the vertices cj with j /∈ B′
and j ≥ i. In both cases, the proofs for these vertices depend on the valuation of
the vertices fj with j /∈ B′. The following proposition proves a useful inequality for
these vertices.
Proposition 5.28. For every j /∈ B′ we have ValσBR2(fj) ≤ ValσBR2(fi). Moreover,
if j > i then we have Valσ
B
R2(fj) ≤ ValσBR2(fi)− (10n + 4)2j−1 − 1.
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Proof. We first consider the vertices fj where j < i. At these vertices we have:
Valσ
B
R2(fj) = Val
σB
R2(bj)− (10n + 4)2j−1 − 1
= Valσ
B
R2(fi) + 4n+ 1− (10n + 4)2j−1
Therefore, the claim follows from the fact that 4n + 1 − (10n + 4)2j−1 > 0 when
j > 0.
We now consider the vertices fj where j > i and j /∈ B′. Since j /∈ B′ we
must have σBR2(bj) = dk for some k. Therefore, we have:
Valσ
B
R2(fj) = Val
σB
R2(bj)− (10n + 4)2j−1 − 4n
≤ ValσBR2(y)− (10n + 4)2j−1 + 2n + 1
In the case where i > 1, we have σBR2(y) = c1, and we have σ
B
R2(c1) = f1. We can
use the formula that we obtained for the vertices fj with j < i to obtain:
Valσ
B
R2(fj) ≤ ValσBR2(y)− (10n + 4)2j−1 + 2n+ 1
= Valσ
B
R2(f1)− (10n + 4)2j−1 + 6n+ 2
= Valσ
B
R2(fi)− (10n + 4)20 − (10n + 4)2j−1 + 10n + 3
= Valσ
B
R2(fi)− (10n + 4)2j−1 − 1
In the case where i = 1, we have that σBR2(y) = cl, where l > 1. Moreover,
we have that σBR2(b1) = a1 and σ
B
R2(r1) = cl. Therefore, we have the following two
facts:
Valσ
B
R2(fi) = (10n + 4)(2
1 − 20)− 4n − 1 + ValσBR2(cl)
Valσ
B
R2(fj) ≤ ValσBR2(cl)− (10n + 4)2j−1 + 2n + 1
From this it is easy to see that Valσ
B
R2(fj) ≤ ValσBR2(fi)− (10n + 4)2j−1 − 1.
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We can now prove that greedy strategy improvement does not switch the
vertex x away from the action (x, fi) in the strategy σ
B
R2. Since Proposition 5.27
implies that Valσ
B
R2(fj) = Val
σB
′
0 (fj) for every j ∈ B′, we can use Proposition 5.19
to conclude that Valσ
B
R2(fi) > Val
σB
R2(fj) with j ∈ B′ and j 6= i. Moreover, Propo-
sition 5.28 implies that Valσ
B
R2(fi) > Val
σB
R2(fj) for every j /∈ B′. Therefore, the
action (x, fi) must be the most appealing action at the vertex x in the strategy σ
B
R2.
We can also prove that greedy strategy improvement does not switch the
vertices cj with j /∈ B′ and j > i away from the action (cj , rj). To do this, we will
prove that the action (cj , fj) is not switchable in σ
B
R2. Note that Appeal
σB
R2(cj , fj) =
4n+ 1 + Valσ
B
R2(fj), and therefore Proposition 5.28 implies that:
Appealσ
B
R2(cj , fj) ≤ ValσBR2(fi)− (10n + 4)2j−1 + 4n.
Following the strategy σBR2 through the vertices fi, bi, gi, and ri gives:
Appealσ
B
R2(cj , fj) ≤ ValσBR2(cmin(B>i∪{n+1})) + (10n + 4)(2i − 2j−1 − 2i−1)− 1
Now we can apply Proposition 5.27 and Proposition 5.2 to conclude the following
two facts:
Appealσ
B
R2(cj , fj) ≤
∑
m∈B′>i
(10n + 4)(2m − 2m−1) + (10n + 4)(2i − 2j−1 − 2i−1)− 1
Valσ
B
R2(cj) =
∑
m∈B′≥j
(10n + 4)(2m − 2m−1)
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Therefore, we have:
Appealσ
B
R2(cj , fj) ≤ValσBR2(cj) + (10n + 4)(
∑
m∈B′<j∩B′>i
(2m − 2m−1)
+ 2i − 2j−1 − 2i−1)− 1
≤ValσBR2(cj) + (10n + 4)(
j−1∑
m=i+1
(2m − 2m−1)
+ 2i − 2j−1 − 2i−1)− 1
=Valσ
B
R2(cj) + (10n + 4)(2
j−1 − 2i + 2i − 2j−1 − 2i−1)− 1
=Valσ
B
R2(cj)− (10n + 4)2i−1 − 1
Therefore, the action (cj , fj) is not switchable in the strategy σ
B
R2, which implies
that greedy strategy improvement cannot switch away from the action (cj , rj).
We now turn our attention to the vertices dk. We must prove that greedy
strategy improvement switches the action (dk, x) at these vertices. The next propo-
sition proves that the valuation of x must be significantly larger than the valuation
of y in the strategy σBR2, which is a fact that will be used to prove the behaviour of
greedy strategy improvement at each vertex dk.
Proposition 5.29. We have Valσ
B
R2(y) + 6n+ 1 < Valσ
B
R2(x).
Proof. Let l = min(B ∪ {n + 1}). We first consider the case where l < i. It is
not difficult to see that if l < i then l = 1, since i is the smallest index that is
not contained in B. In this case we can express the valuation of y in terms of the
valuation of the vertex fi as:
Valσ
B
R2(y) = −(10n + 4)2l−1 + 4n + 2 + ValσBR2(fi)
= −(10n + 4) + 4n+ 2 +ValσBR2(fi)
= −6n− 2 + ValσBR2(fi).
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Moreover, we can express the valuation of x as:
Valσ
B
R2(x) = Valσ
B
R2(fi).
Therefore, we have Valσ
B
R2(y) + 6n+ 1 < Valσ
B
R2(x).
The second case that we must consider is when l > i, which occurs only when
i = 1. In this case we can express the valuation of y in terms of the valuation of cl
as:
Valσ
B
R2(y) = Valσ
B
R2(cl).
Similarly, we can express the valuation of x in terms of the valuation of cl. Our
derivation uses the fact that i = 1.
Valσ
B
R2(x) = −(10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n+ (10n + 4)2i − 1 + ValσBR2(cl)
= (10n + 4)− 4n− 1 + ValσBR2(cl)
= 6n+ 3 + Valσ
B
R2(cl).
Once again it is clear that Valσ
B
R2(y) + 6n + 1 < Valσ
B
R2(x).
We can now prove that the action (dk, x) is switched at the vertex dk. Propo-
sition 5.29, and the fact that r(dk, x) = r(dk, y) for every k, imply:
Appealσ
B
R2(dk, y) = r(dk, y) + Val
σB
R2(dk, y)
< r(dk, y) + Val
σB
R2(dk, x) = Appeal
σB
R2(dk, x).
Every vertex dk with k ≥ 1 has an additional action (dk, dk−1), for which we consider
two cases. Since σBR2(dk) = σ
B
2i+3(dk) for every k, we can use Proposition 5.7. When
1 ≤ k ≤ 2i+ 4 this proposition, in combintation with Proposition 5.29 gives:
Appealσ
B
R2(dk, dk−1) = 4n − k + 1 + ValσBR2(y) < ValσBR2(x) = AppealσBR2(dk, x).
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In the case where k > 2i+ 4, Proposition 5.7 and Proposition 5.29 imply:
Appealσ
B
R2(dk, dk−1) = Valσ
B
R2(y)− 1 < ValσBR2(x) = AppealσBR2(dk, dk−1).
We have therefore shown that the action (dk, x) is the most appealing action at the
vertex dk.
We now turn our attention to the vertex y. For this vertex, we must prove
that greedy strategy improvement switches the action (y, ci), and to do this it is
sufficient to prove that Valσ
B
R2(ci) > Val
σB
R2(cj) for every j 6= i. For the vertices
cj with j ≥ i, we can use Proposition 5.27 and Proposition 5.2 to prove that
Valσ
B
R2(ci) > Val
σB
R2(cj) where j > i.
We will now deal with the vertices cj with j < i. At these vertices we have
σBR2(cj) = fj, σ
B
R2(fj) = bj, and σ
B
R2(bj) = fi. Therefore, we have:
Valσ
B
R2(cj) = −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 4n+ 2 + ValσBR2(fi)
On the other hand, since σBR2(ci) = fi, we have:
Valσ
B
R2(ci) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σB
R2(fi)
Therefore, it is obvious that Valσ
B
R2(ci) > Val
σB
R2(cj) when j < i, and we have
completed the proof that greedy strategy improvement switches the action (y, ci) at
the vertex y.
The arguments that we have just made can also be used for the vertices rj
with j < i. At these vertices, we must show that greedy strategy improvement
switches the action (rj , ci). Every outgoing action from the vertex rj has the same re-
ward, and leads to a vertex ck. We have already shown that Val
σB
R2(ci) > Val
σB
R2(cj)
for every j 6= i, which implies that the action (rj , ci) must be the most appealing
action at rj . Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will switch the action (rj , ci)
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at the vertex rj in the strategy σ
B
R2
We will now consider the vertices cj with j < i − 1. At these vertices we
must show that greedy strategy improvement does not switch away from the action
(cj , fj). In order to do this, we will show that the action (cj , rj) is not switchable at
the vertex cj . Note that we have σ
B
R2(rj) = cj+1, σ
B
R2(cj+1) = fj+1, σ
B
R2(fj+1) = bj+1
and σBR2(bj+1) = fi. Therefore, we have:
Appealσ
B
R2(cj , rj) = −(10n + 4)2j + 4n+ 1 + ValσBR2(fi).
Whereas, the fact that σBR2(cj) = fj, that σ
B
R2(fj) = bj , and that σ
B
R2(bj) = fi imply:
Valσ
B
R2(cj) = −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 4n+ 2 + ValσBR2(fi).
Since 2j > 2j−1, we have that the action (cj , rj) is not switchable at the vertices cj
with j < i− 1 in the strategy σBR2. This implies that greedy strategy improvement
cannot switch away from the action (cj , fj) at these vertices.
We now consider the vertex ci−1, for which we must prove that greedy strat-
egy improvement does not switch away from the action (ci−1, fi−1). The arguments
used in the previous paragraph imply that:
Valσ
B
R2(ci−1) = −(10n + 4)2i−2 + 4n+ 2 + ValσBR2(fi).
Moreover, we have that σBR2(fi) = bi, σ
B
R2(bi) = ai, and σ
B
R2(ri) = cl, where l =
min(B>i ∪ {n + 1}). This implies that:
Valσ
B
R2(ci−1) = (10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1 − 2i−2) + 1 + ValσBR2(cl) > ValσBR2(cl).
On the other hand, we have that σBR2(ri−1) = cl, which implies that:
Appealσ
B
R2(ci−1, ri−1) = Valσ
B
R2(cl)− 1 < ValσBR2(cl).
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Therefore, the action (ci−1, ri−1) is not switchable in the strategy σBR2.
Finally, to complete the proof of Proposition 5.26, we must consider the
vertices bj . We start by considering the vertices bj with j /∈ B′. For these ver-
tices, we must show that the action (bj , x) is the most appealing action. We will
begin by showing that Appealσ
B
R2(bj , x) > Appeal
σB
R2(bj , dk) for every k. Since
σBR2(dk) = σ
B
2i+3(dk) for every k, we can apply Proposition 5.11 to argue that
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , dk) ≤ ValσBR2(y) + 6n + 1. Then, we can apply Proposition 5.29 to
conclude that:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , dk) ≤ ValσBR2(y) + 6n+ 1 < ValσBR2(x) = AppealσBR2(bj , x).
We can also apply Proposition 5.29 to argue that the action (bj , x) is more appealing
than the action (bj , y):
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , y) = 1 + Val
σB
R2(y) < Valσ
B
R2(x) = Appealσ
B
R2(bj , x).
We now consider the actions (bj , fk) where k /∈ B′ and k < i. Since k > j,
we must also have that j < i. Therefore, it must be the case that σBR2(bj) = fi and
that σBR2(bk) = fi. Therefore, we have the following two facts:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , fk) = 4n+ 2− (10n + 4)2k−1 +ValσBR2(fi)
Valσ
B
R2(bj) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σB
R2(fi)
Therefore, the action (bj , fk) is not switchable in the strategy σ
B
R2.
Now we condiser the actions (bj , fk) where k /∈ B′ and k > i. In this case we
have σBR2(bj) = dl for some l. The following derrivation uses this fact, along with
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Proposition 5.11 and Proposition 5.29, to obtain:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , fk) = 1− (10n + 4)2k−1 +ValσBR2(bj)
≤ 1− (10n + 4)2k−1 + 6n+ 1 +ValσBR2(y)
< 1 + Valσ
B
R2(y) = Appealσ
B
R2(bj , y) < Appeal
σB
R2(bj , x)
Therefore, the action (bj , x) is more appealing than the action (bj, fk).
We move on to consider the actions (bj , fk) where k ∈ B′. Since Proposi-
tion 5.27 implies that Valσ
B
R2(fk) = Val
σB
′
0 (fk) for all k ∈ B′, we can apply Propo-
sition 5.19 to argue that Valσ
B
R2(fi) > Val
σB
R2(fk) with k 6= i. If j < i, then we have
that σBR2(bj) = fi, which immidiately implies that none of the actions (bj , fk) where
k ∈ B′ can be switchable at bj in σBR2. For the vertices bj with j > i, we will argue
that Valσ
B
R2(x) > Valσ
B
R2(fl) where l = min(B
′>i). We can assume that l is well
defined since otherwise there would be no action (bj , fk) with k ∈ B′. By following
the strategy σBR2 from x we obtain:
Valσ
B
R2(x) = −(10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1)−ValσBR2(fl) > ValσBR2(fl) + 4n+ 1
Since Proposition 5.19 implies that Valσ
B
R2(fl) > Val
σB
R2(fm) withm > l andm ∈ B′,
we must have that Appealσ
B
R2(bj, fk) < Appeal
σB
R2(bj , x).
Finally, we condiser the action aj. Proposition 5.27 and Proposition 5.2
imply that Val(gj) < (10n + 4)2
n. From this we can derrive, in a similar manner
to Proposition 5.10, that Appealσ
B
R2(aj) < Val
σB
R2(bj) + 1. In the case where j > i,
we have that σBR2(bj) = dk for some k. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 5.11 to
conclude:
Valσ
B
R2(bj) ≤ 6n+ 1 + ValσBR2(y)
Proposition 5.29 implies that Appealσ
B
R2(bj , x) > 6n+1+Val
σB
R2(y), and since every
valuation in σBR2 is an integer, we have that Appeal
σB
R2(bj , x) ≥ ValσBR2(bj)+ 1. This
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implies that the action (bj , x) is more appealing than the action aj at the state bj
in the strategy σBR2.
We now consider the case where j < i− 1. In this case we have the following
two facts:
Valσ
B
R2(bj) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σB
R2(fi)
Valσ
B
R2(gj) = (10n + 4)(2
j − 2j)− 1 + 4n+ 1− 4n+ 4n+ 1 + ValσBR2(fi)
This implies that Valσ
B
R2(gj) = Val
σB
R2(bj), and therefore we have Appeal
σB
R2(aj) =
Valσ
B
R2(bj). This implies that the action ai is not switchable in the strategy σ
B
R2 at
the vertex bj .
Finally, we consider the case where j = i− 1. If l = min(B>i ∪{n+1}) then
we have the following two facts:
Valσ
B
R2(gi−1) = (10n + 4)2i−1 − 1 + ValσBR2(cl)
Valσ
B
R2(bi−1) = 4n+ 1 + (10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1)− 4n − 1 + ValσBR2(cl)
This implies that Valσ
B
R2(gi−1) < Valσ
B
R2(bi−1), which gives:
Appealσ
B
R2(bi−1, ai−1) = r(bi−1, ai−1) +
∑
s∈S
p(s|bi−1, ai−1)ValσBR2(bi−1(s)
= 0 + (1− 2
−n
10n + 4
)Valσ
B
R2(bi−1) +
2−(n)
10n + 4
Valσ
B
R2(gi−1)
< 0 + (1− 2
−n
10n + 4
)Valσ
B
R2(bi−1) +
2−(n)
10n + 4
Valσ
B
R2(bi−1)
= Valσ
B
R2(bi−1)
Therefore, the action ai−1 cannot be switchable at the vertex bi−1 in the strategy
σBR2.
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.26, we consider the vertices bj where
j ∈ B′. We will begin by showing that the actions (bj , x), (bj, y), (bj , fk) with k /∈ B′,
163
and (bj , dk) for all k, are not switchable in the strategy σ
B
R2. For the action (bj , x)
we have Appealσ
B
R2(bj , x) = Val
σB
R2(x), and for the action (bj , y) Proposition 5.29
gives:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , y) = 1 + Val
σB
R2(y) < Valσ
B
R2(x)
For the actions (bj , dk), Proposition 5.11 and Proposition 5.29 imply:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj, dk) ≤ 6n + 1 + ValσBR2(y) < ValσBR2(x)
For the actions (bj , fk) with k /∈ B′, we have:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , fk) = 4n+ 1− (10n + 4)2k−1 − 4n+ValσBR2(bj) < ValσBR2(bj)
Since k /∈ B′ we must have σBR2(bk) = dl for some l, therefore we can use the same
arguments as we did for the action (bj , dk) to conclude:
Appealσ
B
R2(bj , fk) < Val
σB
R2(bj) < Val
σB
R2(x)
Therefore, to show that the actions (bj, x), (bj , y), (bj , fk) with k /∈ B′, and (bj , dk)
for all k are not switchable, we must show that Valσ
B
R2(x) < Valσ
B
R2(bj). Since
σBR2(x) = fi we have:
Valσ
B
R2(x) = −(10n + 4)2i−1 − 4n+ValσBR2(bi) < ValσBR2(bi)
If j = i then the proof is complete. On the other hand, if j 6= i then the fact that
j ∈ B′ implies that j > i. If we follow the strategy σBR2 from the vertex bi then
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Proposition 5.27 and Proposition 5.4 give:
Valσ
B
R2(bi) = (10n + 4)2
i − 1 + ValσBR2(cmin(B′>i))
≤ (10n + 4)2i − 1 + ValσBR2(cj) + (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2i)
= (10n + 4)2i +Valσ
B
R2(bj) + (10n + 4)(2
j−1 − 2i)− (10n + 4)2j−1
= Valσ
B
R2(bj)
Therefore, none of the actions that we are considering are switchable at the vertex bj
in the strategy σBR2.
We now consider the actions (bj , fk) with k ∈ B′. Proposition 5.27 implies
that Valσ
B
R2(bj) = Val
σB
′
0 (bj) and Val
σB
R2(fk) = Val
σB
′
0 (fk). This implies that the
action (bj, fk) is switchable in the strategy σ
B′
0 if and only if it is switchable in
the strategy σBR2. Therefore, Proposition 5.16 implies that the action (bj , fk) is not
switchable at the vertex bj in the strategy σ
B
R2. Moreover, since we have now shown
that there are no switchable actions at the vertex bj , we have shown that greedy
strategy improvement will not switch away from the action aj at this vertex.
5.4.4 The Final Reset Strategy
The purpose of this section is to provide a proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 5.30. Greedy strategy improvement moves from the strategy σB
R3
to
the strategy σB
′
0 .
We begin by stating an analogue of Proposition 5.27. However, since the
strategy σBR3 is closer to the strategy σ
B′
0 , more vertices can be included in this
proposition.
Proposition 5.31. We have Valσ
B
R3(v) = Valσ
B′
0 (v) for every v ∈ {cj , : j ≥
i} ∪ {rj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ {bj , fj : j ∈ B′} ∪ {x, y}.
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Proof. The proof of this proposition uses exactly the same reasoning as the proof of
Proposition 5.27. This is because σBR3 is closed on the set {cj , : j ≥ i} ∪ {rj : 1 ≤
j ≤ n} ∪ {bj , fj : j ∈ B′} ∪ {x, y}.
The arguments that we used to show that a vertex rj with j ≥ i will not
be switched away from the strategy σBR2 can also be applied to the strategy σ
B
R3.
Since every outgoing action from the vertex rj is of the form (rj , v), where v ∈ {cj :
j > i}, Proposition 5.31 implies that AppealσB
′
0 (rj , v) = Appeal
σB
R3(rj , v) for every
outgoing action from rj . The claim then follows from the fact that Proposition 5.16
implies that if greedy strategy improvement is applied to σB
′
0 , then it will not switch
away from σB
′
0 .
The same argument can also be used to prove that a vertex cj with j ∈ B′
will not be switched away from the strategy σB
′
0 (cj). Once again, this is because
we have that every outgoing action from the vertex cj is of the form (cj , v) where
v ∈ {cj , rj : j ≥ i} ∪ {bj , fj : j ∈ B′}. Therefore, we can apply Propositions 5.31
and 5.16 in the same way in order to prove the claim.
We will now consider the vertices rj with j < i, where we must show that
(rj , ci) is the most appealing action. We will begin by showing that the actions
(rj , ck) with k < i are not switchable. Since we have σ
B
R3(ck) = fk, σ
B
R3(bk) = x,
and σBR3(x) = fi we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , ck) = −(10n + 4)2k−1 +ValσBR3(fi).
On the other hand, since σBR3(rj) = ci and σ
B
R3(ci) = fi we have:
Valσ
B
R3(rj) = 4n+Val
σB
R3(fi).
Therefore, the actions (rj , ck) with k < i are not switchable in σ
B
R3. Proposition 5.31
and Proposition 5.2 then imply that Appealσ
B
R3(rj , ci) > Appeal
σB
R3(rj , ck) with for
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every k > i. Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will not switch away from the
action (rj , ci) in the strategy σ
B
R3.
We will now consider the vertices cj with j /∈ B′ and j < i. At these vertices
we must argue that greedy strategy improvement switches the action (cj , ri). Since
σBR3(cj) = fj, σ
B
R3(bj) = x, and σ
B
R3(x) = fi we have:
Valσ
B
R3(cj) = 1− (10n + 4)2j−1 +ValσBR3(fi)
On the other hand, since σBR3(rj) = ci and σ
B
R3(ci) = fi we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(cj , rj) = −1 + 4n+ 1 + ValσBR3(fi)
Therefore, we have Appealσ
B
R3(cj , rj) > Val
σB
R3(cj), which implies that greedy strat-
egy improvement will switch the action (cj , rj) at the vertex cj in the strategy σ
B
R3.
Now we will consider the vertices cj with j /∈ B′ and j > i. At these vertices
we must argue that greedy strategy improvement does not switch away from the
action (cj , rj). We will do this by arguing that the action (cj , fj) is not switchable.
As we have argued previously, we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(cj , fj) = 1− (10n + 4)2j−1 +ValσBR3(fi)
= (10n + 4)(2i − 2i−1 − 2j−1) + ValσBR3(cmin(B′>i)∪{n+1})
We can then apply Proposition 5.31 and Proposition 5.4 to show:
Appealσ
B
R3(cj , fj) ≤ (10n+4)(2i− 2i−1− 2j−1− 2i+2j−1)+ValσBR3(cj) < ValσBR3(cj)
Therefore, the action (cj , rj) is not switchable in the strategy σ
B
R3.
We will now consider the vertex x, where we must show that the most ap-
pealing action is (x, fi). We will begin by showing that the actions (x, fj) where
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j /∈ B′ are not switchable in σBR3. Since σBR3(bj) = x, we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(x, fj) = −(10n + 4)2j−1 − 4n+ValσbR3(x) < ValσBR3(x)
Therefore, the actions (x, fj) where j /∈ B′ are not switchable in σBR3. For the
actions (x, fj) where j ∈ B′ and j 6= i, Proposition 5.31 and Proposition 5.19
imply that Appealσ
B
R3(x, fi) > Appeal
σB
R3(x, fj), which implies that greedy strategy
improvement will not switch away from the action (x, fi).
We can apply the same reasoning for the vertex y, where we must show that
(y, ci) is the most appealing action. For the actions (y, cj) with j /∈ B′ we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(y, cj) = −(10n + 4)2j−1 + 1 +ValσbR3(x) < ValσBR3(x) + 4n+ 1.
Since σbR3(y) = ci and σ
b
R3(x) = fi we must have Val
σB
R3(y) = Valσ
B
R3(x) + 4n + 1.
Therefore we have shown that the actions (y, cj) with j /∈ B′ are not switchable in
the strategy σBR3. Proposition 5.31 and Proposition 5.2 imply that Appeal
σB
R3(ci) >
Appealσ
B
R3(cj) for every j ∈ B such that j 6= i. Therefore greedy strategy improve-
ment will not switch away from the action (y, ci) in the strategy σ
B
R3.
We now consider the vertices dk for all k. For every vertex dk, we must show
that (dk, y) is the most appealing action. For the action (dk, dk−1) we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(dk, dk−1) = Valσ
B
R3(x)− 1 < ValσBR3(x) = AppealσBR3(dk, x).
For the action (dk, x), the fact that r(dk, y) = r(dk, x) implies:
Appealσ
B
R3(dk, x) = r(dk, x) + Val(fi)
< r(dk, y) + 4n+ 1 + Val(fi) = Appeal
σB
R3(dk, y).
Therefore, the action (dk, y) is the most appealing action at the vertex dk.
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Finally, we consider the vertices bj. We begin with the case when j /∈ B′. In
this case we must show that (bj , y) is the most appealing action at the vertex bj .
We will first argue that the action (bj , x) is not switchable. Since σ
B
R3(x) = fi,
σBR3(y) = ci and σ
B
R3(ci) = fi, we have the following two equalities:
Valσ
B
R3(x) = Val(fi)
Valσ
B
R3(y) = Val(fi) + 4n+ 1
Therefore, we must have Appealσ
B
R3(bj , x) < Appeal
σB
R3(bj , y). These two equalities
can also be used to prove that the actions of the form (bj , dk) are not switch-
able. This is because we have Appealσ
B
R3(bj , dk) ≤ 4n + ValσBR3(x) and we have
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) = 4n+ 2 + Val
σB
R3(x).
We now consider the actions of the form (bj , fk). We will first prove that
the actions (bj , fk) where k /∈ B′ are not switched by greedy strategy improvement.
Since k /∈ B′, we have:
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , fk) = −(10n + 4)2k−1 + 1 + ValσBR3(x)
< Valσ
B
R3(y) + 4n + 2 = Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y)
Therefore, these actions will not be switched by greedy strategy improvement in the
strategy σBR3. We now consider the actions (bj , fk) where k ∈ B′. We will prove that
these actions are not switchable in σBR3. The appeal of the action (bj , fk) is:
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , fk) = 4n+ 1 + Val
σB
R3(fk).
On the other hand, the appeal of the action (bj , y) can be expressed as:
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1)− 4n+ValσBR3(cmin(B′>i))
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We can then use Proposition 5.31 and Proposition 5.4 to conclude:
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1 − 2i + 2k−1)− 4n+ValσBR3(ck)
= (10n + 4)(2k−1 − 2i−1)− 4n+ValσBR3(ck)
= (10n + 4)(2k−1 − 2i−1) + 1 + ValσBR3(fk) > 4n+ 1 +ValσBR3(fk)
Therefore, the action (bj , fk) will not be switched by greedy strategy improvement.
Finally, we consider the action aj . We will first argue that Appeal
σB
R3(bj, y) >
Valσ
B
R3(bj) + 1. This holds because we have Val
σB
R3(bj) = Val
σB
R3(fi), and we have
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) = 4n + 2 + Val
σB
R3(fi). On the other hand Proposition 5.31 and
Proposition 5.10 imply that Appealσ
B
R3(bj , aj) < Val
σB
R3(bj) + 1. Therefore, greedy
strategy improvement will not switch the action aj.
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.30, we will show that greedy strategy
improvement does not switch away from the action aj at every vertex bj with j ∈ B′.
We can use exactly the same arguments as we used for the vertices bj with j /∈ B′
to argue that Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) > Appeal
σB
R3(bj, a) for every action a ∈ {(bj , dk) :
1 ≤ k ≤ n} ∪ {(bj , fk : j < k ≤ n} ∪ {(bj , x)}. Therefore, we can prove the claim
by showing that Appealσ
B
R3(bj, y) < Val
σB
R3(bj). As we have done previously, we can
use Proposition 5.31 and Proposition 5.4 to obtain the following characterisation for
the appeal of the action (bj , y):
Appealσ
B
R3(bj , y) = (10n + 4)(2
i − 2i−1 − 2i + 2j−1)− 4n +ValσBR3(cj)
= (10n + 4)(2j−1 − 2i−1)− 4n+ValσBR3(ck)
= −(10n + 4)(2i−1)− 4n+ 1 + ValσBR3(bj) < ValσBR3(bj)
Therefore, greedy strategy improvement will not switch away from the action aj at
the vertex bj in the strategy σ
B
R3.
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5.5 Exponential Lower Bounds For The Average Re-
ward Criterion
We can now state the main theorem of this Chapter. The proof of this theorem
follows from Proposition 5.16 in the flip phase, and Propositions 5.21, 5.23, 5.26,
and 5.30 in the reset phase.
Theorem 5.32. When greedy strategy improvement for the average-reward criterion
is applied to the strategy σ
{1}
0 it will take at least 2
n−1 iterations to find the optimal
strategy.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have shown how Friedmann’s lower bounds for the greedy switch-
ing policy in the strategy improvement setting can be extended to apply to the
Markov decision process setting. We have shown lower bounds for the the average-
reward criterion, but lower bounds for the discounted-reward criterion have been
left open. We suspect that a smart choice of discount factor will allow the same
construction to be used to prove an exponential lower bound in this setting. This is
because the valuation of a vertex under the discounted-reward criterion approaches
the valuation of that vertex under the total-reward criterion as the discount factor
approaches 1. Therefore, if the discount factor is chosen to be sufficiently close to 1,
then the appeal of each action under the discounted-reward criterion will be close to
appeal of that action under the total-reward criterion. If it can be shown that the
ordering of successor actions at each vertex does not change, then greedy strategy
improvement will make the same decisions at those vertices, and an exponential
lower bound would follow.
Another open question is whether the sub-exponential lower bounds of Fried-
mann, Hansen, and Zwick for the random facet switching policy [FHZ10] can be
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generalised to the Markov decision process setting. Their construction also uses the
machinery of a binary counter, but they have a more complex gadget to represent
each bit. If this lower bound can be extended to the Markov decision process setting,
then it would seem likely that the lower bound could also be extended to the ran-
dom facet pivot rule for linear programming. This is because strategy improvement
algorithms that only switch one action in each iteration are strongly related to the
behaviour of the simplex method as it is applied to the dual of the reduction from
Markov decision processes to linear programming.
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Chapter 6
Non-oblivious Strategy
Improvement
The switching policies for strategy improvement that have been considered so far
have been general switching policies, which are not concerned with the type of game
or MDP that they are solving. Either these switching policies follow a simple rule,
such as “switch some switchable edge”, or they use a rule that depends on the appeal
of an edge, such as “switch the edge with maximal appeal”. This generality allows
the switching policies to be applied to a wide variety of models, such as both MDPs
and games, but it prevents the switching policy from using more complex rules that
depend on the model to which it is being applied. It is for this reason that we refer
to these switching polices as oblivious switching policies. In this chapter, we develop
non-oblivious switching policies for the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy improvement
algorithm.
In the first part of this chapter we study switchable edges, and we show that
these edges can be classified into two types: cross edges and back edges. We show
that the effect of switching a switchable cross edge can be very different to the effect
of switching a switchable back edge. The traditional switching policies that we have
described do not consider this distinction, and they are therefore unable to exploit
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it in their decision making.
This however, is only the first step. We go on to show how each switchable
back edge corresponds to a structure in a mean-payoff game that we call a snare.
We show that if a switching policy is aware of a snare in the game, then it can make
better decisions. Therefore, we propose a family of switching policies that remember
the snares that have been seen in the game, and then use this knowledge to make
better decisions in future iterations. We also show how a traditional switching policy
can be modified to make use of these techniques.
Finally, we examine the behaviour of our techniques on the families of ex-
amples that have been used to show super-polynomial lower bounds. In particular,
we consider the examples of Friedmann, which show a lower bound for the greedy
and optimal switching policies [Fri09], and we consider the examples of Friedmann,
Hansen, and Zwick, which show a sub-exponential lower bound for the random facet
switching policy [FHZ10]. We show that modifying each of these switching policies to
make use of our techniques allows these switching policies to avoid super-polynomial
behaviour on their respective examples.
6.1 Classifying Profitable Edges
In this section we study switchable edges. We are interested in how the choice of
edge to switch affects the behaviour of a strategy improvement algorithm. We show
that, in the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy improvement algorithm, there are two
different types of switchable edge, and that these types of edge behave differently
when strategy improvement switches them. In the first part of this section we define
our classification of switchable edges, and in the second part we show the effect of
switching both of these types of edges.
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6.1.1 Strategy Trees
The purpose of this section is to show how a strategy and its best response can be
viewed as a tree, and to classify switchable edges by their position in this tree. The
strategy tree will only contain vertices with finite valuation. This means that for
each Max strategy σ, if a vertex v has Valσ(v) = ∞, then it will not be contained
in the strategy tree for σ. To make this more natural, we will rephrase the problem
slightly so that the set of vertices with infinite valuation can be ignored.
We define the positive-cycle problem to be the problem of finding a strategy σ
with Valσ(v) =∞ for some vertex v, or to prove that there is no strategy with this
property. This is clearly a weakening of the zero-mean partition problem, which
required us to find every vertex v for which there is some strategy σ with Valσ(v) =
∞. Strategy improvement can be applied to solve the positive-cycle problem simply
by executing it as normal, but stopping in the first iteration in which some vertex
has an infinite valuation.
In this section we will show how a switching policy for the positive-cycle
problem can be adapted to find the optimal strategy. Let α(σ,G) be a switching
policy for the positive cycle problem on the graph G. Algorithm 4 shows a switching
policy that uses α to find the optimal strategy. The algorithm first finds the set U
that contains every vertex with a finite valuation in the current strategy. For a set
of vertices W we define G  W to be the sub-game induced by W , which is G with
every vertex not in W removed. The algorithm runs α on G  U until α produces
a strategy in which some vertex has an infinite valuation. When this occurs, the
algorithm will continually switch switchable edges (v, u) where Valσ(u) = ∞ until
no such edges remain. It then recomputes the set U , by removing every vertex
whose valuation has risen to ∞.
To prove the correctness of this approach, we will prove the following propo-
sition, which shows that the valuation of some vertex rises to ∞ every time the
second inner while loop in Algorithm 4 is executed.
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Algorithm 4 ZeroMeanPartition(σ, α,G)
U := V
while σ is not optimal do
while Valσ(v) <∞ for every v in U do
σ := α(σ,G  U)
end while
while There is a switchable edge (v, u) with Valσ(u) =∞ do
σ := σ[v 7→ u]
end while
U := U \ {v ∈ V : Valσ(v) =∞}
end while
Proposition 6.1. If (v, u) is a switchable edge in σ with Valσ(u) = ∞, then we
have Valσ[v 7→u](v) =∞.
Proof. Since the edge (v, u) is switchable in σ, we have by Theorem 3.6 that σ[v 7→
u] is admissible. Moreover, since Valσ(u) = ∞, we have have Valσ[v 7→u](u) =
∞. Therefore, we have Play(u, σ[v 7→ u], τ) = 〈u, v1, . . . vk, 〈c0, c1, . . . cl〉ω〉 with∑l
i=0 r(ci) > 0 for every Min strategy τ . In the strategy σ[v 7→ u], every play
starting at v moves directly to u. Therefore, we have Play(v, σ[v 7→ u], τ) =
〈v, u, v1, . . . , vk, 〈c0, c1, . . . , cl〉ω〉 with
∑l
i=0 r(ci) > 0 for every Min strategy τ . This
implies that Valσ[v 7→u](v) =∞.
Suppose that the first inner while loop terminates with a strategy σ. We will
have that either there is some vertex v contained in U with Valσ(v) =∞, or we will
have that σ is an optimal strategy for the sub-game induced by the set of vertices U .
In the first case, we will have that |U | will strictly decrease in the next iteration of
the outer while loop. In the second case, we argue that σ is also optimal for the
full game. Since σ is optimal for the sub-game induced by U , there cannot be a
switchable edge (v, u) where both v and u are contained in U , and there obviously
cannot be a switchable edge (v, u) where both v and u are both contained in V \U .
This leaves only the case of switchable edges (v, u) where v ∈ U and u ∈ V \ U .
This case is dealt with by the second inner while loop, which only terminates when
no such edges exist in the current strategy. Moreover, Proposition 6.1 implies that
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the second inner while loop can execute at most |V | times during the entire run
of the algorithm. Therefore, we have the following bound on the running time of
Algorithm 4.
Proposition 6.2. If α is a switching policy that solves the positive-cycle problem
in O(f(n)) iterations then Algorithm 4 is a switching policy that finds an optimal
strategy in O(n · f(n)) iterations.
The purpose of defining the positive-cycle problem is to allow us to ignore
the set of vertices with infinite valuation. For the rest of this chapter we will focus
on devising switching policies for the positive cycle problem. Therefore, we can
assume that every strategy σ that is considered by strategy improvement will have
the property Valσ(v) <∞ for every vertex v. Proposition 6.2 indicates that only a
linear factor must be paid in terms of complexity to generalise our switching policies
to solve the zero-mean partition.
With the assumption that every vertex has a finite valuation in place, we are
now ready to define the strategy tree.
Definition 6.3 (Strategy Tree). Given a Max strategy σ and a Min strategy τ we
define the tree T σ,τ = (V,E′) where E′ = {(v, u) : σ(v) = u or τ(v) = u}.
In other words, T σ,τ is a tree rooted at the sink whose edges are those chosen
by σ and τ . Recall that, although there may be many best responses to a particular
strategy, the function br(σ) selects one of these best responses, and we make no
assumptions about which best response this function selects. Therefore, there is
a unique tree T σ,br(σ), and we define T σ to be shorthand for this tree. The define
Subtreeσ(v) : V → 2V to be the function that gives the vertices in the subtree rooted
at the vertex v in T σ.
We can now define our classification for switchable edges. Let (v, u) be a
switchable edge in the strategy σ. We call this a switchable back edge if u is in
Subtreeσ(v), otherwise we call it a switchable cross edge.
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Figure 6.1: A strategy tree.
Figure 6.1 gives an example of a strategy tree. The dashed edges show a
strategy for Max, and the dotted edges show the best response to this strategy. The
strategy tree contains every vertex, and every edge that is either dashed or dotted.
The subtree of v is the set {v, b, c, d, u}. The edge (v, u) is switchable because
Valσ(s) = 0 and Valσ(u) = 1. Since u is contained in the subtree of v, the edge
(v, u) is a switchable back edge.
6.1.2 The Effect Of Switching An Edge
In this section we will justify the usefulness of our classification of switchable edges
by giving some basic results about how these edges affect the behaviour of strategy
improvement. We will see that the result of switching a switchable cross edge is
quite different to the result of switching a switchable back edge. The standard
switching policies for strategy improvement are not aware of this distinction, and so
they cannot exploit it in order to make better decisions.
We will measure the outcome of switching a switchable edge by the increase
in valuation that occurs when the edge is switched. More specifically, if an edge (v, u)
is switched in the strategy σ, we are interested in maxw∈V (Valσ[v 7→u](w)−Valσ(w)).
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We begin by considering switchable cross edges. The first thing that we will
show is a lower bound on how much valuations can increase when a switchable cross
edge is switched. For every switchable cross edge (v, u) in the strategy σ we define
the increase of that edge as:
Increaseσ(v, u) = Valσ(u)−Valσ(σ(v)).
The following lower bound has long been known for strategy improvement algo-
rithms: when the switchable edge (v, u) is switched in a strategy σ, we will have
that Valσ[v 7→u](v) ≥ Valσ(u)+r(v) . We will provide a short proof that this is correct
for the Bjo¨rklund-Vorobyov strategy improvement algorithm.
Proposition 6.4. Let (v, u) be a switchable edge in a strategy σ. After switching
the edge we have Valσ[v 7→u](v)−Valσ(v) ≥ Increaseσ(v, u).
Proof. It follows from the definition of a valuation that Valσ(v) = Valσ(σ(v))+ r(v)
and that Valσ[v 7→u](v) = Valσ[v 7→u](u) + r(v). Since (v, u) is a switchable edge in σ,
Theorem 3.6 implies that Valσ[v 7→u](u) ≥ Valσ(u). Combining these gives:
Valσ[v 7→u](v) −Valσ(v) = (Valσ[v 7→u](u) + r(v)) − (Valσ(σ(v)) + r(v))
= Valσ[v 7→u](u)−Valσ(σ(v))
≥ Valσ(u)−Valσ(σ(v)).
The lower bound given in Proposition 6.4 holds for both switchable cross
edges and switchable back edges. However, for switchable cross edges we can show
that this bound is tight.
Proposition 6.5. Let (v, u) be a switchable cross edge in the strategy σ. For every
vertex w we have Valσ[v 7→u](w) −Valσ(w) ≤ Increaseσ(v, u).
Proof. We assume that Min plays br(σ) against σ[v → u]. We will prove for every
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vertex w that
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w) −Valσ(w) ≤ Increaseσ(v, u).
This is sufficient to prove the proposition because, by properties of the best response,
we have that Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ[v 7→u])(w) ≤ Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w), and therefore
Valσ[v 7→u](w)−Valσ(w) ≤ Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w) −Valσ(w).
We shall first consider a vertex w that is not in Subtreeσ(v). Note that
Play(w, σ[v 7→ u],br(σ)) does not pass through through the vertex v, which implies
that Play(w, σ[v 7→ u],br(σ)) = Play(w, σ,br(σ)). Since the valuation of a vertex is
determined entirely by the play, this implies that Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w) = Valσ(w). Note
that since (v, u) is a switchable edge it must be the case that Increaseσ(v, u) > 0.
We therefore have:
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w)−Valσ(w) = 0 < Increaseσ(v, u).
Now consider a vertex w that is in Subtreeσ(v). Let pi = 〈w = v0, v1, . . . , vk =
v〉 be the prefix of Play(w, σ,br(σ)) that ends at the vertex v. Since the only
modification to σ was to change the successor of v, we also have that pi is a prefix
of Play(w, σ[v 7→ u],br(σ)). If c =∑ki=0 r(vi) then we the following two expressions
for the valuation of w:
Valσ(w) = Valσ(v) + c,
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w) = Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v) + c.
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Therefore, the increase of the valuation of w can be represented as:
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(w)−Valσ(w) = (Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v) + c)− (Valσ(v) + c)
= Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v)−Valσ(v).
To complete the proof we must show that Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v) − Valσ(v) ≤
Increaseσ(v, u). By definition we have that Valσ(v) = Valσ(σ(v))+r(v) and we have
that Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v) = Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(u) + r(v). Since (v, u) is a switchable cross
edge, we have that u is not in the subtree of v, and so we have already shown that
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(u) = Valσ(u). Combining these facts gives:
Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(v)−Valσ(v) = Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(u) + r(v)− (Valσ(σ(v)) + r(v))
= Valσ[v 7→u],br(σ)(u)−Valσ(σ(v))
= Valσ(u)−Valσ(σ(v))
= Increaseσ(v, u).
The lower bound given by Proposition 6.4 is the one that is generally used
in the design of switching policies. This can be seen, for example, in the greedy
switching policy that was defined in Section 3.2.4. When there is more than one
switchable edge at a vertex v, the greedy policy chooses the switchable edge (v, u)
which has the largest value of Appealσ(v, u). The reason for this choice is that
Proposition 6.4 guarantees the largest increase in valuations for the edge (v, u).
With Proposition 6.5 we have shown that this is a valid approach when the edge
(v, u) is a switchable cross edge. In the remainder of this section, we will argue
that relying on Proposition 6.4 is not a good idea when considering switchable back
edges.
For a switchable back edge, the lower bound given by Proposition 6.4 can
dramatically underestimate the increase in valuation that is caused by switching the
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edge. The example shown in Figure 6.1 is one such case. For the strategy σ that is
shown, we have Valσ(u) = 1, and therefore Increaseσ(v, u) = 1. However, when the
edges (v, u) is switched, Min will use the edges (b, a) and (u, b) in the best response
to σ[v 7→ u]. This causes the valuation of u to rise to 12, and we therefore have that
Valσ[v 7→u](u)−Valσ(u) = 11, which is clearly much larger than the increase that was
implied by Proposition 6.4.
The problem with the lower bound given in Proposition 6.4 is that it does
not consider the effect that switching an edge has on the behaviour of the opponent.
We will now formalize what this effect is. For a switchable back edge (v, u) in a
strategy σ we define the critical set, which is the vertices in Subtreeσ(v) that Min
can reach from u when Max plays σ.
Definition 6.6 (Critical Set). If (v, u) is a switchable back edge in the strategy σ,
then we define the critical set as
Criticalσ(v, u) = {w ∈ Subtreeσ(v) : there is a path 〈u, u1, . . . , uk = w〉,
where for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have ui ∈ Subtreeσ(v),
and if ui ∈ VMax then ui+1 = σ(ui)}.
In the example given by Figure 6.1, the critical set for the switchable back
edge (v, u) is {v, b, d, u}. The vertex b is in the critical set because it is in the
subtree of v, and Min can reach it from u when Max plays σ. On the other hand,
the vertex c is not in the critical set because σ(d) = v, and therefore Min cannot
reach c from u when Max plays σ. The vertex a is not in the critical set because it
is not in the subtree of v.
We can now explain why Min must use the edge (b, a) in the best response to
σ[v 7→ u] in this example. This happens because σ[v 7→ u] is a winning strategy for
the vertices in the critical set of (v, u). It can be verified that if Min does not choose
an edge that leaves this critical set, then a positive cycle must be formed. Therefore,
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Min must use the edge (b, a) in the best response to secure a finite valuation. The
fact that σ[v 7→ u] is a winning strategy for the critical set of (v, u) is a general
property, which we will now prove. In this proof we will refer to valuations from
multiple games. We use ValσG(v) to give the valuation of the vertex v when σ is
played against br(σ) in the game G. We extend all of our notations in a similar
manner, by placing the game in the subscript.
Proposition 6.7. Let (v, u) be a switchable back edge in the strategy σ and let C =
Criticalσ(v, u). The strategy σ[v 7→ u] is winning for every vertex in G  C.
Proof. Since C is a critical set it must be the case that every vertex in C must be in
the subtree of v according to σ, and this implies that σ[v 7→ u](w) is not the sink,
for every vertex w in C. Note that only paths ending at the sink can have finite
valuations, and that no such paths can exist when σ[v 7→ u] is played in G  C.
Therefore, we must argue that σ[v 7→ u] is an admissible strategy for G  C.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that σ[v 7→ u] is inadmissible. This im-
plies that there is some vertex v and some Min strategy τ for which PlayGC(v, σ[v 7→
u], τ) ends in a negative cycle. We define τ ′ to be a strategy G that follows τ on
the vertices in G  C and makes arbitrary decisions at the other vertices. For every
vertex w in VMin we choose some edge (w, x) and define:
τ ′(w) =

τ(w) if w ∈ C,
x otherwise.
Now consider σ[v 7→ u] played against τ ′ on the game G. Note that neither of the
two strategies choose an edge that leaves the set C and so PlayG(w, σ[v 7→ u], τ ′) =
PlayGC(w, σ[v 7→ u], τ) for every vertex w in C. Therefore, PlayG(w, σ[v 7→ u], τ ′)
must end in a negative cycle in G. This implies that σ[v 7→ u] is inadmissible in G,
which contradicts Theorem 3.6 because (v, u) was a switchable edge in σ. Therefore,
σ[v 7→ u] is an admissible strategy in G  U .
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In our running example, the edge (b, a) allowed Min to leave the critical set
of the edge (v, u). We call these edges escapes. An escape edge from a given set of
vertices is an edge that Min can use to leave that set of vertices.
Definition 6.8 (Escapes). Let W be a set of vertices. We define the escapes from W
as Esc(W ) = {(v, u) ∈ E : v ∈W ∩ VMin and u /∈W}.
The effect of switching a switchable back edge is to force Min to use an escape
edge from the critical set of that back edge.
Proposition 6.9. Let (v, u) be a switchable back edge in the strategy σ. There is
some edge (x, y) in Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)) such that br(σ[v 7→ u])(x) = y.
Proof. Consider a strategy τ for player Min for which there is no edge (x, y) in
Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)) with τ(x) = y. We argue that Valσ[v 7→u],τ (w) =∞ for every ver-
tex w in Criticalσ(v, u). Note that neither σ[v 7→ u] or τ chooses an edge that leaves
Criticalσ(v, u), which implies that Play(w, σ[v 7→ u], τ) does not leave Criticalσ(v, u),
for every vertex w in Criticalσ(v, u). By Proposition 6.7 we have that σ[v 7→ u] is a
winning strategy for G  Criticalσ(v, u), and therefore Valσ[v 7→u],τ (w) =∞ for every
vertex w in Criticalσ(v, u).
We will now construct a strategy for Min which, when played against σ[v 7→
u], guarantees a finite valuation for some vertex in Criticalσ(v, u). Let (x, y) be
some edge in Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)). We define the Min strategy τ , for every vertex w
in VMin as:
τ(w) =

y if w = x,
br(σ)(w) otherwise.
By definition of the critical set we have that y cannot be in the subtree of v, since
otherwise it would also be in Criticalσ(v, u). This implies that Play(y, σ,br(σ)) =
Play(y, σ[v 7→ u], τ), since τ = br(σ) on every vertex that is not in Subtreeσ(v),
and σ = σ[v 7→ u] on every vertex that is not v. From this we can conclude that
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Valσ[v 7→u],τ (y) = Valσ(y) < ∞. By construction of τ we have that Valσ[v 7→u],τ (x) =
Valσ[v 7→u],τ (y) + r(x), and so we also have Valσ[v 7→u],τ (x) <∞.
In summary, we have shown that every Min strategy τ that does not use
an edge in Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)) has the property Valσ[v 7→u],τ (w) = ∞ for every ver-
tex v in Criticalσ(v, u). We have also shown that there is a Min strategy τ which
guarantees Valσ[v 7→u],τ (w) < ∞ for some vertex w in Criticalσ(v, u). From the
properties of a best response we can conclude that Min must use some edge in
Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)).
We will use the property given by Proposition 6.9 to define a better lower
bound for the increase in valuation caused by switching a switchable back edge. We
define:
EscIncσ(v, u) = min{(Valσ(y) + r(x)) −Valσ(x) : (x, y) ∈ Esc(Criticalσ(v, u))}.
The function EscInc captures the smallest increase in valuation that can be caused
when Min chooses an escape from the critical set. In the example given by Figure 6.1
we have EscIncσ(v, u) = 12, which accurately captures the increase of valuation at u
when the edge (v, u) is switched. We can now extend the Increase function to give
a lower bound for every switchable edge (v, u) in the strategy σ.
NewIncσ(v, u) =

Increaseσ(v, u) if (v, u) is a cross edge,
max(Increaseσ(v, u),EscInc(v, u)) otherwise.
We now prove that this lower bound is correct.
Proposition 6.10. Let (v, u) be a switchable edge in the strategy σ. There is a
vertex w such that Valσ[v 7→u](w)−Valσ(w) ≥ NewIncσ(v, u).
Proof. For switchable cross edges this proposition is implied by Proposition 6.4.
For switchable back edges, if Increaseσ(v, u) ≥ EscInc(v, u)) then this proposition is
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again implied by Proposition 6.4. Otherwise, Proposition 6.9 implies that there is
some edge (x, y) in Esc(Criticalσ(v, u)) such that br(σ[v 7→ u])(x) = y. We therefore
have that Valσ[v 7→u](x) = Valσ[v 7→u](y)+r(x), and by Theorem 3.6 combined with the
fact that (v, u) is a switchable edge we have Valσ[v 7→u](y) ≥ Valσ(y). The increase
at x is therefore
Valσ[v 7→u](x)−Valσ(x) = Valσ[v 7→u](y) + r(x)−Valσ(x)
≥ Valσ(y) + r(x)−Valσ(x)
≥ EscInc(v, u).
We close this section by using our new bounds to define a more intelligent
version of the greedy policy. While the original policy picks, for each vertex v
in a strategy σ, the edge (v, u) that maximizes Appealσ(v, u), our version of the
greedy policy will pick the edge that maximizes NewIncσ(v, u). Once again, to
define this formally we require that each vertex v is given a unique index in the
range {1, 2, . . . , |V |}, which will denote as Index(v).
New-Greedyσ(F ) = {(v, u) : there is no edge (v,w) ∈ F with
NewIncσ(v, u) < NewIncσ(v,w) or with (NewIncσ(v, u) = NewIncσ(v,w)
and Index(u) < Index(w))}.
6.2 Remembering Previous Iterations
In the previous section we classified switchable edges into two types: switchable
cross edges and switchable back edges. We also showed how switching policies can
be made aware of these concepts. However, the New-Greedy switching policy still
takes an exponential number of steps on the examples of Friedmann, which implies
that simply being aware of these concepts is not enough.
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With the New-Greedy switching policy, we showed how awareness of switch-
able back edges in a strategy could be exploited when strategy improvement con-
siders that strategy. However, we claim that a switchable back edge can be used to
make better decisions in other iterations. In this section, we introduce a structure
that is called a snare. The dictionary definition1 of the word snare is “something
that serves to entangle the unwary”. This is a particularly apt metaphor for these
structures since, as we will show, a winning strategy for a player must be careful to
avoid being trapped by the snares that are present in that player’s winning set.
A snare is a structure that is contained in a parity or mean-payoff game,
and we will show that every switchable back edge that is encountered by strategy
improvement must correspond to some snare that is embedded in the game. We
propose that strategy improvement algorithms should remember a snare for each
switchable back edge that they encounter, and we show how a switching policy that
has remembered a snare can exploit this knowledge to make better progress.
6.2.1 Snares
In this section we introduce a structure that we call a snare. These structures
are contained in a mean-payoff game, and we claim that the behaviour of strategy
improvement on a given mean-payoff game is strongly related to the snares that
exist in that game. In this section we will introduce these structures, and derive
some of their general properties.
As usual, the definitions that we give in this section could be formalized for
either player. We choose to focus on player Max because we chose Max to be the
strategy improver. A snare for player Max is defined to be a sub-game for which
player Max can guarantee a win from every vertex.
Definition 6.11 (Max Snare). For a game G, a snare is defined to be a tuple (W,χ)
where W ⊆ V and χ : W ∩ VMax → W is a partial strategy for player Max that is
1American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition
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winning for every vertex in the sub-game G  W .
Clearly, this definition is strongly related to the properties of switchable
back edges that we exposed in Section 6.1.2. If (v, u) is a switchable back edge in
a strategy σ, then we define Snareσ(v, u) to be (Criticalσ(v, u), χ), where χ is the
strategy σ[v 7→ u] defined only for the vertices contained in Criticalσ(v, u). For for
every vertex w we have:
χ(w) =

σ[v 7→ u](w) if w ∈ Criticalσ(v, u),
undefined otherwise.
Since Proposition 6.7 implies that χ is a winning strategy for the set Criticalσ(v, u),
we have that Snareσ(v, u) meets the definition of a snare for every switchable back
edge (v, u). For the example shown in Figure 6.1, we have that Snareσ(v, u) =
({v, u, b, d}, {v 7→ u, d 7→ v}).
Although our definition of a snare is closely tied to the properties of switch-
able back edges, we argue that applications of snares are not restricted to strategy
improvement. In the following proposition, we will show that the existence of a
snare in a game places restrictions upon the strategies that are winning for that
game. Recall that in the zero-mean partition problem, a winning strategy for player
Min is one that ensures a non-positive payoff.
Proposition 6.12. Suppose that τ is a winning strategy for Min on a set of ver-
tices S. If (W,χ) is a Max snare where W ⊂ S, then there is some edge (v, u) in
Esc(W ) such that τ(v) = u.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that τ is a winning strategy for S
that does not choose an edge in Esc(W ). Since χ also does not choose an edge that
leaves W , we have that Play(v, χ, τ) never leaves the setW , for every vertex v inW .
Furthermore, since χ is a winning strategy for the sub-game induced by W we have
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M(Play(v, χ, τ)) > 0 for every vertex v in W , which contradicts the fact that τ is a
winning strategy for S.
We will now argue that the conditions given by Proposition 6.12 must be
observed in order for strategy improvement to terminate. We begin by defining a
concept that we call snare consistency. This concept captures the idea that every
winning strategy for Min must choose an escape from every Max snare. We say that
a Max strategy is consistent with a snare if Min’s best response chooses an escape
from that snare.
Definition 6.13 (Snare Consistency). A strategy σ is said to be consistent with the
snare (W,χ) if br(σ) uses some edge in Esc(W ).
We can show that strategy improvement cannot terminate unless the current
strategy is consistent with every snare that exists in the game. This is because every
strategy that is not consistent with some snare must contain a switchable edge.
Proposition 6.14. Let σ be a strategy that is not consistent with a snare (W,χ).
There is a switchable edge (v, u) in σ such that χ(v) = u.
Proof. In order to prove the claim we will construct an alternate game. We define
the game G′ = (V, VMax, VMin, E′, r) where:
E′ = {(v, u) : σ(v) = u or brG(σ)(v) = u or χ(v) = u}.
In other words, we construct a game where Min is forced to play brG(σ)(v) and
Max’s strategy can be constructed using a combination of the edges used by σ
and χ. Since Min is forced to play brG(σ)(v) we have that Val
σ
G(v) = Val
σ
G′(v)
for every vertex v. To decide if an edge is switchable we compare two valuations,
and since the valuation of σ is the same in both G and G′ we have that an edge is
switchable for σ in G if and only if it is switchable for σ in G′. Note also that the
only way σ can be modified in G′ is to choose an edge that is chosen by χ but not
189
by σ. Therefore, to prove our claim it is sufficient to show that σ has a switchable
edge in G′.
We define the strategy:
χ′(v) =

χ(v) if v ∈W,
σ(v) otherwise.
We will argue that χ′ is a better strategy than σ in G′. The definition of a snare
implies that χ is a winning strategy for the sub-game induced byW , and by assump-
tion we have that br(σ) does not use an edge in Esc(W ). We therefore have that
Valχ
′
G′(v) =∞ for every vertex v in W . On the other hand, since we are considering
the positive cycle problem, we know that ValσG′(v) < ∞ for every vertex v in W .
This implies that σ is not an optimal strategy in G′. Theorem 3.6 implies that all
non-optimal strategies must have at least one switchable edge, and the only edges
that can be switchable in G′ are those chosen by χ. Therefore there is some edge
chosen by χ that is switchable for σ in G′ and as we have argued this also means
that the edge is switchable for σ in G.
6.2.2 Using Snares To Guide Strategy Improvement
In the previous sections, we have shown that the switchable back edges that strategy
improvement encounters are related to the snares that exist in the game. In this
section, we will show how snares can be used to guide strategy improvement. We
then propose a new kind of strategy improvement algorithm that remembers the
switchable back edges that it encounters in previous iterations, and then uses those
snares to guide itself in future iterations.
Proposition 6.14 implies that strategy improvement cannot terminate until
the current strategy is consistent with every snare in the game. It therefore seems
natural that strategy improvement algorithms should try to maintain consistency
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with the snares that are known to exist in the game. We will give a method by
which strategy improvement algorithms can achieve this.
We will give an efficient procedure FixSnare that takes a snare, and a strat-
egy σ that is inconsistent with that snare. It will return a strategy σ′ that is
consistent with the snare. Moreover, we will have σ ≺ σ′. This means that applying
FixSnare during strategy improvement does not break the property given in Theo-
rem 3.6, and therefore strategy improvement algorithms that use FixSnare are still
guaranteed to terminate.
To define FixSnare we will use Proposition 6.14. Recall that this proposition
implies that if a strategy σ is inconsistent with a snare (W,χ), then there is some
switchable edge (v, u) in σ such that χ(v) = u. Our procedure will actually be a
strategy improvement switching policy, which will choose to switch an edge that
is chosen by χ but not by the current strategy. As long as the current strategy
remains inconsistent with (W,χ) such an edge is guaranteed to exist, and the policy
terminates once the current strategy is consistent with the snare. This procedure is
shown as Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 FixSnare(σ, (W,χ))
while σ is inconsistent with (W,χ) do
(v,w) := Some edge where χ(v) = w and (v,w) is switchable in σ.
σ := σ[v 7→ u]
end while
return σ
Since FixSnare is implemented as a strategy improvement switching policy
that switches only switchable edges, Theorem 3.6 implies that the strategy that is
produced must be an improved strategy. The following proposition proves that the
procedure FixSnare does indeed produce a strategy that is consistent with the snare
that was given to it.
Proposition 6.15. Let σ be a strategy that is not consistent with a snare (W,χ).
Algorithm 5 will arrive at a strategy σ′ which is consistent with (W,χ) after at
191
most |W | iterations.
Proof. By Proposition 6.14 we know that as long as the current strategy is not
consistent with the snare (W,χ) there must be an edge (v, u) with χ(v) = u that
is switchable in σ. The switching policy will always choose this edge, and will
terminate once the current strategy is consistent with the snare. Therefore in each
iteration the number of vertices upon which σ and χ differ decreases by 1. It follows
that after at most |W | iterations we will have σ(v) = χ(v) for every vertex v in W .
Since χ is a winning strategy for the sub-game induced by W we have that player
Min must choose some edge that leaves W to avoid losing once this strategy has
been reached.
We now define a strategy improvement algorithm that can exploit the prop-
erties of snares. This algorithm will record a snare for every switchable back edge
that it encounters during its execution. In each iteration it can either switch a sub-
set of switchable edges or run the procedure FixSnare on some recorded snare that
the current strategy is inconsistent with. This algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.
We will describe the properties of the function Policy in the next section.
Algorithm 6 NonOblivious(σ)
S := ∅
while σ has a switchable edge do
S := S ∪ {Snareσ(v, u) : (v, u) is a switchable back edge in σ}
σ := Policy(σ, S)
end while
return σ
6.2.3 Switching Policies For Snare Based Strategy Improvement
Traditional strategy improvement algorithms require a switching policy to decide
which edges should be switched in each iteration, and our strategy improvement
algorithm requires a similar function. However in our setting, the switching policy
can decide to either switch a subset of switchable edges, or to run the procedure
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FixSnare for some snare that has been recorded. There are clearly many possible
switching policies for our algorithm, however in this section we will give one specific
method of adapting a switching policy from traditional strategy improvement for
use in our strategy improvement algorithm.
The switching policy for our algorithm will begin with a switching policy α
from traditional strategy improvement, such as the greedy policy, the optimal pol-
icy, or the random-facet policy. Whenever our switching policy chooses not to use
FixSnare, it will choose to switch the edges that would have been switched by α.
Our goal is to only apply FixSnare when doing so would provide a better increase
in valuation than the increase that would be obtained by applying α. The first part
of this section is concerned with formalizing this idea.
The goal of our switching policy will be to obtain the largest possible increase
in valuation in each step. This is a heuristic that has been used by traditional
switching policies, such as the optimal switching policy given by Schewe [Sch08]. It
is not difficult to see that strategy improvement must terminate after at most |V | ·∑
v∈V |w(v)| iterations. This is because the valuation of some vertex must increase
by at least 1 in every iteration. From this we can see that strategy improvement to
performs poorly in the situations where the valuations of the vertices increase slowly.
In order for the algorithm to actually take |V |·∑v∈V |w(v)| iterations, each iteration
of the algorithm must increase the valuation of exactly one vertex by 1. Therefore,
by attempting to ensure a large increase in valuations, we are also attempting to
minimize the number of iterations that the algorithm takes.
Another potential justification for this heuristic is that it attempts to max-
imize the number of strategies that strategy improvement eliminates in each itera-
tion. Each run of strategy improvement produces a sequence of strategies that form
a chain in the ≺ ordering. When strategy improvement chooses a successor to a
strategy σi, it may only move to a strategy σi+1 with the property σi ≺ σi+1. If
there is a strategy χ such that σi ≺ χ, but either χ ≺ σi+1 or χ is incomparable
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with σi+1, then this strategy is eliminated. This is because strategy improvement
can never visit the strategy χ after it has visited the strategy σi+1. It is not difficult
to see that attempting to maximize the increase in valuation also maximizes the
number of strategies eliminated by each step.
We now show how the increase in valuation of a traditional switching policy α
can be determined. Since every iteration of strategy improvement takes polynomial
time, we can simply switch the edges and measure the difference between the current
strategy and the one that would be produced. Let σ be a strategy and let P be the
set of edges that are switchable in σ. The increase of applying α is defined to be:
PolicyIncrease(α, σ) =
∑
v∈V
(Valσ[α(P )](v)−Valσ(v)).
We now give a lower bound on the increase in valuation that an application
of FixSnare produces. Let (W,χ) be a snare and suppose that the current strategy σ
is inconsistent with this snare. Our lower bound is based on the fact that FixSnare
produces a strategy that is consistent with the snare. This means that Min’s best
response is not currently choosing an escape from the snare, but it will be forced to
do so after FixSnare has been applied. It is easy to see that forcing the best response
to use a different edge will cause an increase in valuation, since otherwise the best
response would already be using that edge. Therefore, we can use the increase in
valuation that will be obtained when Min is forced to use and escape. We define:
SnareIncreaseσ(W,χ) = min{(Valσ(y) + r(x)) −Valσ(x) : (x, y) ∈ Esc(W )}.
This expression gives the smallest possible increase in valuation that can happen
when Min is forced to use an edge in Esc(W ). We can prove that applying FixSnare
will cause an increase in valuation of at least this amount.
Proposition 6.16. Let σ be a strategy that is not consistent with a snare (W,χ),
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and let σ′ be the result of FixSnare(σ, (W,χ)). We have:
∑
v∈V
(Valσ
′
(v)−Valσ(v)) ≥ SnareIncreaseσ(W,χ).
Proof. We will prove this proposition by showing that there exists some vertex w
with the property Valσ
′
(w) − Valσ(w) ≥ SnareIncrease(W,χ). Since the procedure
FixSnare switches only switchable edges we have by Theorem 3.6 that Valσ
′
(v) −
Valσ(v) ≥ 0 for every vertex v. Therefore, this is sufficient to prove the proposition
because
∑
v∈V (Val
σ′(v)−Valσ(v)) ≥ Valσ′(w) −Valσ(w).
Proposition 6.15 implies that σ′ is consistent with the snare (W,χ). By
the definition of snare consistency, this implies that br(σ′) must use some edge
(w, x) in Esc(W ). We therefore have that Valσ
′
(w) = Valσ
′
(x) + r(w). Since the
FixSnare procedure switches only switchable edges, we have by Theorem 3.6 that
Valσ
′
(x) ≥ Valσ(x). The increase at w is therefore:
Valσ
′
(w)−Valσ(w) = Valσ′(x) + r(w)−Valσ(w)
≥ Valσ(x) + r(w) −Valσ(w)
≥ SnareIncrease(W,χ).
We now have the tools necessary to construct our proposed augmentation
scheme, which is shown as Algorithm 7. The idea is to compare the increase obtained
by applying α and the increase obtained by applying FixSnare with the best snare
that has been previously recorded, and then to only apply FixSnare when it is
guaranteed to yield a larger increase in valuation.
6.3 Evaluation
Unfortunately, we have not been able to show good worst case upper bounds for the
running time of our augmented switching policies. In this section, we justify their
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Algorithm 7 Augment(α)(σ, S)
(W,χ) := argmax(X,µ)∈S SnareIncrease
σ(X,µ)
if PolicyIncrease(α, σ) > SnareIncreaseσ(W,χ) then
P := {(v, u) : (v, u) is switchable in σ}
σ := σ[α(P )]
else
σ := FixSnare(σ, (W,χ))
end if
return σ
usefulness by explaining how the augmentation helps traditional switching policies
to avoid the pathological behaviour that occurs when they are run on the examples
that have been used to show super-polynomial lower bounds.
6.3.1 Performance on Super Polynomial Time Examples
In this section, we analyse the examples that have been used to show super polyno-
mial time lower bounds for the greedy switching policy, the optimal switching policy,
and the random facet switching policy. The examples for the greedy and optimal
switching policies were given by Friedmann [Fri09], and the examples for the random
facet switching policy were given by Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick [FHZ10]. We
will explain why the lower bounds do not apply to the augmented versions of these
switching policies.
We begin by describing the general themes that appear in both of the families
of examples. These themes also appear in the family of MDPs that we constructed
in Chapter 5. The examples use a structure to represent the state of a bit in a
binary counter. Figure 6.2 shows these structures. Each of these gadgets contains
exactly one state belonging to Min, and the state of the bit can be determined by
the strategy that Min uses in the best response at this state. The bit represented by
the gadget is a 1 for some strategy if and only if the best response to that strategy
chooses the edge that leaves the gadget.
In the example of size n, there are n instances of the appropriate gadget.
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Figure 6.2: Left: the gadget that represents a bit in Friedmann’s examples. Right:
the gadget that represents a bit in the examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick.
The connections between the gadgets are designed to force a switching policy to
take super-polynomial time. Friedmann’s examples force the greedy and optimal
switching policies to mimic a binary counter, which implies an exponential lower
bound. The examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick force the random facet
switching policy to mimic a randomized counter. This is a stochastic model that
bears some similarity to a binary counter, and it is known that a process that
mimics a randomized counter takes an expected sub-exponential number of steps to
terminate.
To see why our augmentation procedure is helpful, it suffices to note that
the bit gadgets are Max snares. It is not difficult to see that in both cases, if Max
does not choose to leave the gadget, then Min is forced to use the edge that leaves
the gadget. Furthermore, when a bit is set to 1, strategy improvement switches
a switchable back edge that corresponds to this snare. Therefore, in the iteration
immediately after a bit has been set to 1 for the first time, our augmentation pro-
cedure will have remembered the snare that corresponds to the gadget representing
that bit.
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We can now give a simple argument that shows that the augmented versions
of the greedy and optimal policies must terminate in polynomial time on Friedmann’s
examples. Suppose that the switching policy sets the i-th bit to 1 for the first time,
and that after doing so it sets every bit that is smaller than i to 0. When the bits
are set to 0, Min’s best response will no longer use the escape edge from the snare,
and it turns out that fixing these snares gives a much larger increase in valuation
than continuing to use the switching policy. Therefore, the augmentation procedure
will spend i − 1 iterations to fix these snares, and it will arrive at a strategy in
which the first i bits are 1. Clearly, this rules out the exponential behaviour, and
the algorithm must terminate after a quadratic number of steps. Similar arguments
can be made to show that the augmented version of random facet cannot take more
than a quadratic number of steps when it is applied to the examples of Friedmann,
Hansen, and Zwick.
6.3.2 Experimental Results
In order to test the effectiveness of the switching policies presented in this chapter
experimentally, we have implemented them. This section gives a report of the results
that we obtained using this implementation.
We began by testing our switching policies on the examples that have been
used to prove super-polynomial lower bounds. Table 6.3.2 shows the number of
iterations taken by the greedy switching policy and the augmented greedy switching
policy on the family of examples given by Friedmann. It can clearly be seen that
the greedy switching policy takes 9 · 2n− 9 iterations to solve the example of size n,
which matches the bound given by Friedmann in his paper. It can also be seen that
the augmented greedy switching policy takes a linear number of steps to solve the
examples. The number of iterations shown for the augmented version is the sum of
the iterations spent by the greedy switching policy, and the iterations used by the
procedure FixSnare.
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n |V | Iterations
Original Augmented
1 15 9 4
2 25 27 10
3 35 63 15
4 45 135 20
5 55 279 25
6 65 567 30
7 75 1143 35
8 85 2295 40
9 95 4599 45
10 105 9207 50
Table 6.1: The number of iterations taken by the greedy and augmented greedy
switching policies on Friedmann’s exponential time examples.
The reason why the augmented version takes a linear number of steps is that
the initial strategy contains one switchable back edge for each of the bit gadgets
in the game. Normally, greedy strategy improvement would not switch these edges
because they do not have the largest appeal. However, these switchable back edges
allow our augmented version to discover the snares that correspond to each of the
bit gadgets. This causes the augmentation procedure to immediately run FixSnare
for each of the bit gadgets in turn, until a strategy that represents a 1 for every bit
is produced. After this, the greedy switching policy spends a few iterations to find
a strategy that is optimal for every other vertex.
Table 6.2 shows the results that were obtained for the random facet switching
policy on the examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick. The random facet switch-
ing policy uses a randomized rule to pick the next edge that should be switched, and
therefore each run will take a different number of steps. We ran both the original
and augmented switching policies nine times for each example size, and the table
shows the smallest, largest, and average number of iterations that the switching
policies took. The averages are rounded to the nearest integer.
It is obvious that the augmented version vastly outperforms the original
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n |V | Original Augmented
Min Max Average Min Max Average
2 79 39 75 66 38 38 38
3 280 295 557 404 153 153 153
4 517 917 1383 1155 292 292 292
5 856 1729 3536 2644 495 495 495
6 1315 4170 7381 5205 774 774 774
7 1912 6374 21930 12299 1141 1141 1141
8 2185 10025 32867 16071 1304 1304 1304
9 2998 15265 85924 30070 1809 1809 1809
10 3331 30505 53560 42251 2010 2010 2010
Table 6.2: The number of iterations taken by random facet and augmented random
facet on the examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick.
switching policy. It is interesting to note that the augmented version of the switching
policy showed no variance in the number of iterations taken. This occurs due to
an effect that is similar to the one we observed in Friedmann’s examples. The
augmentation procedure chooses to use FixSnare in the very first step, and control
is not given to random facet until every bit gadget has been set to 1. There are still
some edges left for random facet to switch at this point, however the order in which
these edges are switched does not affect the running time of the switching policy.
Therefore, the randomized choice made by random facet does not lead to a variance
in the running time.
In addition to analysing the performance of our augmentation procedure on
the super-polynomial time examples, we are also interested in the behaviour of this
algorithm on more realistic inputs. Our implementation is capable of processing
examples from the PGSolver collection [FL10], and the next examples are taken
from that library. Parity games can be used as an algorithmic back end to µ-
calculus model checking. PGSolver includes a family of examples that correspond
to verification that an elevator system is fair. A fair elevator system is one that
always eventually arrives at a floor from which a request has been made. PGSolver
200
n |V | Iterations
Original Augmented
FIFO
1 37 3 3
2 145 5 5
3 565 8 8
4 2689 13 13
5 15685 18 18
6 108337 25 25
LIFO
1 37 3 3
2 145 2 2
3 589 2 2
4 2833 2 2
5 16357 2 2
6 111457 2 2
Table 6.3: The number of iterations taken by the greedy and augmented greedy
switching policies on the elevator verification examples.
provides examples that correspond to two possible elevator systems: one that uses
a FIFO queue to store requests, and one that uses a LIFO queue. Clearly, the
system that uses a FIFO queue will satisfy the property, and the system that uses
a LIFO queue will not. The results of applying the greedy switching policy and the
augmented greedy switching policy are shown in Table 6.3.
It can clearly be seen that the augmented version of the switching policy
behaves in the same way as the original. The reason for this is that the augmented
version never chooses to run FixSnare, because using the original switching policy
gives a larger increase in valuation. One way of explaining this is that greedy
strategy improvement is too fast on typical examples for the augmentation to make
a difference. Since greedy strategy improvement takes only a handful of iterations
to find an optimal strategy, the algorithm cannot find a significant number snares
to run FixSnare on.
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6.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have studied switching policies for strategy improvement. For
the strategy improvement algorithm that we have studied, we have shown that
switchable edges can be classified into two distinct types. In doing so, we exposed a
weakness of existing switching policies, because they do not take this classification
into account. Moreover, we showed how switching policies can use this knowledge in
future iterations by remembering snares, and we developed a snare based strategy
improvement algorithm.
We developed an augmentation scheme, that allows oblivious switching poli-
cies to take advantage of snares, and we showed that the augmented versions of
the greedy policy and the random facet policy terminate quickly on their super-
polynomial time examples. In doing so, we demonstrated that snares are the key
weakness that these examples exploit in order to force exponential time behaviour
upon these switching policies. This is because, when the policies are modified so
that they are aware of these structures, they no longer behave poorly.
There are a wide variety of questions that are raised by this work. Firstly,
we have the structure of snares in parity and mean-payoff games. Proposition 6.12
implies that every optimal strategy for one of these games must use an escape from
every snare that exists in the game. We therefore propose that a thorough and
complete understanding of how snares arise in a game would be useful in order to
devise a polynomial time algorithm that computes optimal strategies.
It is not currently clear how the snares in a game affect the difficulty of solving
that game. It is not difficult, for example, to construct a game in which there an
exponential number of Max snares: in a game in which every reward is positive
there will be a snare for every connected subset of vertices. However, computing the
zero-mean partition in a game where every reward is positive is obviously trivial.
Clearly, the first challenge is to give a clear formulation of how the structure of the
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snares in a given game affects the difficulty of solving it.
In our attempts to construct intelligent non-oblivious strategy improvement
algorithms we have continually had problems with examples in which Max and Min
snares overlap. By this we mean that the set of vertices that define the sub-games
of the snares have a non empty intersection. We therefore think that studying how
complex the overlapping of snares can be in a game may lead to further insight.
There are reasons to believe that these overlappings cannot be totally arbitrary,
since they arise from the structure of the game graph and the rewards assigned to
the vertices.
We have presented a switching policy that passively records the snares that
are discovered by a traditional switching policy, and then uses those snares when
doing so is guaranteed to lead to a larger increase in valuation than using a given
oblivious switching policy. While we have shown that this approach can clearly
outperform traditional strategy improvement in some cases, it does not appear to
immediately lead to a proof of polynomial time termination. It would be interesting
to find an exponential time example for the augmented versions of the greedy policy
or of the optimal policy. This may be significantly more difficult since it is no longer
possible to trick strategy improvement into making slow progress by forcing it to
repeatedly consider a small number of snares, which is the technique used by the
examples of Friedman, and the examples of Friedmann, Hansen, and Zwick.
There is no inherent reason why strategy improvement algorithms should
be obsessed with trying to increase valuations as much as possible in each itera-
tion. Friedmann’s exponential time example for the optimal switching policy demon-
strates that doing so in no way guarantees that the algorithm will always make good
progress. Our work uncovers an alternate objective that strategy improvement algo-
rithms can use to measure their progress. Strategy improvement algorithms could
actively try to discover the snares that exist in the game, or they could try and
maintain consistency with as many snares as possible, for example. We believe that
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there is much scope for intelligent snare based switching policies.
We have had some limited success in designing intelligent snare based strat-
egy improvement algorithms for parity games. We have developed a switching policy
which, when given a list of known snares in the game, either solves the game or finds
a snare that is not in the list of known snares. This gives the rather weak result of
a strategy improvement algorithm whose running time is polynomial in |V | and k,
where k is the number of Max snares that exist in the game. This is clearly unsat-
isfactory since we have already argued that k could be exponential in the number
of vertices. However, this is one example of how snares can be applied to obtain
new bounds for strategy improvement. As an aside, the techniques that we used to
obtain this algorithm do not generalize to mean-payoff games. Finding a way to ac-
complish this task for mean-payoff games is an obvious starting point for designing
intelligent snare based algorithms for this type of game.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have studied strategy iteration algorithms for infinite games and
for Markov decision processes. In Chapter 4, we studied Lemke’s algorithm and the
Cottle-Dantzig algorithm, and showed how they behave when the input is an LCP
that is derived from an infinite game. We also showed a family of examples upon
which these algorithms take exponential time.
It is important to note that the lower bounds for Lemke’s algorithm only hold
for a specific choice of covering vector, and the lower bounds for the Cottle-Dantzig
algorithm only hold for a specific ordering over distinguished vertices. We do not
currently have a good understanding of how these parameters affect the running time
of their respective algorithms. It is possible that the choice of these parameters could
be as important as the choice of switching policy in strategy improvement. If this
were the case, then perhaps our lower bounds could be seen in a similar light to the
lower bounds given by Melekopoglou and Condon [MC94]: although they showed
an exponential lower bound for a simple switching policy, we have seen that there
is still potential for a switching policy that performs well.
In Chapter 5 we showed that Friedmann’s exponential upper bounds can
be extended to cover greedy strategy improvement for Markov decision processes.
An important part of this result was showing how the snares used by Friedmann’s
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examples could be simulated using randomness. Currently, our concept of a snare
only applies to mean-payoff games and parity games. It would be interesting to see
if these concepts could be generalised to produce non-oblivious strategy improve-
ment algorithms for Markov decision processes. Since Markov decision processes
are already known to be solvable in polynomial time, perhaps this model would
provide an easier starting point for proving good upper bounds on the running time
of non-oblivious strategy improvement switching policies.
In Chapter 6 we laid the foundations of non-oblivious strategy improvement,
and we provided a simple way of constructing a non-oblivious strategy improvement
policy. Although we showed that our switching policies perform well in certain
circumstances, we do not think that it will be easy to prove good upper bounds
on the running time of these switching policies. Instead, we propose that research
should be focused on the design of more advanced non-oblivious switching policies.
In order to construct these, we will require a detailed understanding of snares, and
how they arise in games. All of the concepts that we have introduced in this chapter
can also be applied to the discrete strategy improvement algorithm for parity games
given by Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski [VJ00], and we speculate that their algorithm may
provide a better basis for the construction of non-oblivious switching policies. This
is because their algorithm uses a discrete valuation, and it is likely to be easier to
prove upper bounds using this valuation. Indeed, the non-oblivious switching policy
for parity games that we mentioned in Section 6.4 makes use of a discrete valuation
that was inspired by Vo¨ge and Jurdzin´ski’s valuation.
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